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ABSTRACT

The alternative M arxist approach to literary criticism in the present
study consists of three "vocal" modes of interpretation: the public voice, the
private voice, and the homeless voice of the self. The public voice represents
authorial visions of the ideological real projected by dominant ideology th at
covers up the "objective" real, while the private voice corresponds to the
authorial conscious or unconscious insertion into radical ideology th a t turns
the "objective" real into the ideological real. However, the homeless voice of
the self obliterates any ties with history and authorial ideology. A
personification of the M arxist "particular interest" of the self, the homeless
voice echoes in the open space of the text and reaches for the distant real
shaped by the reader’s interpretive paradigms inside or outside the
constraints of the institutional discourse. Incorporating both traditional and
poststructuralist M arxist insights, the current M arxist framework departs
from the traditional conviction of a neutral reality and from the postmodern
concept of the totalizing ideology. It acknowledges the role of the dialectical
real th a t is simultaneously "objective" (edited out by dominant ideology) and
"subjective" (picked up by radical ideology to be molded as the ideological
real). The alternative M arxist approach also attaches relative importance to
authorial intention, the text, and reader response in an interpretive activity
and values both historical studies and theoretical elucidations because the

in terp lay betw een th e two ap p aren tly contradictory modes of criticism m ay
reinforce an d supplem ent each other in th e ir shared territo ry of th e study of
th e priv ate voice o f the se lf in th e text, although th e public voice is more
oriented tow ards history an d th e hom eless voice tow ards theory. T he different
voices o f th e self a re exemplified in a study of D aniel Defoe’s Robinson
Crusoe. C aptain Singleton. Moll F lan d ers, an d Roxana, which profits from
both m odem critical theory (deterritorialization, Schlegelian irony, and
fem inist theory) an d historical insights into Defoe’s fiction.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

There h as been a tom ato/tom ahto th in g going in th e field of eighteenthcentury studies: a debate over trad itio n versus theory or literatu re versus
"m etaliterature." The defense of the m ainstream tradition rose to its climax
a t the April 1987 conference a t Georgetown, the addresses of which were
published in a book entitled Theory and T radition in E ighteenth-C entury
Studies in 1990. The authors in th is conference collection, led by Donald
Greene, have launched attacks on m odem critical theory, th e "French clerks,"
and especially Joel W einsheim er and other critics for th eir rem arks on the
tendency of being "relatively unresponsive to new critical system s and literary
theories" and on barely having "something new to say" in eighteenth-century
studies.1 While one side of the argum ent encourages new theoretical
developments and deplores traditional historical studies, the other side tu rn s
its back on the workings of theory in th e critical enterprise and values the
tap estry of historical weavings th a t contributes to our understanding of the
au th o r’s a rtistry in a literary work. A t one extrem e, literary criticism may be
understood as "tomato" because th e tradition of historical studies is, as
G reene p u ts it, w h at we grew up with. A t th e other extrem e, "tomahto" may
be th e rig h t term because W einsheimer, as th e founding editor of The
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E ighteenth Century: Theory and Interpretation, is a leader of th e radical new
generation who h as close ties w ith the thoughts of the French and other
E uropean chefs an d is determ ined to question the value of the m ain recipe in
the kitchen. They both represent w h at they stan d for, and they are both
involved in th e political power struggle for a m ainstream representation up
front in th e critical arena: one tries to p u sh theory forward to th e cutting
edge while the other hangs on to tradition and preserves it in th e front range.
B asking in the wisdom and insight of both sides, students of literatu re are
easily puzzled by th e contradictory n atu re of the debate. B u t they are faced
w ith a Foucauldian choice th a t they have to m ake between "filiation" w ith the
"natural" critical trad itio n an d "affiliation" w ith the in stitu tio n al practices
th a t have gained grounds in some other fields. Are we bound to m ake such
a choice? I t does n o t have to be th is way.
The present study aim s to harm onize the conflict between history and
theory an d incorporates both historical and theoretical insights into a reading
of D aniel Defoe’s fiction. Based on an alternative M arxist approach, this
project absorbs elem ents of both traditional (classical and cultural) M arxism
and postm odern or p o ststru ctu ralist M arxism. I t proposes a fram ew ork of a
split self th a t possesses th ree kinds of voices: the public voice, th e private
voice, and th e homeless voice; w ithin th is framework, both history and theory
occupy a place, although th e ir contradictory n atu re is n o t effaced. The public
voice of the self, which is related to th e author’s public im age defined by

dom inant ideology, can be the sole interpretive domain in which historical
studies play a leading role in m aking a connection between the author’s aims
in the tex t and history as reflected by dom inant ideology or th e conventional
ideas of a certain historical period. History and theory m ay reinforce or
supplem ent each other when it comes to a study of the private voice of the
self, which promotes and advances radical ideology in struggle w ith dom inant
ideology. A repudiation of th e established historical principles, the private
voice of th e self m akes it possible for the critic to approach the literary text
from both a historical and a theoretical point of view or to rely on one to
m ake sense of the other (which is w hat I attem p t for the m ost p a rt in the la st
three chapters on Defoe’s Action). However, the "homeless" voice of the self,
a term borrowed from Georg Lukacs, can m ake sense only by applying theory
to th e text, for it is characterized as a dissonance from both history and
ideology. In short, both history and theory ought to be valued in literary
criticism because a work of a r t m ay unfold th e split self w ith those three
voices.
T h at th e present study proposes an alternative M arxist approach is
obvious in th e origin of the three voices. Both th e public and private voices
are derived from the M arxist notions of ideology, the traditional M arxist
notion about ideology th a t represents the dom inant class’s in terest as the
common in terest to cover up the real or the postmodern M arxist concept th a t
rejects such a real and constitutes the real as ideological. B ut the homeless

voice departs from history and ideology and therefore goes beyond both
traditional and poststructuralist Marxism. Although the term "homeless" is
borrowed from Lukacs’s notion of the "transcendental homelessness of the
novel," the homeless voice differs from such a Lukacsian notion. For Lukacs,
the home or origin of ancient artistic forms is "the transcendental structure
of the form-giving subject," a cosmic organic world th a t finds harm ony and
u nity in the created a rt forms. The m odem novel, then, is "an expression of
th is transcendental homelessness," where the organic equilibrium between
th e form-giving subject and the artistic forms is destroyed or "is never again
concentrated in the forms themselves." T h at is, the fragm ented m odem world
has replaced the ancient organic harm onious cosmic world, and th is m odem
fragm entedness reflected in the novel h as destroyed the "home" in th e a rt
form.2 Here, the novel’s "homelessness" is historically determ ined by the
fragm ented m odem world. The "homeless" voice of the self in the alternative
M arxist approach, however, is freed from such a traditional M arxist
argum ent and from the postmodern M arxist control of th e institutional
discourse as well, for the homeless voice, which represents a d istan t real, is
cut off from ideology and history and moves outside social relations into a
"horizon of future aesthetic experience" (to use H ans Robert Ja u ss’s term )
w ith the reader’s interpretive modes th a t may or m ay not be influenced by
th e postm odern M arxist "interpretive community."
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W hat really th reaten s the dom inant place of historical studies in
literary criticism are anti-historical propositions in the new theoretical
developments. According to postmodern theories, th e literary text h as its own
force and does not im itate or reflect external realities. H istory for the
poststructuralists is not a neutral objective reality independent of the text.
As H ayden W hite points out,
th e difficulty w ith the notion of a tru th of p a st experience is th a t
it can no longer be experienced, and th is throw s a specifically
historical knowledge open to the charge th a t it is a construction
as m uch of imagination as of thought...[which] p u ts historical
discourse on the same level as any rhetorical performance and
consigns it to the statu s of a textualization n eith er more or less
authoritative th a n ‘literatu re’ itself can lay claim to."3
Here, W hite has turned history as a neu tral tru th of the p ast experience into
ju s t another form of discourse on the sam e level as the literary text; the
Active and the real are all the im aginative workings of th e hum an mind, and
there is no such thing as an authoritative reality th a t dictates w h at is real
and w hat is fictive. H istory in the present study, however, is not a textual
construction; nor is it defined as an objective and independent real against
which literatu re is m easured and studied. R ather, the historical real is
always a hybrid of the traditional M arxist objective real, the postmodern
M arxist ideological real, and the alternative M arxist dialectical real. The
ideological real is most often w hat we conceive in the established accounts of
historical events, shaped by dom inant ideology and tradition; the literary text
can be an expression of this external condition th a t is projected as the real.

6

Digging deep down into the historical phenomena th a t are the projected real
and beneath the established descriptions of them , we disclose the objective
real th a t is covered up by dom inant ideology or ignored by tradition-oriented
scholars. B ut according to the alternative M arxist approach, the statu s of this
objective real is unstable, for although it is blocked out by th e interference of
dom inant ideology and rem ains outside the boundaries of the illusive real
th a t dom inant ideology aims to project, this objective real will be picked up
by another ideology and become a projected real as well. Therefore, the
objective real is always dialectical in the sense th a t it bears w ithin itself a
tendency of being subjectified and advanced as an ideological real by radical
ideology. So besides the acknowledgement of the postmodern M arxist real
shaped by ideology, the alternative M arxist approach also sym pathizes with
the traditional M arxist objective real and fuses the two into a dialectical real
th a t is both objective and ideological, objective in contrast to the illusive real
molded by dom inant ideology b u t ideological in relation to an em ergent
ideology. My argum ent does not am ount to saying th a t everything is
ideological, which is the same conviction as the postm odern M arxists. W hat
it boils down to, in term s of the difference of the alternative M arxist approach
from both the traditional and the postmodern, is th a t the alternative
approach trea ts th e ideological blocked-out or filtered-out seriously. The
traditional M arxists regard the ideological filtered-out as th e objective real
th a t somehow th reaten s the social formation of the dom inant class and is
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determ ined by the m aterial existence of the subjugated class, while the
postmodern M arxists reject such an ideological cast-off. For them , ideology
has a totalizing power and does not cast off any p art of the real outside its
grips; ideology constitutes the real. But for the alternative M arxist approach,
ideology is always selective, and this alternative framework acknowledges
ideological cast-offs, as in the distant real in its component of the homeless
voice, which are neither historically determined nor ideologically constituted.
These various forms of the distant real are cast off in various historical
stages, first by dom inant ideology and then by emergent ideology to shape its
own real after picking it up as the objective real filtered out by dominant
ideology, and these forms of the distant real will be in contact with only the
future reader’s interpretive paradigms influenced by or freed from the
constraints of the institutional discourse.
The self has long been considered split from itself. For Jacques Lacan,
the hum an being w ith its genetic label of gender is split first a t the moment
of birth from a primordial androgynous being. Lacan calls it the first "lack."
The self is further divided from itself (the second "lack") as the child
experiences the "mirror stage" or the Imaginary, where for the first time it
identifies w ith an other (the mother or nurse), and passes into the symbolic
realm of language acquisition (the Symbolic). By acquiring the symbolic
system of language, the child is perm anently split from the other h alf of itself
and performs its roles in accord with cultural codes as dictated by the

8
linguistic sign.4 M ore im p o rta n t are W ayne C. Booth’s an d Georges P oulet’s
notions of th e sp lit self a s th e au th o r an d th e read er respectively. U nlike
L acan ’s psychoanalytical model, B ooth’s a n d P o u let’s models have direct
bearin g on discussions ab o u t th e au th o r/rea d er relationship. Booth’s notion
of th e split au th o r deals w ith th e actu al a u th o r an d th e au th o ria l "second
se lf' in th e text. In th is model of th e au th o rial split self, th e au th o r h as
au th o rity over th e te x t an d over th e created re a d e r’s in te rp retatio n of th e te x t
in te rm s of reconstructing th e a u th o r’s aim or in te n tio n in it. In th e case of
th e sp lit self in P oulet’s read er-o rien ted model, however, th e a u th o r is
dropped from th e dom ain of in te rp retatio n , for th e "thinking I" or th e
"think in g subject" th a t is divided from th e re a d e r asse rts to be th e subject
a n d a u th o rity of th e ideas a n d all th e o th er "m ental entities" in th e text.5
W ithin th e se two models, th e re exists a n im passable g u lf betw een th e au th o r
an d th e re a d e r in a n in te rp retiv e activity. A lthough W olfgang Iser’s model
bridges th e gap betw een th e au th o r an d th e read er, J a u s s ’s is th e closest to
th e a ltern ativ e M arx ist approach to lite ra ry criticism in th e p re se n t study.
Ise r stresses th e in teractio n betw een th e te x t an d th e re a d e r th rough the
a u th o r’s a rtistic guidelines th a t stim u late th e re a d e r’s im agination an d
im m ediate p articip atio n in th e text. J a u s s also read s th e lite ra ry te x t as th e
jo in t w ork o f th e a u th o r an d th e re a d e r in "continuing productivity." B u t m ore
im po rtan tly , J a u s s ’s in sig h t into th e aesth etic distance betw een a w ork of a r t
a n d its reception an d in to th e w ork’s "horizon of fu tu re aesth etic experience"
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characterized by a belated critical reception approxim ates th e d ista n t real in
th e altern ativ e M arxist critical approach.6The altern ativ e approach, however,
does n o t exactly follow J a u s s b u t deals w ith th e "horizon of fu tu re aesthetic
experience" on th e basis of M arx’s notion of "the p artic u lar interest" of the
individual, w hich m atches u p w ith th e fu tu re read e r’s in terp retiv e paradigm s
influenced by or freed from th e control of th e postm odern M arxist
"interpretive community." T he altern ativ e approach also incorporates J a u s s ’s
trad itio n al M arxist views of historical determ inism into th e public voice of the
auth o rial se lf and differentiates it from th e hom eless voice th a t dism antles
relatio n s w ith history an d authorial ideology. W hile assigning value to both
au th o rial in ten tio n in th e public voice of th e self an d th e read er’s interpretive
strateg ies in th e hom eless voice, the altern ativ e M arxist approach also
em phasizes th e in terp lay betw een th e au th o r and th e read er in th e private
voice of th e self, w here authorial ideology is n o t necessarily in ten tio nal b u t
a jo in t production by the au th o r and th e reader. T hus, th e split self in the
p rese n t stu d y h a s th ree forms. The self th a t articu lates a public voice is the
auth o rial public im age defined by dom inant ideology, an d th e self th a t
pronounces a p riv ate voice is th e au th o r’s in ten tio n al or unintentional
insertio n in to radical ideology. B u t th e hom eless voice of th e self is created
by th e read e r as a tex tu al self th a t is alien to th e author. Such a study of the
th re e kinds of voices of th e split self d ep arts from Booth’s and P oulet’s
notions of th e split self an d J a u s s ’s aesthetics of reception after incorporating

10

them into th e alternative M arxist framework, and it recognizes the relative
im portance of the role of th e author, of the reader, and th e interaction
betw een th e two.
The model of the split self w ith the public, private, and homeless voices
is established in C hapter 2, which offers a critique of both traditional and
po ststru ctu ralist M arxism and advances an alternative M arxist approach to
literary criticism th a t consists of an analysis of those th ree voices. C hapters
3, 4, and 5 exemplify th is model in Defoe’s fiction w ith a n em phasis on the
private an d homeless voices of the self, an d th e public voice is undertaken
only in contrast. C hapter 3 exam ines th e private voice as shown in Deleuzian
lines of flight or deterritorialization. In contrast to Robinson Crusoe’s
reterritorialization to au th o rity (the public voice of th e self) after
deterritorializing th e religious boundaries, both C aptain Singleton and
Roxana deterritorialize w ithout coming to term s w ith authority. The private
voice in eith er of th e novels echoes through to th e end. In C hapter 4, Defoe’s
private voice is illu strated by Schlegelian irony in Moll’s chaotic world of
becoming th a t disrupts the sense of a universal order and the certainty of
authorial intention. C hapter 5 indicates a reversal of L acan’s model of the self
th a t progresses from the prim ordial androgynous sta te through th e Im aginary
to th e Symbolic. The Symbolic system serves to p erp etu ate th e hum an
subject’s position in society, which corresponds to Defoe’s public voice about
Roxana’s gender roles as perceived through th e "male gaze." Roxana then
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reverses h er role as a dependent wom an in the m ale-dom inated society in the
second stage of th e Im aginary and becomes a whore who articulates a private
voice and poses a th re a t to the m ale dominance. Finally, w ith a homeless
voice, Defoe th ru sts Roxana back to the prim ordial androgynous state and
deconstructs h e r distinctive cultural gender roles tow ards the end of the
novel.

CHAPTER 2

VOICES OF THE SPLIT SELF: AN ALTERNATIVE
MARXIST APPROACH TO LITERARY CRITICISM

The self in the present study is defined as a split self, a self th a t
articulates different voices, a self th a t borders on the domains of the author,
the text, and th e reader, and the present approach propels a dynamic motion
of these relationships in literary

criticism.

Such a

study of the

author/text/reader dynamism builds on a notion of the split self derived from
various models already developed by Wayne C. Booth, Georges Poulet, and
H ans Robert Jau ss. Inherent gaps between the author and the reader are
somehow bridged through the space of the literary tex t in each of those
models, b u t those critics stress either authorial intention, th e authority of the
reader, or historical determ inism . The present study intends to resolve the
author/text/reader/ dilemma and harmonize the confrontation between theory
and history. By incorporating authorial dom inant ideology into the sphere of
the public voice of the self portrayed in th e text and by studying th e text’s
departure from dom inant ideology as the private voice and th e textual open
space void of authorial ideology and history as the "homeless" voice of the
self, th e following pages aim to lay a theoretical foundation for the next three
chapters dealing w ith Defoe’s different voices in his fictional narratives.
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The author, for Booth, is a split self who creates an "official scribe" or
"second self.” The created "official versions" of the author play a different role
or establish "a different air" depending on the needs of different works.
Through such roles of "the implied author," the reader can trace intentions
and value system s back to the biographical author. The created authorial
second selves in Fielding’s Joseph Andrews. Tom Jones, and Amelia, for
instance, Booth tells us, all "value benevolence and generosity; all of them
deplore self-seeking brutality." And through Shakespeare’s plays, the reader
knows w hat Shakespeare loved and hated, for "it is hard to see how he could
have w ritten his plays a t all if he had refused to take a strong line on a t least
one or two of the seven deadly sins." The "second self' helps convey the text’s
m eaning to another "second self," th e created reader. Booth argues th a t "the
m ost successful reading is one in which the created selves, author and reader,
can find complete agreement."7 In Booth’s framework, biographical authors
play a key role in the reading process: they create the implied author and the
implied reader; th eir artistic m erit lies in th eir ability to bring the two in
unison and in sharing the authorial values and intentions. The author
communes w ith th e reader bu t from one "second self’ to another. The "second
self’ of a reader such as Booth is totally passive as it is created by the author
and divided from the real historical Booth in a particular reading context. In
other words, there is a strong bond between the author and the text, and the
reader vanishes from the picture.

14
As the other extreme goes, the biographical author disappears from the
text, and w hat m atters, Poulet argues, is the "thinking subject" or "thinking
I" of the reader. Here, the duality of the reader rem ains valid, for there is
still a distinction between the "thinking subject" Poulet and the historical
theorist Poulet. "Whenever I read," Poulet writes, "I m entally pronounce an
I, and yet the I which I pronounce is not myself." It is not the author who
creates and separates the "second self' from th e reader; it is language th a t
surrounds the reader w ith "unreality" and spurs the reader to split a
"thinking I" th a t is draw n into the God-like fictional world. I t is a game the
"thinking I" and language play on the author, who is isolated from the text.
Although the tex t embodies the author's ideas, the "thinking I" or the second
self of the reader breaks the ties of the ideas from th e ir source or from the
author’s authority. The "thinking I" celebrates the lost authorship of the text
because as long as the "thinking I" en tertain s the "mental entities" such as
language or the ideas in the text, Poulet writes, it asserts itself as the subject
of those ideas. Therefore, th e text "is there w ithin me, not to send me back,
outside itself, to its author, nor to his other writings." The author, the created
authorial second selves in one text or the other texts, and the biography of
th e author are all a t the mercy of the "thinking I" of the reader in a reading
process. The text exists in the reader, and the "thinking I" enjoys full
supremacy.8
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The celebration of the author authority or the reader authority
handicaps the author/text/reader relationships in literary criticism. Such
maimed relationships are remedied in Jau ss’s "aesthetics of reception," where
Ja u ss emphasizes the first historical reader’s response to the literary text in
an interacted production of the author’s artistic greatness. "History of
literature," Ja u ss argues, "is a process of aesthetic reception and production
th a t takes place in the realization of literary texts on the p a rt of the receptive
reader, the reflective critic, and the author in his continuing productivity."
Both the author and the reader play an im portant role in determ ining the
aesthetic value of a literary text, m easured by the reader’s "horizons of
expectations," the distance, or "the disparity between the given horizon of
expectations and the appearance of a new work." The greater th e distance is,
the more aesthetic the work may be. The greatest distance of all involves "a
‘change of horizons’ through negation of fam iliar experiences or through
raising newly articulated experiences to the level of consciousness." So on a
scale from "culinary" or entertainm ent a rt to the a rt of "horizonal change," a
literary work "satisfies, surpasses, disappoints, or refutes the expectations of
its first audience." This "aesthetic distance" is connected to reception and
"objectified historically along the spectrum of the audience’s reactions and
criticism’s judgment."9
However, Jau ss’s theory turns the author/text/reader relationship into
a stagnant, historically determined mode and reveals a lim ited view of
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traditional M arxist aesthetics. His model is restricted to historical
determinism and to conceiving the formal "horizonal change" as a product of
history. First, Jauss’s emphasis of the continuing author/reader joint
production of the literary text is mainly frozen a t the historical moment when
the work first makes its appearance. If a literary work destroys the familiar
and conventional "horizon of expectations," it is only determined by history
and works on the domain of "raising newly articulated experiences to the
level of consciousness." The "newly articulated" or radical experiences bear
conflicting interests with the established or familiar "expectations" and are
bound to find their expression or representation in a work of art. When this
happens, according to Jauss, the first reader and critic alike will be so
stunned by the radical elements in a work promising "horizonal change" th a t
it achieves "gradual or belated understanding" in its reception. Literary
criticism of later generations ought to trace the reactions by the first reader
to assess literary value. The assumption is this: a literary work is a product
of history, a product of its social, ideological conditions. A great work of art
transcends established or dominant ideologies and interacts with radical ones
th a t have been "newly articulated" prior to the historical moment of the
work’s appearance. Second, Jau ss’s historical determinism also finds
expression in its implicit cause/effect relationship between historical
conditions and artistic form. His ideal example of "horizonal change" is
Cervantes’ Don Quixote (1605). In it, the reader’s familiar "horizon of
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expectations" is evoked, th e "horizon" formed by a "convention of genre, style,
or form." As C ervantes arouses th e read er’s "horizon of expectations" in the
form of th e fam iliar m edieval tales of chivalry, th e adventure of his knight
destroys such a "horizon" an d becomes a parody of th e conventional form. In
other words, th e m edieval a rtistic form of chivalry no longer keeps pace w ith
th e early m odem life, and th e changed social reality dem ands a parody and
negation of th e out-of-rhythm form.
Among th e th ree term s in th e au th o r/tex t/read er relationship, Booth
isolates th e read e r an d P oulet isolates th e au th o r from th e other two term s.
J a u s s ’s model includes one lay er of th e public voice of th e self in relation to
th e fam iliar "horizons of expectations" an d th e other lay er of th e p riv ate voice
o f th e self in breaking w ith th e fam iliar and embodies a "horizonal change"
w hich is historically determ ined. My fram ew ork of th e sp lit self incorporates
all of th ese models b u t goes beyond J a u s s ’s paradigm of historical
determ inism an d deals w ith th e hom eless voice of th e self th a t is not
historically determ ined or ideologically constituted. The self in th e p resent
study, in its vocal division am ong th e public voice, th e p riv ate voice, and the
hom eless voice of th e self, provokes a n in terp lay am ong th e au th o r, th e text,
a n d th e re a d e r an d proposes a n altern ativ e M arxist approach to literary
criticism . F irst, the public voice of the self p erta in s to th e au th o r’s insertion
into th e dom inant ideology or adherence to th e conventional "horizons of
expectations." Second, th e private voice of th e self prom otes radical ideology
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th a t is subm erged by dom inant ideology and needs to be raised to th e level
of consciousness an d shape a n ideological real out of it. U n d er these
circum stances, th e read er’s role to dig o u t historical facts an d m ake
connections betw een history and fiction serves to m ake sense of th e literary
text. The hom eless voice of th e self, however, tran scen d s au th o rial ideology
an d in ten tio n an d in itiates a w hispered conversation w ith th e future
in terp retiv e paradigm s. Such a distance betw een th e au th o r’s ideology and
th e read er’s in terp retatio n s occupies a space in th e lite ra ry text, an d the
connection betw een th e two is m ade possible w ith th e application of critical
theory. W ithin such a fram ew ork of th e self, history an d theory, in th e first
place, have d istin ct functions. H istorical studies, on th e one h an d , m ake sense
of th e te x t in term s of the au th o r’s ideology and th e socio-historical m ilieu
th a t produces ideology, e.g. th e public voice of th e self. Theory, on th e other
h and, abandons history and historical determ inism an d trie s to m ake sense
of th e te x t solely in theoretical term s, e.g. th e hom eless voice of th e self th a t
transcen d s th e au th o r’s ideology and anticipates th e read e r’s interpretive
strategies. In th e second place, despite th e ir contradictions, history and
theory also occupy a n overlapping are a th a t covers p a rt of both history and
theoiy, e.g. th e p riv ate voice th a t d ep arts from th e fam iliar "horizons of
expectations" b u t ta p s into th e radical "horizons" of ch an g e-b o th h istory and
theory can, in such cases, arrive a t th e sam e conclusions about th e text, as
in th e following chapters on deterritorialization, th e chaotic world of
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becoming, and th e reversal of gender roles in Defoe’s fiction. So the
fram ew ork of th e split self am ong th e public, the private, and the homeless
can be reduced to a simple model th a t involves history and theory and the
au th o r and the read er in relation to th e text: the public voice (authorial
dom inant ideology and history), th e private voice (authorial radical ideology
and shared territo ry of history and theory), and the homeless voice (flight out
of authorial ideology and history into th e reader’s interpretive paradigm s).
Critical theory reinforces historical studies ju s t as historical studies reinforce
critical theory in th a t shared territory of literary criticism. L iterary criticism,
it can be argued w ithin the p resen t model, ought to recognize and value all
of th e th ree "vocal" spheres of interpretation, for a g reat work of a r t can
reveal a split self on all th e three levels of its voices.
The following pages will be divided into two sections: (1) a critique of
traditio n al an d p o ststru ctu ralist M arxism and (2) th e voices of th e self: the
public voice, th e private voice, and the homeless voice. The first section deals
w ith th e lim ited view of M arxism, in which both traditional M arxism
(classical and cultural) in its historical determ inism and p o ststru cturalist
M arxism in its ideological and institutional approaches are examined and
revised. The second section first evaluates the public voice in relation to th e
notions of history and the ruling class ideology in traditional M arxism and in
relation to th e concept of the ideology-centered hum an subject in
p o ststru ctu ralist M arxist theories. Then, the private voice coincides w ith
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radical or em ergent ideologies. The homeless voice of th e self is derived from
M arx’s theory of "particular interest" in contrast to "communal interest." This
component of the homeless voice promises an alternative M arxist approach
and enhances an expanded view of M arxism th a t moves beyond its traditional
and poststructuralist variations. It revises both in its departure from
traditional M arxist historical determ inism and in its aw areness of the
dissonance between authorial ideology and the reader’s interpretive
paradigm s, controlled by or freed from the "interpretive community," so th a t
a literary tex t m ay obliterate its ties w ith both ideology and history, creating
an open space for the reader. In th is sense, the author, w ith the public voice,
the private voice, and/or the homeless voice of the self in th e text, m ay or
m ay not be m anipulated by ideology; th e same applies to the reader and the
critic, whose interpretations of the text m ay or may not adhere to their
ideology influenced by the institutional discourse and may leave an open
space, too, for th e future interpretive paradigm s.

2.1. A Critique of Traditional and Postm odern M arxism

For M arx, the economic structure of society or the m aterial productive
forces constitute an economic base th a t gives rise to a legal, political, and
spiritual superstructure and to forms of social consciousness. M arx writes, "it
is not the consciousness of men th a t determ ines th eir being, but, on the
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contrary, th eir social being th a t determ ines th eir consciousness." This is w hat
M arx deems as th e determ inistic relationship between th e economic base or
infrastructure and th e ideological superstructure. In The G erm an Ideology
(1846), M arx and Engels regard "the m aterial activity and th e m aterial
intercourse of men" as "the language of real life" and consider the production
of ideas as conditioned by the productive forces. While th e base contains all
the m aterial existence in society, the superstructure consists of th e State, the
legal system, and all the ideological components such as religion, ethics,
politics, a r t and literatu re, etc. The function of the superstructure, in Louis
A lthusser’s term s, is to reproduce labor power’s "submission to the rules of
the established order" or reproduce all the social relations required to
m aintain the economic base. As the base determ ines the whole edifice of all
social consciousness or ideology, and as a certain class dominates the
productive forces in society and therefore dominates th a t economic base, the
dom inant class always produces a dom inant ideology th a t becomes social
consciousness. "During the time th a t the aristocracy was dominant," Marx
and Engels tell us, "the concepts honour, loyalty, etc. were dom inant, during
the dominance of the bourgeoisie the concepts freedom, equality, etc." This
idea of m aterial existence or social reality as the determ iner of ideological
concepts is especially clear in M arx’s explanation of the English Revolution
of 1688, w here M arx regards m aterial factors concerning conflicting classes
as th e real cause for the overthrow of the English Restoration monarchy. In

22
Marx’s view, the driving force for the Revolution is a class struggle for
m aterial benefits. First, it was "the fear on the p a rt of the great new
landowners," who had to retu rn their property (seven-tenths of England’s
land) they had acquired by robbing the church before the 1660 Restoration.
Second, it was the bourgeoisie who fought for freedom in commerce and
industry. In the Revolution, the new landowner class joined forces with the
commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, which was averse to Charles I’s
interference w ith free competition and to the control of Catholicism over
England’s industry and commerce.10Behind apparent ideological demands for
political privileges and religious freedom lies the m aterial existence th at
determ ines the ideology of the oppositional classes in the Revolution. Marx
and Engels even w arn people of the misconception th a t ideology
revolutionizes society. They argue th a t ideas may revolutionize society but the
ideas are a product of historical conditions, for "within th e old society, the
elements of a new one have been created," and "the dissolution of the old
ideas keeps even pace w ith the dissolution of the old conditions of existence."
T hat is, the revolutionary or "emergent" ideology springs from the elements
of a new society within the old one. And the "residual" ideology will dissolve
if the soil th a t begets its existence and fertilizes its growth is replaced by a
new base or new conditions of existence. T hat is why, for Marx and Engels,
as "feudal society fought its death battle with the th en revolutionary
bourgeoisie," Christianity, which had overcome the ancient world, succumbed
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to the eighteenth-century emergent bourgeois rationalist ideas and had to
rem ain to be "residual" ideology.11
Classical M arxist historical determinism also cuts into a rt and
literature as ideological forms and renders cultural M arxist readings of the
text. W riters’ social consciousness cannot escape from their social existence.
Marx regards "petty-bourgeois writers" as "shopkeepers" of the class they
represent. The "shopkeepers" and the petty-bourgeois class cannot go beyond
the lim its of th eir "material in terest and social position" and are driven "to
the same tasks and solution." A rt and literature, for Marx, are p a rt of the
social process and have social roots in history. Revolutionary developments
in literary form, in Terry Eagleton’s words, "result from significant changes
in ideology. They embody new ways of perceiving social reality." Ja u ss’s view
of Don Quixote, as discussed above, is such an example of the changed social
reality and ideology as determiners of the artistic form. Eagleton’s evidence
is derived from Ian W att’s formal realism in The Rise of the Novel, as
Eagleton argues th a t the novel "reveals in its very form a changed set of
ideological interests.... It shares certain formal structures w ith other such
works: a shifting of interest from the romantic and supernatural to individual
psychology and ‘routine’ experience." Themes of th e romantic and the
supernatural tend to give way to those of the individual and common life, as
the social conditions have changed in favor of the modem artistic form, a
form to b etter express the changed ideology. In Georg Lukacs’s cultural
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M arx ist views, lite ra ry form also reflects a "m etaphysical dissonance," which
is determ ined by cu ltu re or, in M arshall B erm an’s words, stem s from "the
in n e r contradictions of its historical an d social milieu." F or Lukacs, "every a r t
form is defined by th e m etaphysical dissonance of life which i t accepts and
organises as th e basis of a to tality complete in itself." "M etaphysical
dissonance" because th e to tality th a t th e a r t form embodies renders a
com pleteness in itself, b u t com pleteness, L ukacs m ain tain s, is "utopian." Both
th e epic and the novel th in k in term s of totality, an d th e basis of such a
to tality or "the m etaphysical dissonance" corresponds to th e respective outside
realities of th e epic an d of th e novel. In th e epic, Lukacs argues, th e basis of
th e to ta lity is derived from th e form-giving philosophy characteristic of the
ancien t world th a t deem s life and essence as identical concepts. T hus, the
epic w orld an d th e outside world k n it a "perfect rhythm ic system" w here all
ch aracters in th e created a rtistic forms are a t th e sam e distance from the
essence. The organic an cien t world, however, is d isrupted by th e fragm ented
m odem world. T he basis of th e to tality of th e novel originates in th is changed
m odem world, w here "the im m anence of m eaning in life h as become a
problem." Then, th e a r t form personifies a totality th a t captures "the life of
the problem atic individual" ra th e r th a n "the im m anence of m eaning" or "the
all-su stain in g essence."12 As th e m odem world h as changed an d h as left no
trace o f th e cosmic essence th a t m ark s th e an cien t world, th e m odem literary
form likew ise keeps pace w ith th a t change.
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H istorical determ inism is perhaps b est illu strated by F redric Jam eson
in his th ree political or ideological horizons of w h at he calls a "M arxist
m ethod of lite ra ry an d cultural interpretation," which realizes th e force of
cultu re on poetics or th e political in te re st behind art. W ithin Jam eso n’s first
(narrow ) horizon, th e te x t or "the object of study" (the individual literary
work) functions as "a symbolic act,” w here social contradictions "find a purely
form al resolution in th e aesthetic realm ." Political an d ideological ju s t as the
first, th e second (expanded) horizon refers to th e text, which, construed as
class discourses, "has widened to include th e social order" an d serves as "the
ideologeme" th a t reflects "the essentially antagonistic collective discourses of
social classes." The te x t in this horizon, in other words, m ay be used as a tool
to m a in ta in th e reign of th e dom inant social class an d to rep ress or resolve
social opposition an d ideological antagonism . Jam eson’s th ird and la s t
political and ideological horizon encom passes "hum an history as a whole" in
th e form of cultural revolution. All of th e th ree horizons are determ ined by
m odes of production. W hile th e individual te x t (the fist horizon) an d the
collective ideologemes (the second horizon) are "sign system s w hich are
them selves traces or anticipations of modes of production," th e u ltim ate broad
horizon of cu ltu ral revolution enhances and p erp etu ates the dom inant place
of th e new social form ation or th e new modes of production—as a product of
cu ltu ral revolution—and th e new ideology th a t is m e a n t to ju stify them .
H aving established th e th ree horizons of in terp retatio n , Jam eson calls for "a
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whole new fram ew ork for th e hum anities, in which th e study of culture in the
w idest sense would be placed on a m aterialist basis."13 A rt an d literatu re in
Jam eson’s model are symbolic forms of ideology th a t enact social conditions
or reflect class interests. These symbolic "traces" of the economic base or of
the modes of production are all worked up tow ards cultural revolution, w here
the old modes of production give way to the new on which a new ideology or
social consciousness is based.
T raditional M arxism is often accused of claim ing a dichotomy between
a n eu tra l reality and ideology as false consciousness. In The G erm an
Ideology. M arx and Engels discuss ideology’s function of legitim ation or
universalization. "Each new class which p u ts itself in th e place of one ruling
before it," according to M arx and Engels, "is compelled, m erely in order to
carry through its aim, to rep resen t its in te re st as the common in te re st of all
th e m em bers of society, th a t is, expressed in ideal form: it h as to give its
ideas th e form of universality, and rep resen t them as the only rational,
universally valid ones." To prevent th e subjugated classes from knowing th eir
tru e in te re st in society, ideology here is stam ped w ith a ruling class
trad e m ark in order to p erpetuate the power stru ctu re and is conceived as an
illusion alien to th e objective external world. However, a r t and literature,
w hen activating radical ideologies, can pierce through th e dom inant ideology
or th e false consciousness of the ruling class. M arx speaks highly of the
nineteenth-century English realists such as Dickens, Thackeray, Bronte, and
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Gaskell for exposing the m iddle class and issuing to the world "more political
and social tru th s th a n have been u ttered by all the professional politicians,
publicists and m oralists p u t together." In his 1888 le tte r to M argaret
H arkness, Engels, too, believes in the penetrating capacity of literature. He
praises Balzac’s Comedie H um aine (1816-48) for being freed from the ruling
class’s restrictive ideology and plunging into th e objective reality of his era,
for Balzac goes against "his own class sym pathies and political prejudices"
and adm ires "representatives of the popular masses." L iterary form, in the
hands of Balzac, transcends ideology or false consciousness into tru th or an
independent external world. Here, we actually confront a dilemma in this
dichotomy between an objective world and ideology as false beliefs. On the
one hand, ideology functions to impose the dom inant class’s will on all classes
in society as a universal ideal th a t blocks the dominated classes from a true
knowledge of reality. On the other hand, in helping us get a glimpse into
tru th , the literary work, ideological in nature, challenges and dispels the false
beliefs th a t ideology strives to project.14
In order to resolve th is dilemma and repudiate th e traditional M arxist
conviction of a n eu tral reality, the poststructuralist or postm odern M arxists
launch a different operation th a t centers on ideology (residual, dominant, and
em ergent) as the real itself. F irst, the postmodern M arxist pioneer Louis
A lthusser sta rts off by obscuring the traditional M arxist distinction between
the m aterial and th e conceptual, between the prim ary independent world and
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secondary illusive ideology, and by asserting the influence of the institutional
"Ideological State Apparatuses" to constitute individuals as subjects.
Emphasizing the relative autonomy of the superstructure, A lthusser refuses
to categorize ideology as dependent on the m aterial and claims th a t "ideology
has a m aterial existence" in itself. R ather th an being external to ideology,
m aterial existence is embodied in ideology, and the two are yoked into
individuals’ m aterial practice of w hatever they believe in. For Althusser,
"ideology interpellates individuals as subjects," who are always subjected to
one ideology or another and free to act in accord with th eir ideology, and "the
id e a s’ of a hum an subject exist in his actions." First, the interpellation of
ideology starts even before the hum an being is bom. Family ideology turns
the unborn into a subject, for there is an "ideological ritu al th a t surrounds
the expectation of a ‘birth’, th a t ‘happy event.’" The unborn child also carries
with it an ideological impress in social and gender term s the moment when
it is expected to be bom: it is going to bear its father’s nam e and is going to
be conceived along the lines of the male/female dichotomy in relation to its
gender roles in society. Also, ideology does not rem ain in tact in the cognitive
sphere. If you believe in God, for example, you do not ju s t harbor th a t notion
in your mind and keep faith in it w ithout doing anything; th a t ideological
notion in you will materialize itself in your actions and your practice of the
m aterial rituals of religion. As A lthusser says, if a hum an subject believes in
God, "he goes to Church to attend Mass, kneels, prays, confesses, does
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penance." In this m aterialist concept, ideology no longer represents false
consciousness, something to be penetrated through in order to reach for the
real. Ideology, in this poststructuralist M arxist view, opens on to the outside
world and is, as Jonathan Dollimore puts it, "the very term s in which we
perceive the world."16
While the m aterial and the conceptual are mixed and blurred in
A lthusser’s theory, Terry Eagleton even rejects the objective real and takes
it as non-existent. J u s t as Eagleton feels there is no exteriority or the
signified outside language, there is not any "direct, spontaneous relation
between text and history." The text does not render referential ties to the
real. Any reading of Balzac by-passing ideology into history "belongs to a
naive empiricism which is to be discarded." Balzac’s insights, for Eagleton,
are the effect of "authorial insertion into ideology." The text does not pierce
holes in ideology as false beliefs and disclose the real but produces an
ideology th a t is the real itself. Drawing on Engels’s distinction between the
musical score and the tim es played by the band and his distinction between
"dead" dram a in script form and dram a on stage performed "from the thvmele
and orchestra [the orchestra and the chorus] through the living mouths of the
actors," Eagleton introduces the idea of the text as production. The literary
tex t is "a certain production of ideology" not the "expression" of it, "nor is
ideology the ‘expression’ of social class," ju st as a play on stage "produces" the
script on which i t is based rath e r th a n expresses or reflects it. Thus, history
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and th e real are erased from th e traditional M arxist determ inistic historyideology-text form ulation.16 W hat rem ains is au th o rial in sertio n into ideology
in the text.
B esides th e au th o r’s production of ideology in th e tex t in stead of
reaching for th e objective real, th e reader, too, is m an ip u lated by w hat
S tanley F ish

calls the "interpretive community" or th e

educational

in stitu tio n s as a n A lthusserian "Ideological S tate A pparatus" to constitute the
h u m a n subject. W ithin the p o ststru ctu ralist M arxist fram ew ork, this
in stitu tio n al approach repudiates th e autonom y of the read er an d em phasizes
th e determ in in g force exerted by the in stitu tio n al discourse th a t reproduces
ideology in settin g u p interpretive norm s to regulate reading strateg ies and
orchestrate p a tte rn s of thinking. This in stitu tio n al control produces both
tex tu al m eaning an d authorial intention. Any interaction betw een th e critic
an d th e text, F ish argues, will never occur w ithout reference to "a public and
stable norm ," for "m eanings come already calculated, n o t because of norm s
em bedded in th e language b u t because language is always perceived, from the
very first, w ithin a stru ctu re of norms" established by the "interpretive
com m unities." Following F ish’s argum ent, E dw ard Said studies critical
consciousness as a product of in stitu tio n al influence by distinguishing
betw een "filiation" and "affiliation." Filiation, for Said, p erta in s to a n a tu ra l
in stin c t to include certain aspects of culture (involved w ith "birth, nationality,
and profession") as "us" and exclude others as "them," w hile affiliation is
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related to institutional influence of the critic by "social and political
conviction, economic and historical circumstances." Filiation in preserving
culture gives rise to affiliation in educating the young, b u t the latter, with its
relative autonomy, "sometimes reproduces filiation, sometimes makes its own
forms." Said contends th a t "the narrow circle of w hat is natural, appropriate,
and valid for ‘us’" is influenced by filiation, which canonizes W estern culture
w ithin the "narrow circle" and represses and "excludes the non-literary, the
non-European, and above all the political dimension in which all literature,
all texts, can be found." The filiative order lim its literary value within
boundaries and m arks them as hum anities th a t are to be studied in the
classroom and to be handed down to the next generation, while leaving out
w hat is social and political, w hat is non-literary, and w hat is opposite to
W estern culture. T hat is, n atu ral filiation w ith culture dem arcates between
an "us" as the self to be valued and passed on and a "them" as the other to
be repressed and discredited. However, filiation does not exist without
affiliation, the affiliative institutional influence of those in the classroom to
in h erit th e cultural legacy, "who in tu rn become members, by affiliation and
formation, of the company of educated individuals"—affiliation reproduces
filiation. Affiliation also "makes its own forms" by adding another interpretive
param eter th a t reads the non-European, social and political, and the so called
"non-literary" text as aspects of culture, aspects th a t filiation excludes, and
by relating them to the critic’s "actual social world." In this sense,
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institutional discourse in the form of poetics produces an effect on culture.
Faced w ith filiation and affiliation, the critic cannot escape being
institutionalized. As Said points out, "the contemporary critical consciousness
stands between the tem ptations" represented by these two institutionreinforced powers. The critic is free to choose between th e two b ut is
constituted by either choice and free from neith er one.17
W hile traditional M arxism claims an objective real th a t is obtained
through

radical ideology to

demystify dom inant ideology as

false

consciousness representing the illusive real, poststructuralist M arxism in
both its author/ideology and reader/institutions approaches deems ideology,
both dom inant and radical, as the real itself (see Figure 1 below):
(Illusive Real)

T r a d itio n a l M a rx ism

I

/

\

(Objective Real)

I

(Dom inant Ideology)
(Radical Ideology)
\
/
(Ideological Real)
I
P o s ts tr u c t u r a lis t M a rx ism
(Figure 1 Notions of the real in traditional and poststructuralist Marxism)
A critique of traditional and poststructuralist Marxism, w ithin the scope of
the present study, will focus on th e dialectic of the real and ideology.18 More
specifically, it will focus on the dialectic of a spectrum of the two-layer reality
and the exposing and productive ideology, a dialectic th a t both traditional and
poststru ctu ralist M arxists ignore. F irst, there is an elem ent of tru th in the
traditional M arxist belief in the real or w hat we call "history," but the real
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ought to be distinguished from the real constituted by dom inant ideology.
L iterature, in a sense, tries to catch up w ith reality or historical
developments in society. T hat is why critics can locate connections between
history and fiction, and Lenin's critical method about a tim e lapse between
the real and the reproductive fiction applies h e re -th e a r t form usually lags
behind historical events it aims to portray. In Lenin’s view, the relation of a
literary work to historical reality, as Macherey writes, "cannot be reduced to
the ‘spontaneous’ or the ‘sim ultaneous,’" and "the w riter is behind the times,
if only because he invariably speaks after the event."19 Following Lawrence
Stone’s historical insight, for example, Dollimore, in his New Historicist
reading, sees Shakespeare’s M easure for M easure (1606) as reaching for the
historical real and George W hetstone’s A M irror for M agistrates (1584) as
conforming to the ruling class ideology-both are behind the times. By the
early seventeenth century, the authoritarian family and the authoritarian
state had become responsible, according to Stone, for m aintaining social order
as p a rt of "solutions to an intolerable sense of anxiety" on the p art of the
ruling class. Sexuality was heavily under this family social surveillance,
Dollimore argues, as a result of the upper classes’ "insecurity in the face of
change." Suppression of sexual licence "was an attem pt to regulate not the
vice, nor, apparently, even the spread of venereal disease, b u t the criminal
underworld" th a t threatened social order and the power structure of the
upper classes. T hreat from the underworld, the anxiety, and insecurity were
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the historical real to the ruling class, but this real was ideologinated by the
dominant class as a concern about low-life immorality. This ideological
regulation was in effect w hat Dollimore calls a "displacement" of blame from
the ruling class to the ruled. While Whetstone reinforced the dominant
ideology by blaming the low, Shakespeare lashed across and th ru st through
ideology and presented the real cause for disorder—misrule, unjust law, and
corruption from above—and the blame was truthfully re-placed from the ruled
to the rulers.20
We can define the real or historical conditions as whatever the
dominant ideology attem pts to hide, as the ruling class will (and has the
power to) "naturalize" their class interest as the "common interest." In
Dollimore’s reading, there could be two layers of the real th a t the literary
work is related to. One is Whetstone’s work th a t corresponds to the real
(sexual licence and immorality) constituted by the dominant ideology, the real
th a t the ruling class wants to make the ruled believe; the other kind of the
real is the real constituted by another kind of ideology, the ideology of the
ruled, although the ruled have not realized it yet. Paradoxically, social
existence determines the ruling class’s ideology, but non-dominant ideology
does not originate as the discourse of the subjugated classes. When you focus
on the first p a rt of the sentence, historical determinism holds true (dominant
ideology js determined by the social existence of the ruling class to m aintain
social formation), but the second p art contradicts the same claim. Consider
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th is: if a w riter brings th e illusion of th e ruled to light, th e illusion of th eir
believing in th e "real" th a t is constructed by dom inant ideology, an d reveals
or constitutes th e real an d even arouses them to fight for it, th e n (radical or
em ergent) ideology m akes things h appen or even triggers revolution and
tran sfo rm atio n of th e in frastru ctu re. In th is la tte r case, radical ideology
d eterm ines history an d revolutionizes society. A lthough M arx is rig h t in
a sse rtin g th a t radical ideology or elem ents of a new society em erge from the
old (from th e contradictions of social classes), th a t new ideology is not
necessarily determ ined by th e social existence of th e ruled, for th e y are not
aw are of th e ideology u n til external figures from outside th e ir social class,
like M arx an d Engels, even Shakespeare, Balzac, or Tolstoy, despite th eir
class in te re sts, s ta r t to produce and p o rtray th a t em erg en t ideology, an
ideology th a t opens on to reality or cuts through th e dom inant ideology into
th e historical real. The conflict betw een th e u p p er classes an d th e low-life
underw orld, th e real in th e sense of th e early seventeenth-century English
ru lin g class’s alarm for anxiety a n d insecurity, did exist. B u t it would be
blind fa ith to amplify, like th e critical m ethod of trad itio n al M arxism , the
determ inistic pow er of th e in frastru ctu re w ithout realizing th e reciprocal
n a tu re of in fra stru ctu re an d su p erstru ctu re, and i t would be blind faith to
reject th e fact th a t one ideology p en etrates an other in th e process of reaching
for th e real, in the w ay th e historical real is conceived by radical ideology in
D ollim ore’s reading of Shakespeare.
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In fact, M arx a n d E ngels on m any occasions p o in t o u t th e reciprocal
n a tu re of base an d su p e rstru c tu re an d deny an y m echanical an d passive
correspondence betw een th e two. T he E n g lish free-thinking philosophy
developed by Locke, for M arx, influenced an d activ ated th e F ren ch Revolution
of 1789. T he reciprocal n a tu re of b ase an d su p e rstru c tu re is also reflected in
M arx an d E ngels’s belief th a t "circum stances m ake m en ju s t as m uch as m en
m ake circum stances" an d in th e p rio rity M arx gives to education in schools,
w hich h a s to be ta k e n over from th e "intervention of society" and the
"influence of th e ru lin g class." T his is because "on th e one h an d a change of
circum stances," according to M arx, "was req u ired to estab lish a proper system
o f education, on th e o th er h an d a p roper system of education w as required to
b rin g ab o u t a change of social circum stances." T he M arx ist theory of base and
su p e rstru c tu re , for E ngels, too, is a two-way traffic system . H e corrects th e
m isconception of p assiv ity in it, a s h e w rites "political, ju rid ical, philosophical,
religious, literary ,

artistic, etc., developm ent is based

on

economic

developm ent. B u t all th e se reac t upon one a n o th e r a n d also upon th e
economic base."21
To em phasize th e role of ideology b ased on th e reciprocal n a tu re of
in fra stru c tu re an d su p erstru ctu re is to stu d y th e m agic of radical or em ergent
ideology to shape th e real in spite of th e determ inistic pow er of th e real. M arx
a n d E ngels a s M ichel Foucault’s "initiators of discursive practices," for
exam ple, aw aken th e w orking class from th e ir illusions an d dispel th e m yth
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of th e ruling class ideology, in an attem p t to shape th e real. And th is real is
not a n eu tral objective reality. In this sense, p o ststru ctu ralist M arxism
certainly h as a point here. M arx and Engels, in th e ir first jo in t work The
Holy Fam ily (1844), em phasize th e "self-abolishing" side of th e dialectic
n a tu re of property. W ithin the H egelian an tith esis of property, M arx and
Engels w rite, th e proletarian is th e destructive side while th e property-owner
th e conservative side; one is to annihilate it an d the other to preserve it. In
th e ir theory, wage-labor produces "wealth for others and poverty for itself,"
and then, no doubt, th e social existence of the working class, th eir poverty,
determ ines th e ir will to annihilate property, th u s the "self-abolishing" side of
th e property dialectic.22 However, th is self-destructive side will never
m aterialize w ithout a link betw een the social conditions and the aw areness
of them . This is w here the role of a n ideology comes in. The working class is
not conscious of the "self-abolishing" n a tu re of property to begin with; th a t
consciousness does not surface in "clarity" due to th e cover-up of the
dom inant ideology. As ideology, in M arx’s views, functions to m ain tain the
infrastru ctu re, it smooths things over or "naturalizes" th e property/poverty
antithesis in order to regulate, justify, and reproduce th e social relations
around it. N ot u n til the "initiators" have developed th eir revolutionary
ideology, can the working class realize th e ir "spiritual and physical poverty"
and "dehum anisation." As M arx and Engels have in itiated a radical ideology
th a t attack s th e dom inant ideology, "a large p a rt of th e English and French
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p roletariat is already conscious of its historic task and is constantly working
to develop th a t consciousness into complete clarity." Social consciousness
plays a vitally im portant role here in M arx and Engels’s "historic task" th a t
is m ean t to lead to a new historical epoch. The relationship between
infrastru ctu re and superstructure here is far from a "Hegelian expressive
causality" one (to use Jam eson’s term).23 Infrastructural change will never
guarantee a n autom atic transform ation of the superstructure. Such a change
will not even have too much effect on the working class’s consciousness of
th e ir dehum anization, not until "initiators" of ideology shed light on th a t
social reality and activate the superstructure to change the infrastructure.
It is safe to say th a t the revolutionary or em ergent ideology in the
superstructure reacts and influences the infrastructure and helps to shape
th e real, b u t th e real out of the mold of radical ideology is not a neutral
reality or a n objective world. While the real, in the traditional M arxist sense
of the term , does not align w ith the dom inant ideology th a t attem pts to
conceal it (and vice versa), the "real" here is tin ted w ith th e radical ideology
(like M arx’s revolutionary ideology) th a t shapes it an d la te r functions to
promote it. Engels’s comments on realism as "the tru th fu l reproduction of
typical characters under typical circumstances" serve as a good example of
how ideology functions to shape and promote the real. In his review of
H arkness"s City Girl (1888), Engels argues th a t the essence of "typical
characters under typical circumstances" should not be the depiction of the
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working class as "a passive m ass, incapable of helping itself or even trying to
help itself." The working class appears passive in the City Girl, because "all
attem pts to raise i t out of its wretched poverty come from the outside, from
above." R ather, for "the fighting proletariat," Engels suggests, em ancipation
should be "the cause of the working class itself."24 In other words, the
novelist, in Engels’s argum ent, should in the first place depict historical
reality where the working class is already conscious of its "dehumanisation"
and is already fighting for its place in Society, and the real here th a t the
literary work unfolds is the working class’s "typical," embodied in its ideology
(the cause of emancipation w ithin th e class itself). In th e second place, the
novelist should promote and reinforce th e working class ideology th a t has
shaped th e real and is "typical" to its class (leaving out the untypical).
M arxist radical ideology has shaped the real, and the novelist should function
to consolidate, promote, and advance th a t real.
I t is im portant to note th a t M arx and Engels’s definition of ideology in
The German Ideology m eans to represent class in terest as the universal
in terest of all members of society and to project an illusion as the real.
Ideology, for M arx and Engels, has an across-the-board m eaning th a t applies
to all dom inant classes in all historical periods. Even when the working class
is in power, in th eir view, it will also "naturalize" its class in terest as "the
general interest" of all members of society. "Every class which is struggling
for mastery," M arx and Engels write, "even when its domination, as is the
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case w ith the proletariat, postulates the abolition of the old form of society in
its entirety and of domination itself, m ust first conquer for itself political
power in order to represent its interest in tu rn as the general interest."25
Here Marx and Engels emphasize the necessity of the working class’s
overthrowing the dom inant political power to ensure its own "mastery" in
society, b u t the new society with the new m asters in dominance, in its total
sum of m aterial existence and social relations, lives in the shadow of another
ideology, the working class ideology th a t represents its class in terest "in tu rn
as the general interest." The objective real th a t is rescued from a dominant
ideology bears in itself a tendency of covering up another spectrum of the real
and projecting an illusion in its place. T hat is, when the working class is still
subjugated by the bourgeoisie, it has to rely on a radical ideology to lift the
"veil" from the real th a t is submerged by the dominant ideology. When the
radical ideology finally becomes dominant, it will, like every dominant
ideology, perpetuate the social place of the new dom inant class, promote the
"real," and justify the new modes of production by imposing the dominant
class’s in terest as the general universal interest. Then, outside this very
"real" th a t the new dominant ideology functions to represent, there will exist
another new historical real th a t is filtered out by the network of the new
dom inant ideology, an ideology th a t in tu rn , in M arx and Engels’s logic, will
be false consciousness or illusive representation of the real.
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In any given historical era, th ere m u st be two kinds of th e real going
h an d in hand. One is th e "surface" real m anipulated by the dom inant ideology
an d th e other, th e filtered-out "underlying" real th a t is an an tith esis to the
real rem ain in g on "surface." And th is "underlying" objective real itself is
tin te d w ith ideology and will become an o th er level of th e subjective "surface"
re a l in its projection of class in te re st as u n iv ersal in te re st, a "real"
intertw in ed w ith both objective an d subjective elem ents. The side-by-side
coexistence of the "illusive" real an d th e "historical" real only proves the
dialectic or th e relative stability of eith er real. T raditional M arxism am plifies
th e M arxist conviction of historical determ inism in literary criticism , and
p o ststru c tu ralist M arxism , in denying the determ inistic passivity in
trad itio n al M arxism , em phasizes th e power o f th e in stitu tio n s and questions
th e validity of an independent objective world. They both rep resen t a lim ited
view of M arxism in th a t the firs t proposes th e te x t’s p en etratio n through
ideology into history (text--ideology—history) and th e second obliterates the
tex t’s ties w ith history and establishes a n ideology th a t is th e "real" itself
(text=ideology="history") because th e tex t is produced by an d perceived
throu g h ideology. B oth are a lim ited view of M arxism because both isolate
one p a r t from th e dialectical on-going cycle of reality production and
representation. T raditional M arxism believes in th e real th a t is u n d ern eath
th e ideologination of th e dom inant class and rejects th e dom inant ideology as
false consciousness. P o ststru ctu ra list M arxism ignores th e real filtered
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thro u g h th e m assive legitim ation of dom inant ideology an d regards ideology
in general as th e "real." A dialectical relationship betw een ideology and the
real is th a t dom inant ideology produces the "surface" subjective real and
radical or em ergent ideology picks u p th e "underlying" objective real and
shapes an d prom otes i t so th a t it becomes "surface" an d subjective itself. So
th e respective traditional an d p o ststru ctu ralist M arxist claim s ab out the
objective historical re a l an d about th e subjective ideological "real" verge on
radical ideology th a t g enerates th e distinction betw een th e above two kinds
of th e real. T raditional M arxism targ ets th e real th a t only radical ideology
exposes in spite of th e w orkings of dom inant ideology, and p o ststru ctu ralist
M arxism (besides its conviction about the real shaped by dom inant ideology
as ideological), by contrast, h its on th e sam e real th a t only radical ideology
shapes an d prom otes, a real th a t boarders on th e objective an d th e subjective.
In th e ir dialectical relatio n to radical ideology as a m ediation betw een th e two
variations of M arxism , th e trad itio n al M arxist objective real th a t radical
ideology reveals is w h at I would call "the preceding real" and the
p o ststru c tu ra list M arx ist ideological real "the consequential real" as a
consequence of the prom oting radical ideology, ju s t for th e purpose of clearing
u p th e objective/subjective confusion. A broad view of M arxist criticism would
fuse th e two aspects of th e lim ited view as th e public voice th a t indicates the
ideological real an d th e private voice th a t captures th e precedingconsequential real or the dialectical real, and would suggest a n expanded
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view in term s of the homeless voice of the self in the text. On this la s t level
of th e voices, th e echoes from history and from ideology or from the
ideological an d the dialectical real, in th e case of Defoe, for example, no
longer resound betw een the pages and are no longer th ere for the critic to
tape-record and to play ou t again b u t are lost into the abyss of th e text. W hat
lingers in the open space of the tex t is a d istan t real connecting the text and
the read er’s interpretive paradigm s (not necessarily influenced by the
"interpretive community"), w hatever theories an d historical insights the
reader m ay adhere to or stan d up against. The model of such a split self is an
alternativ e M arxist approach to literary criticism, for it departs from both
traditio n al an d p o ststru ctu ralist M arxism as well as generates its energy
from

it.

The

alternative

M arxist

approach

carries

on

w ith

the

po ststru ctu ralist notion of ideology representing th e ideological real and
sym pathizes w ith its suspicion about the objective real. The cu rren t approach
also distinguishes betw een the traditional M arxist illusive real and the
p o ststru ctu ralist ideological real and fuses the la tte r w ith th e traditional
objective real an d transform s the two into th e dialectical real. A part from a
p artia l over-lapping w ith th e institutional M arxism in th a t the reader’s
interpretive strategies are governed by the "interpretive community," th e
p resen t study also suggests a reader w ith a "homeless" voice resounding
outside the institutionalized modes of expression an d obliterating any contact
w ith history an d ideology.
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2.2. Voices of th e Self

The model of th e voices of the self in the p resen t alternative M arxist
approach is first derived from traditional an d p o ststru ctu ralist M arxist views
of ideology for th e public and private voices. The traditional M arxist notion
of dom inant ideology constitutes th e dom inant class discourse. Here, the real
represented by dom inant ideology is the illusive real. Radical ideology fights
a b attle ag ain st repression and subjugation by exposing the objective real
th a t is sifted out by dom inant ideology. The representation of th is radical
ideology surfaces to stan d up ag ain st the illusive real an d to project and
shape a p o ststru ctu ralist M arxist ideological real once it gains dominance. As
radical ideology tu rn s th e objective real into the ideological real, th e real
becomes an objective/ideological duality (the dialectical real) in th e alternative
M arxist approach. In th is alternative approach, th e public voice represents
dom inant ideology th a t projects the ideological real. The private voice
prom otes radical ideology th a t shapes a dialectical real. Finally, while the
public voice an d th e private voice are guided by the authorial ideology, the
"homeless" voice of th e self originates from th e M arxist "particular interest"
of the self th a t is defined n eith er by the postm odern M arxist ideological real
nor by the traditional M arxist objective real; instead, th e homeless voice
constitutes a d istan t real th a t is m aterialized n o t by authorial ideology b u t
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by the reader’s interpretive paradigms w ithin or outside the institutional
discourse (see Figure 2 below).
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The public voice of th e self is closely connected to w hat Williams calls
"the political economy of writing" or ideological "alignment.” Writing,
according to Williams, is a commodity ideologically specified because the
author has to survive "the pressures and lim its of the social relationships on
which, as a producer, he depends"; otherwise he will find it difficult to get his
"commodity" supported or sold. About the "pressures" of dom inant ideology
on individuals, Engels offers a vivid description. In his essay "The Condition
of England” (1843), Engels writes: "If you should go amongst educated
Englishm en and say th a t you are C hartists or dem ocrats-the balance of your
m ind will be doubted and your company fled. Or declare you do not believe
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in th e divinity of C hrist, a n d you are done for; if m oreover you confess th a t
you are ath eists, th e n ex t day people will p reten d n o t to know you."26 W riters
in th is sense, due to th e ideological "pressures," are indeed th e "shopkeepers"
or th e rep resen tativ es of th e ir social class. The w riting of W hetstone in
Dollimore’s reading, for exam ple, belongs to th is ideological "commodity." He
is a "shopkeeper" of th e dom inant ideology th a t finds fa u lt w ith th e lower
classes for social im m orality a n d disorder. Booth’s notion of th e "official
scribe" in Fielding an d in Shakespeare about th e ir value system s, too, falls
in to th e category of th e public voice of th e self. There is also a resounding
public voice in Ian W att’s reading of Sam uel R ichardson in his resorting to
P u rita n v alues to resolve th e class differences betw een M r. B. an d Pam ela.
My m an in th e p resen t study is also n o t im m une to th e influence of dom inant
ideology an d h as h is sh are of th e public voice. In fact, Defoe is often conceived
to be read y to m a in ta in th e sta tu s quo, em phasize social order, and
consolidate

th e

dom inant pow er stru ctu re. F o r instance, P au la

R.

Backscheider, following J . P au l H u n ter’s arg u m en t of th e prodigal son,
detects "a longing for social stability a n d order" in th e endings of eighteenthcentury novels, including Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe. Moll F landers, and
Colonel Ja c k . Jim S. Borck enhances th e read er’s u n d erstan d in g of Moll
F lan d ers’s self-image in h e r desire for H obbesian "societal bonding" through
unions w ith m en. F or P au l J. deGategno, too, Defoe in his crim inal
biographies prom otes th e "preservation of society and th e value of the
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culture" an d th e equilibrium betw een God an d m an. Finally, Jo h n Richetti
focuses on th e public voice in Defoe’s w orks in te rm s of th e "totalizing" im pact
of social in stitu tio n s to regulate an d ideologinate individuals like Moll and
Ja ck .27
W hile dom inant ideologies serve th e ru lin g class to efface th e
possibility of opposition an d antagonism and to unify differing ideologies,
oppositional force is situ ated w ithin th e ideological dom inance, rejecting
absorption an d repression, and will find avenues to em erge from subjugation.
In form s of nonhegemonic ideologies, the oppositional dissonance will
challenge th e dom inant ideologies and raise itse lf from latencies to th e level
of consciousness.28 These dissonant em ergent ideologies, in th e ir b attle
a g a in st false rep resen tatio n an d legitim ation, surface in th e tex t as th e
p riv ate voice of th e self. The private voice personifies w h at Engels calls "the
indep en d en t E nglishm an" who ’b egins to th in k an d shakes off the fetters of
prejudice he h a s absorbed w ith his m other’s milk." In doing so, Engels
continues, "he feigns an opinion before society th a t is a t le a st tolerated, and
is quite content if occasionally he can discuss h is views w ith some likem inded person in private." To pronounce a p riv ate voice is to w ater down the
ideological "milk" or to dilute th e stren g th of "prejudice" an d tradition. I t is
p riv ate action because th e "independent" person h as to b ea r w ith the
"pressures" of dom inant ideology an d because once i t goes to public it will be
drow ned by public opinion th a t is sa tu ra te d w ith "milk" fa t an d full of "milk"
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bubbles. T h at m ay be one of th e reasons why a n eighteenth-century w riter
like Jam es Boswell in his biography of Dr. Johnson, as Felicity A. N ussbaum
points out, m ay hold his ideologically conflicting notions of character w ithin
th e "private domain," b u t they m ay "disappear w hen brought to the public
sphere," due to th e im pact of th e "milk."29 B u t in general, th e "private
domain" as well as th e "public sphere" will find th e ir places in fiction. In fact,
the fictional world m ay be perfect fairgrounds w here you can peddle for all
kinds of "dairy products" (good for th e ideological body) such as yogurt, cream,
bu tter, and cheese. In the back streets and bizarre com ers, "independent"
unsavory characters hang around "black-markets" w here they circulate
"anesthetic" th a t m ay num b the ideological spinal nerve-system , "poison" th a t
m ay paralyze th e "milk cows," "germs" th a t m ay spoil th e "dairy products,"
or ju s t nice plain "water" th a t m ay dilute the "milk" itself.
The private voice does n o t appear in a vacuum; it is usually embodied
in radical ideology in literary form. Good examples are C ervantes’s negation
of th e fam iliar "horizons of expectations" in Don Quixote, Shakespeare’s
reaction to th e dom inant ideology in M easure for M easure, and Balzac’s
insertion into th e working class ideology in Comedie H um aine discussed
earlier. Self-writing in spiritual autobiographies and scandalous memories by
eighteenth-century women w riters, N ussbaum tells us, also moves "outside
authorized and institutionalized modes of expression" an d represents a new
consciousness, in resisting m ale dominance and th e public constructs of
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women’s "character." For David M arshall, Defoe’s fiction exemplifies the
influence of the radical anti-P uritan tradition of the th e ate r on the w riter.
Defoe’s authorial disguises and m asks and concealment of identity of his
characters all suggest the roles actors and actresses play-creating and
changing id en tities-in competing w ith God, who creates and inscribes fixed
identity to m an. Also, critics like Leo Braudy and M aximillian E. Novak have
noted Defoe’s two inconsistent voices between his fiction and conduct books,
the public voice in nonfiction and "private impersonation" by his first-person
fictional characters. Although Defoe’s "private impersonation" usually draws
from th e form of criminal biography, it departs from th e conventional by
neutralizing the plot and aw arding his fictional sinners like Singleton, Moll,
an d Jack. Sometimes, th e private voice of the self is dissonant to the degree
th a t Defoe even uses the power of legal discourse itself to disrupt the English
contemporary penal code, as Moll picks up the discourse of n atu ral law, the
foundation, according to the radical ideology of John Locke, on which any
legal discourse is based, to disrupt the eighteenth-century English common
law and justify h er crimes.30 The private voice is here to deliver the self from
th e m anipulation of dom inant ideology th a t functions to regulate the self.
In th e ir relations to dom inant ideology th a t functions to cover up the
objective real and to radical ideology th a t picks up th a t left-out real as a
projected ideological real, both the public voice and the private voice center
on th e ideological real and the dialectical real. The public voice taps into the
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dom inant modes of expression while the private voice is embodied in
em ergent ideology th a t shapes and promotes the radical dialectical real.
There exists yet another voice, hovering in the open space between the text
and the reader, alien to the historical conditions and the ideologies of the
author. Unlike Ja u ss’s "horizon of future aesthetic experience," this open
space m ay echo a "homeless" voice th a t none of the historical and ideological
determ iners can account for. It is a voice without "home" and w ithout origin.
The voice does not lag "behind the times" and does not speak "after the event"
b u t reaches beyond the lim its of historical space and time for the d istant real.
I t abandons the author and communes w ith the reader whose interpretive
paradigm s replace the author’s ideology and drop the author from the
historical and ideological boundaries. Not only does the authorial insertion
into a radical ideology tu rn historical events into the ideological real (as in
Eagleton’s insight about Balzac), b u t there is also a textual (not authorial)
insertion th a t reaches forward into the reader’s ideology out of which the
reader constructs an ideological real th a t is free of the historical author and
the authorial ideology. As the reader, in the institutional M arxists’ views, is
institutionalized by the "interpretive community," in this sense, the reader’s
ideology to replace the author’s may be over-lapped w ith the institutional
discourse or may be influenced by the contemporary theoretical developments.
A part from this partial over-lapping w ith the institutional M arxist approach,
the homeless voice th a t the reader detects in the text m ay be completely cut
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off from any over-lapping, for the reader’s insight may also be "homeless" and
freed from the constraints of the institutionalized discourse. J u s t like fiction
w riters, readers, as authors of their interpretations of the text, too, may
develop their own "homeless" voice or "particular interest" in the reading
process.
The "particular interest" of an individual, in M arxist theories, is
"homeless" and is contrary to the "communal interest" of all individuals. In
The German Ideology. Marx and Engels offer us a full account of this
homeless "particular interest": "the division of labour implies the
contradiction between the in terest of the separate individual or the individual
family and the communal interest of all individuals who have intercourse
w ith one another." The "cleavage" between the particular and communal
interest here is not related to radical ideology representing the opposing
class’s consciousness versus dominant ideology projecting the ruling class
interest as universal interest. Marx and Engels here break social classes
down into small units as particular individuals. As long as there is labor
division, all individuals have to orient themselves toward th a t structure of
social relations constructed around th a t division. When an individual "is a
hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd, or a critical critic" or is in any other
profession, Marx and Engels write, "he m ust rem ain so if he does not w ant
to lose his m eans of livelihood." As restricted by the particular m aterial
existence, individuals cannot develop their "particular interest" or full
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potentiality as to change careers as th ey wish. This, according to M arx and
E ngels, is only possible in com m unist society, a classless society, "where
nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity b u t each can become accomplished
in any b ran ch he wishes," and "society reg u lates th e general production and
th u s m akes it possible for me to do one th in g today an d an o th er tomorrow,
to h u n t in th e m orning, fish in th e afternoon, re a r cattle in th e evening,
criticise a fte r dinner, ju s t as I have a m ind, w ithout ever becoming h u n ter,
fisherm an, shepherd or critic."31 T his "particular interest" is hom eless and
free of class in te re st because no m em bers of society can afford to sw itch to
o th er w alks of life as th ey wish. T h at M arx an d Engels th in k th e "particular
in terest" is only possible in a classless society also proves its affiliation w ith
no social class nor ideology a t all. Because of its s ta tu s of non-affiliation and
de-ideologination, th e "particular interest" or th e hom eless voice cannot be
evaluated w ith reference to th e biographical au th o r, for it is ab o u t the d ista n t
real in th e "horizon of fu tu re aesthetic experience." So th e au th o rial self m ust
tu r n into a tex tu al self or consciousness th a t possesses th e hom eless voice, in
th e way th a t th e voice, free of th e authorial ideology, leaves its trace only in
th e text, a trace only th e read er can identify in th e in terp retiv e activity. In
alignm ent w ith Poulet’s model, th e homeless voice of th e self th u s denotes not
th e au th o r’s presence in th e text, nor th e Ja u ssia n jo in t production by the
a u th o r and th e reader, b u t th e read er’s creation of a textual self free of the
authorial self.
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The te x t m ay be a n em blem of conflicting class society; i t m ay become
a platform for dom inant ideology to a ir th e public voice of th e self. I t m ay also
be a battleground for radical ideology, which seeks its rep resen tatio n as the
priv ate voice of th e self, disguised or openly, in its rebel ag ain st dominance.
T he te x t m ay also characterize a "classless society" or a "no-land" for ideology,
w here th e hom eless voice of the self or th e "private interest" of th e individual,
w hich is im possible to realize in th e individual’s society, m ay slip into the
te x t an d percolate in p a rts of the Actional world. The model of the three
"vocal" in te rp retatio n s of th e self incorporates both th e th in k in g of trad itio n
and th a t of postm odernism . J u s t as the F reudian psychoanalytical fram ew ork
ren d ers "dream s and slips of the tongue readable ra th e r th a n dism issing
them as m ere nonsense or error," an d ju s t as th e D erridaen deconstructive
approach

tre a ts

th e

"gaps,

m argins,

flgures,

echoes,

digressions,

discontinuities, contradictions, and am biguities" as signifying force in a text,
B a rb a ra Johnson is able to argue th a t "when one w rites, one w rites more
th a n (or less th a n , or other th an ) one thinks" w ithout realizing th e fact th a t
those "nonsense" signiflers w ithin th e tex t m ay ju s t as well im bue textual
m eaning as difference in th e process of signiflcation.32 H ere, "one w rites more
th a n one thinks" suggests a trad itio n al claim of authorial in ten tio n as well
as a p o ststru c tu ra list proposition of signiflcation th a t suspends th e traditional
in te re st in history and th e au th o rity of th e author. In close resem blance to
th is p a tte rn of thinking, th e th ree voices of th e self in th e altern ativ e M arxist
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approach acknowledge both of these claims in the public voice and in the
hom eless voice respectively. The notion of the totalizing ideology, in the sense
of th e L ukacsian all-sustaining form-giving subject of th e text, in
p o ststru ctu ralist M arxism tends to encompass the totality of textual meaning-every tex tu al sign is m arked w ithin th e ideological or institutional
boundaries. Ideology in the p resen t study, nevertheless, has its lim its in th a t
totalizing power or is designed to discredit or even edit out things according
to 'b in a ry oppositions" of its own. The edited-out or th e filtered-out in the
process of producing the dialectical real in postm odern M arxism becomes a
d ista n t real th a t em erges in th e sphere where one w rites "other th a n one
thinks," w hile th e public voice represents w h at one thinks.
Pronouncing all th e three kinds of voices, th e self in th e p resen t study
signifies two m eanings. The self w ith its public and private voices represents
authorial visions of dom inant and radical ideologies in th e text. O ut of the
already divided self betw een the public and the private, a textual self out of
contact w ith authorial ideology is created by the reader. However, it is
im p o rtan t th a t authorial ideology ought to be distinguished from authorial
intention. In h is critique of the New Critical thesis of "the intentional fallacy,"
E. D. H irsch, Jr. argues th a t th ere is "no magic land of m eaning outside
hum an consciousness." Em phasizing authorial intention, H irsch directs
critical atten tio n to textual m eaning th a t is constructed by searching for the
auth o r’s consciousness.33 A uthorial intention is always in th e author’s
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consciousness, b u t authorial ideology in th e present study m ay not be. It
consists of the author’s safeguarding of dom inant ideology and authorial
insertion into and production of em ergent ideology. The public voice of the
self, which taps into dom inant ideology or the established ideas, may
constitute authorial intention. In the private voice of the self, however, there
may be two possibilities. W hen authorial insertion into an ideology th a t has
been articulated on th e level of consciousness, the private voice representing
th a t ideology m ay be p a rt of authorial intention. B ut before the ideology
emerges from latencies to consciousness, the author’s production of the
ideology or raising i t to the level of consciousness m ay not involve authorial
intention, b u t th e te x t is still p a rt of authorial ideology. Engels’s
interpretation of realism or the authorial insertion into the working class
ideology in Balzac is a perfect example of this unconscious private voice.
A uthors m ay conceal th eir artistic interface w ith radical ideology in the text,
Engels writes, b u t "the realism I allude to may creep out even in spite of the
author’s views."34 The first is authorial intention to engage in an assau lt on
dom inant ideology, in concealment; the second is authorial ideology without
intention.
In term s of the author/text/reader relationship, the model of the self
w ith the three different voices values its dynam ism and its interrelationship
w ith one another. The public and private voices come out of the authorial
ideological bugles and retain the role of the author w ithin the sphere of
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criticism. The public voice of the self in Defoe’s fiction, for example, always
relates to Defoe’s conduct books and his other nonfiction writings. In reading
this public voice, authorial intention plays a key role. Defoe’s "second selves"
or "official scribes" in his fiction and nonfiction focus the critic’s attention
back on th e author himself, his public value system s being represented by his
public voice in the text. Besides the validity of Booth’s author-oriented study,
Poulet’s model of the reader w ithout the role of the author is also
incorporated in the framework of the split self w ith different voices. The
homeless voice of the self, as it is separated from the author, situates between
the text and th e reader, leaving the author’s intention and ideology out of the
enterprise of interpretation. A uthorial m eaning here m ay be constituted on
th e one h an d by the reader’s ideology as influenced by institutional discourse
and on th e other hand by the reader’s interpretive paradigm s free of
institutional control as in those of the Foucaultian "initiator of discursive
practices." The conflict between the author-oriented and the reader-oriented
approaches is also patched up together w ithin th e unconscious private voice
of the self th a t involves a production of the literary te x t by the joint work of
th e au th o r and th e reader in th a t the author’s unconscious private voice in
negation of the fam iliar "horizons of expectations" is raised to the level of
consciousness in th e text by the reader (e.g. Defoe’s anticipation of
Schlegelian irony in Moll Flanders th a t reinforces radical ideology in Chapter
4). M erging the models developed by Booth, Poulet, and Jau ss into
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cohabitation under the roof of the framework of the split self, instead of
including one to the exclusion of another, this alternative M arxist approach
also departs from those models by assigning relative significance to authorial
intention, historical determinism in the public voice of the self, the play of the
private voice, th e institutional control of the reader, and also the homeless
voices of the author and the reader alien to ideology and the institutional
discourse.
In applying th e model of different voices of the self to Defoe’s novels
such as Robinson Crusoe. Captain Singleton. Moll Flanders, and Roxana, the
em phasis of the following three chapters is laid upon the private and
homeless voices of the self and upon theoretical interpretation. Although the
homeless voice of the self, as the alternative M arxist approach theorizes,
obliterates its ties w ith ideology and history toward the end of Roxana, one
can witness in the next three chapters an interaction between theoretical
explications and historical studies in the mode of the private voice. In this
shared territory of theory and history, the one cannot go w ithout the other.
In C hapter 3 on lines of flight or deterritorialization, theory and history go
hand in hand in the shared territory of interpretation of the private voice.
The discussion of deterritorialization is impossible without a historical
background in the seventeenth-century theories on the relationship between
theology and medicine, Defoe’s notions about dream s as communications with
the supernatural, and his views on the laws of matrimony. W ithout a
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historical background, it is hard to describe how Robinson Crusoe
reterritorializes into his public voice after entertaining a deterritorializing
private voice; w ithout a historical background, it is also hard to know how
Captain Singleton and Roxana articulate th eir private voices in rebelling
against the laws of God and m an without coming to term s w ith authority in
the end. The private voice in Moll Flanders in Chapter 4 is Defoe’s ideology
of radical thought about disorder and chaos in the universe, a sense of the
contemporary skepticism about the already disrupted order of the divine
creation. Incorporating both theoretical and historical insights about the
chaotic world of becoming indicates a level of the private voice in the novel.
Historical studies certainly are valuable here to provide the reader with
insight into the ideologies about universal disorder. The theme of disorder
and chaos is implemented in a theoretical application of Schlegelian irony to
the text, which centers on uncertainty and ironic ambiguities. Critics’
historical studies of natu ral law, the living standards of the contemporary
working class, and the theories of sympathy developed by Burke and Smith
all help to determine Moll the character’s growth and process of becoming and
Moll the n arrator’s ambiguous double role in term s of Schlegelian irony.
Finally, the feminist study of Roxana in C hapter 5 (except for h er homeless
voice, which is in contact w ith the distant real and w ith recent theoretical
systems) draws on both recent critical discoveries and historical concepts
about the distinctions of gender roles, including Defoe’s ideas about an ideal

59
w om an. T he L acan ian critical model is m easu red a g a in st histo rical insights
in lig h t of R oxana’s public voice as a w om an visualized in th e ideology of th e
"m ale gaze" a n d h er p riv ate voice as a "She-Devil” who poses a th re a t to
p atriarch y .

CHAPTER 3

DETERRITORIALIZING CULTURAL BOUNDARIES

Georg L ukacs in The Theory of th e Novel distinguishes betw een the
epic an d th e novel in term s of a spatial/tem poral relation in both of th eir
in n e r and outer forms. E xternally, th e epic soul "goes out to seek adventure;
it lives through adventures." The novel, however, comprises in th e to tality of
its "biographical form" a tem poral order in the lim it w ithin th e beginning and
th e end of th e fictional world, w hich "tends to unfold its full epic totality only
w ithin th a t span of life w hich is essential to it.” T he spatial/tem poral
distinction, for Lukacs, also applies to th e in n e r form of th e epic an d of the
novel. "For th e epic," w rites Lukacs, "the world a t any given m om ent is an
ultim ate principle." Any tem poral historical m om ent is conceived in spatial
relations to essence or th e en tire cosmos, w hich is life itself. Both history and
th e philosophy of history as "a form of life" an d as "the form-giving subject"
of th e epic m ark "the form ative prim e reality of every individual
phenomenon." They supply the content and determ ine th e form of artistic
creation th a t ends up as a to tality w here "every action is only a well-fitting
g arm en t for th e world." The m etaphysical space betw een fictional characters,
then, is "at th e sam e distance from th e all-sustaining essence..., for all are
striving in the sam e w ay tow ards th e sam e centre, an d all move a t the sam e
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level of an existence which is essentially th e same." In the novel, by contrast,
"the extensive totality of life is no longer directly given." Now th a t the all
determ ining transcendental "home" or the harmonic parallelism between the
organic structure (essence and life) as "the form-giving subject" and "the
world of created forms" has been destroyed, the novel supplies its own content
and seeks its own form in th e process of becoming.36 Following Lukacs’s
argum ent, Fredric Jam eson revives the distinction between the earlier novel
and its m odem form along th e lines of such spatial relations and tem poral
order, a Lukacsian distinction between two types of narration: "the novel of
abstract idealism" and "the novel of rom antic disillusionm ent." While the
external world of the earlier world-oriented novel is prim arily spatial, where
th e hero w anders through geographical space and experiences adventures, the
novel of rom antic disillusionm ent is dominated by an external reality th a t is
tim e itself. The hero in the m odem novel as th e renewed epic can act and
express a kind of epic unity of m eaning and life, b u t th e m odem hero acts not
across geographical space b u t in time. "It is a unity th ru st into th e past, a
unity remembered only. For in the present the world always defeats the
hero." Internally, Jam eson m aintains, "each novel is a process in which the
very possibility of narration m u st begin in a void, w ithout any acquired
momentum: its privileged subject m atter will therefore be the search, in a
world in which neith er goals nor path s are established beforehand."36
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The spatial/tem poral criterion of th e m odem novel championed by
Lukacs and Jam eson confronts a re-evaluation in the Deleuzian lines of flight
or "deterritorialization." While Lukacs and Jam eson devalue geographical
space in favor of tem poral order, Gilles Deleuze and Claire P a m e t reverse the
two term s and value geographical flight for its "deterritorialization." In their
elucidation, the tem poral order in term s of both the p ast and the future in
literatu re fixes m an to territorialization or under the supremacy of traditional
culture. Flight across geographical space per se is not belittled; only th a t
which does not launch a departure from tradition is. Deleuze and P a m e t
argue th a t while the French are "too historical, too concerned w ith the future
an d the past" and always begin "the search for a prim ary certainty as a point
of origin," Anglo-American w riters create characters who engage in "a line of
flight" or "deterritorialization." F irst, the tem poral order is no major concern
for Deleuze and P am et. Unlike th e Lukacsian and Jam esonian hero who lives
in the memory of the p ast because "in the present the world always defeats
th e hero," the Deleuzian flight crew enjoy the here and now and concern
neither the traditional p ast nor the future. Second, adventurous journeys
across geographical space are not discredited. "American literatu re operates
according to geographical lines: the flight towards the West, the discovery
th a t th e true E ast is in th e West, the sense of the frontiers as something to
cross, to push back, to go beyond." Besides being geographical, a line of flight
for Deleuze and P a m e t can also "happen on the spot, in motionless travel.”
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Although characters in French literature may go on a voyage, "there is always
a way of reterritorializing" themselves on th e voyage; they always return,
always fall back to an old track and back into something they are fleeing
from, or they escape from th is world and exit to th e next. B u t AngloAmerican literatu re is preoccupied with ruptures, with characters who know
how to become and how to "create a new Earth." Then, fleeing across
boundaries is developing a private voice against tradition. Deleuze and P am et
discuss th e opposition between boundaries and flight in term s of the
dem arcations between trees and grass, gods and demons, tricksters and
traitors. The term s on th e one side of the dem arcations serve th e functions
of cultural fixation: in the im agery of trees, the roots hold the soil in place
w ithin territorializing boundaries and keep it from eroding; gods have "fixed
powers which try to hold us back"; and "the trickster claims to take
possession of fixed properties, or to conquer a territory." On the other hand,
"grass has its line of flight, and does not take root"; demons jum p across
intervals; and traito rs betray "the world of dom inant significations" and the
established order. Flight across geographical lines helps us get loose from the
coils of the tree roots, the fixation of the gods, and the control of the
tricksters, which hold us back from departures and territorialize us within
boundaries and walls. To take a Deleuzian flight is to jum p over, plane down,
or crash through the territorializing walls and is to pick up a cultural code
like th e laws of God and of m an and deterritorialize it. A line of flight is thus
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not striving towards a center of essence b u t is "a sort of delirium" or a
tendency "to go off the rails." I t is a movement of departure away from the
traditional, th e fixed, and the stable. A line of flight is a betrayal of "the
established powers of the earth," a betrayal characterized, for example, by a
"double tuming-away": "Man turns his face away from God, who also turns
his face away from man. It is in this double tum ing-aw ay...that the line of
flight—th a t is, the deterritorialization of m a n -is traced."37
Although critics have rightly argued about the departures of Defoe’s
fiction from the Spanish picaresque novel based on Defoe’s seriousness about
m orality and religion, the present study of deterritorialization does not align
Defoe’s novels back to the picaresque tradition, for they show some vital
differences from their predecessors in th eir lines of flight. The picaro or the
picaresque hero, in Lazarillo. Guzman, or El Buscon. for instance, seeks
adventure in his quest for freedom, b u t the adventure usually ends up in
harm ony with the imperfect world the picaro lives in. The picaro (Lazarillo)
may secure a position and an identity in society and reterritorialize himself
from flight across geographical space and occasional mockery of authority
(e.g. his prayer to God to let more neighbors die so th a t he can commit his
"sin" of eating a t more funerals). Or the rogue (Guzman) m ay experience a
religious conversion and compromise with authority. Or the delinquent
(Pablos) m ay go out to sea and come back to Spain without changing his
original "nature" and without taking any lines of flight. The self and the other
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m ay be in conflict, b u t it is only rogues cheating and robbing rogues; th eir
energy is barely oriented tow ards deterritorialization or jum ping over
boundaries b u t is exhausted in adap tin g to situ atio n s an d begging the mercy
of society.38 T hus, a line of flight can serve as a criterion to distinguish
betw een those novels th a t b reak from th e earlier trad itio n and those th a t
strik e a close resem blance to it.
Defoe’s five m ajor fictional characters, Crusoe, Singleton, Moll, Jack,
and Roxana, all engage in some so rt of getaw ays. Geographically, th e y all get
aw ay from E ngland some tim e in th e ir lives, b u t not all of them take a
D eleuzian line of flight. B oth Moll and Jack spend some tim e in th e New
World, one a tran sp o rted th ie f and th e other a deceived robber and sold as a
slave. B oth re tu rn to E ngland as corrected and rew arded m iddle class
personages who can fit into th e old society and live happily ever after. Crusoe
longs to go to sea an d to flee from E ngland, w here he does not find
satisfaction in h is station. A fter h is isolation on th e island, he comes back a
converted C h ristian an d finally accepts Providence into h is h ea rt. A lthough
they have ta k e n some lines of flight earlier in th e ir lives in com m itting crime
ag a in st th e social an d divine order, th ese th ree ch aracters—Crusoe, Moll, and
Ja c k —finally reterrito rialize them selves an d come to term s w ith th e authority
they rebel ag ain st. Only Singleton and Roxana have ta k e n tru ly Deleuzian
lines of flight in th eir lives, although in a different way. Singleton engages in
a line of flight in m otionless travel after he b reak s th e law s of God and m an,
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for he finally, though reluctantly, comes back to London, and refuses to
identify w ith th e society he flees aw ay from in the first place. Roxana, too,
deterritorializes th e social and divine order in breaking th e laws of
m atrim ony an d leaves E ngland for good.39 The p resen t chapter will focus on
all th e th ree kinds of flight involved w ith th ree of Defoe’s novels:
reterritorialization or a n illusory line of flight in Robinson Crusoe, a line of
flight in motionless travel in C aptain Singleton, and a line of flight across
geographical space in Roxana. Although Crusoe develops a kind of private
voice in d isrupting th e religious tradition earlier in the novel, he comes back
to E ngland in th e end w ith a public voice and reterritorializes him self to
authority. By contrast, both Singleton and Roxana, in deterritorializing the
law s of God and m an, pose a th re a t to au thority and trad itio n w ith the
private voice of the self throughout th e ir lives.

3.1. Crusoe and R eterritorialization

Robinson Crusoe (1719) is Defoe’s dram atization of the confrontation
betw een two opposing attitu d e s tow ard h um an experience: th e secular and
th e religious,40 w here th e la tte r trium phs through to th e end of th e novel, the
triu m p h even extending to its sequel The F a rth e r A dventures (1719) in
Crusoe’s religious dissem ination th a t prepares for his final celestial "longer
journey" into th e next world. W ith his island solitude for P u ritan
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internalization, Crusoe is converted to a C hristian, b u t only after he revisits
his island in the sequel is his religious longing finally realized, in the
successful reform ation of his island. The secular is fighting a losing battle in
the novel, b u t this component of the combat is not w ithout its moments,
especially earlier in the novel, which constitutes a line of flight across
geographical space. Going out to sea for Crusoe against his father’s authority
is

falling into

sin

and

crossing cultural

boundaries.

B ut Crusoe

reterritorializes him self a t the end of the novel by retu rn in g to w hat he is
fleeing aw ay from in the first place and by compromising w ith authority, the
heavenly F ath er, th u s ending in an illusory line of flight and delusion of
deterritorialization.
In spite of fatherly advice to "stay and settle a t Home," the young
Crusoe sets out to sea to seek w ealth and adventures. Defoe prepares the
protagonist in the first three journeys for the subsequent island shipwreck,
and during th e three trials Crusoe demystifies th e traditional symbol of the
tem pest by dislocating the m eaning of it and reinforces his "Original Sin" by
acquiring the necessary survival skills on the coast of Africa and in the
Brazils. On his first journey to sea, his father’s "truly Prophetick" warning
th a t he will be "the m iserablest Wretch" seems to come tru e for Crusoe, for
he, being "a fresh W ater Sailor," gets sea-sick. He reflects th a t "how justly I
was overtaken by the Judgm ent of Heaven for my wicked leaving my F ather’s
House, and abandoning my Duty."41 This religious rude awakening, however,
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is due to the individual’s physical and psychological response to the sea,
which m ay differ from person to person, for it is a "terrible Storm" to Crusoe
w hat is to his sailor friend "a Cap full of Wind" th a t gives the sailors "a good
Ship and Sea Room" (9). The religious confession of guilt is stim ulated by the
symbol of the tem pest, b u t the symbol itself is problematic and inaccessible
to meaning. The "storm" as Crusoe understands it does not constitute a
symbol to the rest of the world b u t a dislocated symbol th a t m eans something
only to its bad reader. W itty and piquant, Crusoe and his "Companion" do not
pierce through the membrane of irony th a t hides a mockery of the religious
overtone of the symbolic storm. Although they do not share the same notion
of the "terrible storm," they do go the same "old way of all Sailors" and share
the punch and make Crusoe drunk with it, so th at, in Crusoe’s words, "in
th a t one N ight’s Wickedness I drowned all my Repentance" (9). The sailors’
m utual comprehension of the "storm" disarm s Crusoe’s unnecessary
repentance more th an the punch "drowns" it in the sailors’ old-fashion way.
Not only does Crusoe dislocate the symbol of the tem pest, b u t he also
refuses to read any significance into it on this first journey, an attem pt to
(over)correct his bad symbol reading. When a real storm h its the ship,
anchored a t Yarmouth Roads, the n arrator changes from the mode of
reflecting to th a t of describing and focuses more on the crew’s physical
activity to save the ship from "foundering" and la ter to escape for life from
the sinking ship. The realistic details, cutting away the foremast and the
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m ainm ast, pum ping up w ater out of the flooded hold, and Crusoe’s being
scared to a swoon by the shot of the SOS signal, all draw the reader’s
attention more to the physical situations of the event th a n its religious
signification. The narrato r is caught up in the victims’ desperate efforts to
fight the storm and the other ship’s difficult b u t successful rescue operation
while forgetting, together w ith everyone of the crew, all about the traditional
w arning on Crusoe’s sin.42 I t crosses no one’s m ind to pray to God for
deliverance; it occurs to no one th a t the storm may be a visible sign of divine
w rath. Only after knowing it is Crusoe’s trial journey against his father’s will
does the captain of the ship w arn Crusoe th a t "perhaps this is all befallen us
on vour Account, like Jonah in the Ship of Tarshish" and swear th a t "I would
not set my Foot in the same Ship with thee again for a Thousand Pounds."
In response to it, Crusoe lightheartedly comments in a comical tone, "This
indeed was, as I said, an Excursion of his Spirits which were yet agitated by
the Sense of his Loss [of the ship]" (15). Crusoe has taken a failed symbol
seriously and treated a possible divine sign lightly on this first journey, not
because he is either ignorant of religious hermeneutics or blind to divine
visible signs. It is because Crusoe has taken a flight across the interpretive
boundaries and blurred the herm eneutic territories of the tem pest symbol.
The symbol first means something for Crusoe but nothing to everyone else,
and he la ter overcorrects his bad reading by ignoring any monitory
implications of the storm. This hypercorrection seems to work for Crusoe,
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because no one a t th e m om ent of d istress read s an y th in g into th e symbol.
T hen, i t is no w onder he does not tak e th e captain’s afterm ath comments
seriously.
C o n trary to fath erly w arning, th e next two journeys consolidate
Crusoe’s restlessn ess to go to sea, for they an sw er th e purpose of acquiring
survival skills Crusoe will la te r find in h an d y a t seafaring. F a r from being
punished for harboring a disobedient w andering soul, Crusoe comes back from
a successful second trip abroad, to the coast of Africa. Besides th e 300 pounds
he h a s m ade from th e voyage, Crusoe h a s also acquired, am ong other things,
"a com petent Knowledge of the M athem aticks and th e Rides of navigation,
learn ed how to keep an Account of th e S hip’s Course, an d ta k e an
O bservation" (17). The n ex t journey proves less fo rtu n ate because Crusoe is
captured by th e M oorish p irates a t Sallee. B u t th ere is also a b rig h t side to
it: physical endurance during th e two y ears of captivity, in trig u e involved in
his escape from th e Moors, an d m ost im portantly h is short career as a p lan ter
in th e B razils. Crusoe does not elaborate on th e survival essentials he has
learn ed from th ese experiences in th is sh o rt p rep aratio n section of th e novel,
b u t he does give credit to them la te r w hen he is stran d ed on th e island. For
exam ple, two im p o rtan t tools essential for survival on th e island, responsible
for sh elter an d food respectively, are m ade w ith th e skills and knowledge
Crusoe h a s learn ed from the Brazils: "the Iron Tree" w ith w hich he m akes a
shovel for digging his cave (73) an d th e technique to m ake th e grinder
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hollowed out from a big log of wood for pounding "Com into M eal to m ake my
Bread" (122). Besides th e tools for subsistence, Crusoe h as also learn ed from
th e B razilians to use tobacco to cure his illness on th e island (93). H aving
th u s allowed Crusoe to dem ystify th e symbol of th e tem p est a n d procure th e
essential survival skills in th e beginning pages of th e novel, Defoe is ready
to p u t Crusoe to te s t in th e b attle betw een th e secular an d th e religious on
h is island.
The confrontation betw een th e secular and the religious is b est shown
in th e firs t few m onths before Crusoe settles down on th e island. A fter
Crusoe’s b reathless struggle o u t of th e foam ing waves of th e sea an d landing
on th e island, th e firs t th o u g h t th a t crosses his m ind is "I h ad a dreadful
Deliverance" (47) in stead of reading th e shipw reck as a sign of divine
punishm ent. T here is no room in Crusoe’s perspectives for religious
herm eneutics for a proper reading of th e sign of th e tem pest. A t th is m oment,
he is occupied w ith th e ta sk of survival ra th e r th a n sp iritu al m editation, for
he is worried about clothes, hunger, shelter, and th e danger of being devoured
by wild beasts. Sleeping in a bushy an d th o rn y tre e to hide from wild
creatures, tying u p logs of wood to m ake a r a ft in order to unload th e wrecked
ship, balancing the w eight of th e load on th e raft, an d seeking an ideal place
for his h ab itat, every physical activity is described to th e m inute detail. W hen
he th in k s about God, i t is H is deliverance th a t he feels th an k fu l for b u t not
th e divine p u n ish m en t of him th a t is supposed to be ju s t to h is "Original Sin"
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to leave his father’s house. So far for Crusoe, God seems to have mercy on
him for his disobedience while he, like a tru e C hristian, should have heeded
God’s visible signs as punishm ent.43 Crusoe does not even realize th e m eaning
of th e sign w hen he dream s about nine m onths la te r of a m an saying “Seeing
all these Things have not brought thee to Repentance, now thou sh alt die."
w hich should have m ade him th in k of th e shipwreck as "a ju s t P unishm ent
of my Sin" (87-8). The m isreading of God’s Providence before th is realization
in the first nine m onths surely constitutes a line of flight in th a t Crusoe has
deconstructed th e traditional symbol of the tem pest. Not only h as he rebelled
ag ain st au thority b u t h as also chosen to ignore th e signification of the
shipwreck.
Crusoe’s m isreading of Providence also resides in his reading of signs
in the barley and the tobacco episodes, w here (m is)reading of the signs of the
divine providence is only th e difference of his (feigned) faith. As soon as
Crusoe spots some barley stalks growing by the side of his cave, "in a Clim ate
w hich I know w as n o t proper for Corn," he, understandably, praises
Providence for th e miracle: "God h ad m iraculously caus’d th is G rain to grow
w ithout an y Help of Seed sown" (78). M iraculous as it seems, th e barley
grows on th e scorching island in the sum m er w ithout a seed! Crusoe h as no
choice b u t to believe it is th e wonder work of Providence. However, Crusoe
th e sign read er disrupts the miracle and tu rn s it into som ething n a tu ra l and
common, piece by piece. As he la te r finds out th a t the barley has grown from
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th e rem ainder of th e grain in a bag, Crusoe is aw are he has made a m istake
and adm its th a t "the Wonder began to cease” and "my religious Thankfulness
to God’s Providence began to abate too upon the Discovering th a t all th is was
nothing b u t w hat was common" C78).44 P a rt of the miracle h as been explained
away; the barley does not grow w ithout seeds. The n ex t p a rt of the myth
about its growing condition is also demystified, for Crusoe has throw n the
grain "in th e Shade of a high Rock" so th a t it has not been "burnt up and
destroy’d" (79). I t is ironic th en th a t faced w ith th e failed sign of Providence,
Crusoe still justifies his m istake by reinforcing his m isreading: "it was really
th e Work of Providence as to me (italics added], th a t should order or appoint,
th a t 10 or 12 G rains of Com should rem ain unspoil’d" (79). As he says ten
pages later, "the growing up of the Corn...began to affect me with
Seriousness, as long as I thought it had something m iraculous in it" (89).
Crusoe can praise God for the things to which H is power is not attributed, as
long as he lets his faith hang in there and not fall w ith the miracle, although
the praise-w orthy miracle itself h as already collapsed.
This blind faith in the divine providence is illu strated in th e tobacco
episode as well. W hen Crusoe is ill, he says "Conscience th a t had slept so
long, begun to awake, and I began to reproach my self w ith my past Life"
(90). He th en thinks about his "Original Sin" and about his father’s advice
and cries out "Lord be mv Help, for I am in great Distress" (91). The next
m orning Crusoe feels "the F it being entirely off," b u t he does not owe it to his
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prayers for divine deliverance b u t to being "refresh’d w ith the Sleep" and
expects the retu rn of the illness the next day. There is no connection between
yesterday’s prayers and today’s slight recovery. He does not w ait for
Providence b u t prepares a m ixture of w ater and rum and puts it along with
a piece of boiled m eat on his table "in Reach of my Bed." Repentance and
prayers do not help much until Crusoe uses tobacco th a t he rem em bers the
B razilians used to cure all kinds of illnesses. In the tobacco chest, Crusoe also
finds the Holy Bible, which he thinks is "a Cure, both for Soul and Body" (93).
Crusoe tries several experim ents on the tobacco for five days and cures "the
F it for good an d all" (95). He th en attrib u tes the cure solely to th e Bible and
thanks God for delivering him from the illness.
I t is clear th a t this traditional separation of theology and medicine
ru n s counter to the practice of the Paracelsian new medicine th a t posed a
th re a t to m ainstream Puritanism in the seventeenth century. Crusoe’s final
attribu tio n of the cure to th e realm of the supernatural ra th e r th a n the
tobacco indicates this P u ritan orthodoxy.46 Defoe in his Review, it is true,
notes the glory and omnipotence of God in nature, as he says, "Heaven having
plac’d Medicinal healing Vertue, in the Plants, Drugs, and other Produce of
the E arth , is a full and authentick Testimony of his Will." The supernatural
may perm eate the n atu ra l life, b u t the practice of medicine, Defoe continues,
is m ainly of a hum an endeavor, for "the Skill of rightly applying proper
Medicines to every Evil, and of rightly judging of the Disease, is obtain’d by

Study, Application and Experience." In A Journal of the Plague Year (1722).
w here Defoe displays both the traditional and contemporary views on the
Plague as a divine visitation and as a natu ral calamity, H. F., the narrator,
even am bivalently endorses hum an efforts in preventing the spreading of the
infection in spite of the divine power. On the one hand, while he explains the
Plague as "a Distemper arising from natu ral Causes" and as a result of "the
Conduct of hum an Causes and Effects," H. F. categorizes both under the
traditional theory th a t "the divine Power has form’d the whole Scheme of
N ature" (194). Since it is "the Hand of God" th a t is behind the epidemic,
"there was nothing to be hoped for, b u t an universal Desolation" (171). On the
other

hand,
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deterritorializes the universal divine boundaries. The observant H. F.
prescribes "the best Phvsick against the Plague is to ru n away." For those
who believe "God is able to keep us in the m idst of Danger, and able to
overtake us when we think our selves out of Danger," they end up in "the
great Pits" w ith the other carcasses, "who, if they had fled from the Danger,
had, I believe, been safe from the Disaster" (197-8). A part from fleeing from
the divine vengeance, H. F. also suggests saving people from the infection by
opposing "shutting Houses up" (159). H. F. him self is immune to the
contagion not because of God’s mercy b u t because of the anti-pestilential
drugs called "Venice Treacle" (240) he takes under the recommendation of his
doctor. The hum an empirical p a rt of medicine, for Defoe, sometimes is even
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more im portant th an the divine "healing Vertue" and even more important
th an Providence itself. In the sequel of Robinson Crusoe. The Farther
Adventures. Crusoe rescues a hurricane wrecked ship bound home to Bristol
from Barbados. All people on board are starving to death, and the doctor’s
role here is vital to saving them. First, Crusoe’s ship being present as divine
deliverance to the victims is not enough, for if the starved eat a t once as
much as they w ant to, they will all perish. Second, Crusoe’s surgeon does not
use any medicine of "healing Vertue" to cure the patients b u t judges on the
nature of the illness and prescribes moderation "to give every m an but a very
little a t a time; and by this caution he preserved the men, who would
otherwise have killed themselves with th a t very food th a t was given them on
purpose to save their lives."46
The tobacco having the healing power in itself may be a sign of glory
in divine creation. However, there is a private voice or an anti-orthodox deep
layer th a t underlies the episode. Found in the same container with the Bible,
the tobacco is not excluded from the marked boundaries of the power of
healing while its role in the healing process apparently is ruled out. Crusoe
only says, in his feigned faith, th a t he has been relieved from the illness by
Providence, but the details about how he experiments with the medicine
suggest the real cure results from a natu ral cause, the tobacco, and Crusoe’s
hum an ingenuity. To use the tobacco correctly to cure a particular disease is
a question of human knowledge and may be more im portant than the
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"healing V ertue" of th e medicine itself. Defoe’s obsession w ith th e details
about Crusoe’s experim ents w ith th e tobacco im plies Crusoe’s role in curing
his own illness, w here his em pirical studies, of a n a tu ra l science n atu re , w ith
th e tobacco overshadow his p ure faith in Providence: drinking th e tobacco
steeped in rum , chewing tobacco leaves, an d holding his head over th e tobacco
smoke. Crusoe h a s cured th e illness only afte r he experim ents w ith the
tobacco all th e th ree w ays w ithin five days and tries th em all a t one tim e and
doubles th e am o u n t of th e tobacco ru m th a t he h as ta k e n th e day before.
Therefore, it is ironic th a t Crusoe, after all th e descriptions of the
experim ents, discredits th e realm of th e m aterial an d a ttrib u te s h is recovery
to th a t of th e su p ern atu ral.
As a m a tte r of fact, Crusoe shows some am bivalence tow ard Providence
or th e invisible w orld in th e novel. A lthough he does n o t fail to acknowledge
Providence w hen i t comes to deliverance from crises, he does n o t h esitate to
give credit to h u m an wisdom or ingenuity. A fter seeing th e footprint on the
shore, for exam ple, Crusoe im agines all sorts of dangers w aiting for him and
adm its th a t "God, who w as n o t only Righteous b u t O m nipotent...; ’tw as my
unquestion’d D uty to resign my self absolutely an d entirely to his Will" (157).
God’s will it m ay be to p u n ish him by giving th e sign of th e footprint, b u t
Crusoe does not adopt a sit-and-w ait attitu d e tow ard w h at m ay be th e hand
of Providence b u t tak es "all th e M easures hum ane Prudence could suggest for
m y own Preservation" (162). One of the things he does to protect him self is
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to p lan t a thick layer of bushes to conceal the wall in front of his cave. Due
to his protective precautions, no one haB ever discovered Crusoe’s re tre a t on
the island, except w hen he, to show off his talen ts, deliberately introduces the
place to his island subjects. Even the English captain Crusoe h as saved on
the islan d from the m utineers la te r gives high m arks to Crusoe’s ingenuity:
"the C aptain adm ir’d m y Fortification, and how perfectly I h ad conceal’d my
R e treat w ith a Grove of Trees" because th e wall of the bushes is so thick th a t
"it w as im passable in any P a rt of it, b u t a t th a t one Side, w here I had
reserv’d my little w inding Passage into it" (258). Moreover, th e h um an m ind
can even alter th e contents of a su p ern atu ral prophecy. Crusoe’s dream about
tak in g a savage as h is slave rem inds him of m a n - la b o r to assist him in his
escape from th e island, and th u s he says, "1 m ade th is Conclusion, th a t my
only W ay to go about a n A ttem pt for an Escape, was, if possible, to get a
Savage into my Possession" (199). Note th a t Crusoe no longer expects any
ships to come to shore as a sign of divine deliverance b u t begins to scheme
u p a plan to escape w ith the help of a savage. H is high hopes of Providence
for deliverance are transform ed down to those of th e sub-hum an. W hat is
more im p o rtan t is th a t Crusoe deliberately changes th e plot of the dream
story in th e process of th e real-life h u n t for Friday, th e savage Crusoe has
rescued and tak en as his servant. Having asked Friday to bu ry the two dead
savages, Crusoe leads him to his cave "on the farth er P a r t of the Island; so
I did not le t m y D ream come to pass in th a t P art, viz. T h at he came into my
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Grove for shelter" (205). The reader fam iliar w ith Defoe’s notion about
dream s as a form of communication w ith the su p ern atu ral47 can easily see
th a t Crusoe h as altered the direction of th e prophecy in th a t p a rt of the
dream he feels m ight be a potential th re a t to his "Castle" while allowing the
re st to come tru e in the process.
Crusoe in The F a rth e r A dventures shows more of th is ambivalence and
even complains about Providence. E arly in th e book, Crusoe’s ship rescues a
French m erchant ship on fire and picks up "two boats full of people." The
rescued people s ta rt to give thanks to God for th e ir deliverance, b u t Crusoe
is having a problem. "To carry this whole company to the E a st Indies,"
Crusoe thinks, "would be ruining our whole voyage by devouring all our
provisions." Being p a rt of th e deliverance th a t m ay jeopardize his mission,
Crusoe seems to th in k God is to hold responsible for th is "unforeseen
accident" because he h as no choice b u t to save the m iserable people according
to his religious principles. About th is inconvenience, "no one could say we
were to blame: for the law s of God and N atu re would have forbid th a t we
should refuse to tak e up two boats full of people in such a distressed
condition" (23). Crusoe is unhappy th a t Providence has p u t him in this
deliverance operation th a t gets him , the rescuer, into trouble. This fram e of
m ind ru n s a sharp contrast to "the variety of postures which these poor
delivered people ra n into to express th e joy of th e ir souls a t so unexpected a
deliverance" (17), about which he is not too excited to see because he has to
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worry about his own mission. W hat Crusoe is getting a t is th a t the rescued
have all the reasons to express their joy and gratitude by owing their
deliverance to Providence, b u t they are only doing th a t a t th e expense of the
rescuer—Crusoe, it seems, would not have rescued th e ship had it not been
"the laws of God and N ature" and had he foreseen the trouble.48 This different
point of view, from the perspective of the rescuer, certainly indicates Crusoe’s
am bivalent instinct about Providence.
Crusoe has tak en lines of flight by crossing herm eneutic boundaries
and m isreading the signs of the tem pest, by ironically pricking the phantom
of Providence and dism antling the traditional dichotomy between religion and
medicine, and by showing his ambivalence tow ard divine deliverance and
giving credit to hum an ingenuity. All these lines of flight are embedded in his
flight across geographical space th a t characterizes his private voice or
"Original Sin" against fatherly and divine authority. Also, th e confrontation
between the power of the spiritual world and the power of the hum an world
in the tobacco and the dream of the savages episodes deterritorializes the
boundaries of th e first (divine) causes and the second (hum an) causes. The
realm of th e hum an forces occupies its place in w hat should be traditionally
assigned to th a t of the supernatural, for hum an knowledge and ingenuity in
the medical experim ents have actually cured Crusoe’s illness, and the hum an
will actually intervenes w ith the supernatural prophecy of Crusoe’s dream.
Fleeing across geographical space, thus, merges w ith crossing cultural

81
boundaries or deterritorialization in Crusoe's restlessness to go to sea.
Seeking adventures a t sea is nothing like driving tow ard a center of
established principles as in the ancient Greek genres b u t is fleeing away from
the

center,

creating

a

slippage,

and

leaving behind

nothing but

deterritorialized boundaries.
However, Crusoe reterritorializes him self in his religious conversion on
the island and goes back to where he was when he started the flight. So his
journey back home to England is a trip back to the center with
reterritorialized boundaries, a trip characterized by his retu rn from his
"fortunate fall.1'49 Being a converted Christian, Crusoe retu rn s to England
after thirty-five years. The success of his plantation in the Brazils, which has
m ade him 5000 pounds and an estate of above 1000 pounds a year, lands
Crusoe in "the middle station," the very state w ith which his father used to
advise him to be content. Crusoe also reterritorializes him self and
compromises w ith a higher authority. D eterm ined to stay a t home, Crusoe
sells his Brazil plantation for "33000 Pieces of Eight" and enjoys his riches in
England. The only reason for his pick for England, instead of the Brazils, as
his home is his newly found au th o rity -P ro testan t Christianity. "As I had
entertain'd some Doubts about the Roman Religion, even while I was abroad,
especially in my S tate of Solitude; so I knew th ere was no going to the Brasils
for me...; so I resolv’d to stay a t Home" (303). Even his mission to revisit his
island in The F arth er Adventures is to "establish them there," to dissem inate
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the Word of God and to imbue his island subjects w ith the laws of God and
m an in his arrangem ents of the m arriages of the converted prisoners and the
savages. Bringing all the m aterial necessities to the island on his revisit is
not sufficient; only after the religious conversion of his subjects has Crusoe
"brought the affair of the island to a narrow compass" (161), and only after
the dissemination of the Word of God has Crusoe colonized a new world and
invented, or duplicated, the hum an civilization all over again on his island.
His father already dead after he comes back, Crusoe, a t his best, becomes a
seventeenth-century "masterless man," who finds a new m aster in God.50 The
world Crusoe has created on his island, after all, is a representation of the
ultim ate principle of divine glory, and now a tru e Christian, he has
territorialized his subjects and subjugated them, following his own example,
to the laws of God and of man. Finally, the life-long journeys of adventures
and the adaptation to the religious principles have qualified him as a
candidate for the after-life in heaven, his la st words of the book being: "I am
preparing for a longer journey th an all these, having lived seventy-two years
a life of infinite variety, and learnt sufficiently to know th e value of
retirem ent, and the blessing of ending our days in peace" (319).

3.2. Captain Singleton’s Flight in "Motionless Travel"
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C aptain Singleton (1720) consists of two flights its hero tak es during
his life-tim e an d is divided into two halves of equal length devoted to both
flights. Singleton sta rts out as an orphan, and his first flight tak es off on
board th e Portuguese ship, w hich is a symbol of social authority. Singleton’s
p riv ate voice originates on th a t ship. U n ru ly an d rebellious, th e young
Singleton cannot stan d his m aster’s cruelty from th e o u tset an d cooks up a
plan, w ithout execution, to kill th e m a ster an d escape from the ship or to flee
across th e social boundaries. Added to his resistance to au th o rity is the
m otivation of a m utiny w orked u p am ong the crew, w hen th e ship comes to
a n anchor on th e coast of M adagascar: "They th re a te n ’d th e C aptain to set
him on Shore.... I w ish’d they would, w ith all m y H eart, for I w as full of
M ischief in m y H ead, and ready enough to do any." As Singleton "em barked
in it so openly" th a t he and th e others "were seized, an d p u t into Irons."61 A
slave’s conspiracy of a m utiny is rebelling ag ain st th e hierarchical system
m aintain ed on th e ship, w ith both civil and religious au th o rities represented
by th e C aptain an d th e C haplain of th e ship. The stru c tu ra l an d social
hierarchy in th e upper/low er consciousness ru n s through th e social order on
board th e ship. Singleton’s m aster refers to th e C ap tain as "in th e Office
above" (7). T he upper/low er social stru ctu re also reflects th e relationship
betw een Singleton and h is m aster. Before being se t on shore because of his
involvem ent in th e m utiny, Singleton req u ests if he can ta lk w ith his m aster,
an d "they told m e I m ight, if m y M aster would come down to me, b u t I could
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be n o t allowed to come up to him" (12). The act of "coming down" is the
m aster’s gesture of benevolence or patronizing, b u t th e slave cannot be
granted th e right to go up to his m aster or to cross social boundaries in th a t
hierarchy and place conscious territory. Then, it is not surprising th a t the
C aptain, th e suprem e au thority of th e ship, th in k s "M utiny on board a Ship
w as the sam e thing as Treason in the King’s Palace" (16). Singleton and the
other crim inals are th en set on shore to fight for th e ir own survival. R ather
th a n a form of punishm ent, it is assistance to Singleton’s escape from
au th o rity he has planned so long. Tw enty-three of the crew m em bers even
volunteer and beg the C aptain to allow them to join the flight in th e nam e of
protecting th e crim inals (17). The group establish a democratic society of
th e ir own, trad e w ith th e natives, p irate on the seas, find a gold m ine on the
way, fight th e ir way out of Africa ag ain st lions and savages in th e jungle, and
finally Singleton comes back to E ngland w ith over three pounds of gold in his
pocket. B u t this flight ag ain st au thority reterritorializes itself, for the whole
flight is characterized by Singleton’s desire to come home, to come back to
w here th e center is, and i t takes Singleton exactly a t the middle point of the
novel back to th e things he h as been fleeing aw ay from. He is broke in two
y ears’ tim e. The lesson he has learned is he should not have tried to fit in a
society th a t does not belong to him , and "it was Time to th in k of farth er
A dventures" (138), which will m ake him change his notions about "home."
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Singleton’s second line of flight m eans m uch m ore to him. C aptain of
h is p irate ship in his flight across geographical space, Singleton breaks the
law s of God and m an and never becomes a converted C hristian like Crusoe.
H e goes through a process of identifying w ith W illiam th e Q uaker, a Godfigure an d an external ideological influence on Singleton, acquiring his own
id en tity as the real com mander of his ship, and dragging th e alm ighty Godfigure down to his own h u m an level. A lthough he finally comes back to
London a t th e end of the novel, he throw s aw ay his newly acquired identity
and refuses to be p a rt of the society th a t offers him no place a t all from the
outset. H e does n o t reterritorialize cultural boundaries b u t completes a
D eleuzian line of flight in motionless travel and reveals th e private voice of
th e self. F irst, Singleton’s line of flight consists in his mockery of th e divine
providence. In the "Blast of Lightning" episode, for example, Singleton’s ship
is "Thunder-struck." Conscious of the conventional tem pest symbol, Singleton
thinks th a t he is "doom’d by Heaven to sink th a t M oment into eternal
D estruction" and is "afflicted a t the Punishm ent, b u t not a t th e Crime." The
persona of th e n arrativ e suggests Singleton should have felt "the moving,
softening Tokens of a sincere Penitent" in face of th e sign (195). I t is
in terestin g th a t the n a rra to r does n o t finalize on th is one in terpretation of
the storm b u t soon points out another one: "But perhaps m any th a t read this
will be sensible of th e T hunder and Lightning, th a t m ay th in k nothing of the
rest, or ra th e r m ay m ake a J e s t of it all" (195). The n a rra to r here is aw are
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of th e n atu ra l cause/divine providence debate th a t caught th e attention of
Defoe’s contem poraries.62 The n arrativ e draw s th e read er’s atten tio n to the
irony th a t no divine punishm ent actually falls on Singleton, n eith er a t this
m om ent nor any tim e in his life-time; nor does Singleton regard th e storm as
a w arning on his piracy. As a m a tte r of fact, Singleton and his crew, the
n a rra to r says, are ju s t like th e ship, whose "P art of th e H ead was gone, b u t
n ot so as to endanger th e Boltsprit; so we hoisted our Topsails again, h aul’d
a ft th e Fore-sheet, brac’d th e Yards, and w ent our Course as before" (196).
Singleton and his crew do m ake a je s t of the storm incident, although the
serious reader m ay not.
A lthough Singleton does not in te rp re t signs so readily as Crusoe, who
in th e Serious Reflections thinks "it is easy to know w hen th a t hand of
Providence opens th e door for, or shuts it against, our m easures" (188), the
tendency in th e young Crusoe to reso rt to the second causes or hum an
knowledge of n atu ra l phenom ena, ra th e r th a n su p ern atu ral signification, also
applies to Singleton. For example, the knowledge of th e monsoons affecting
th e coast of M adagascar earlier in the novel helps Singleton ignore w hat
Crusoe would call "the hand of Providence" and explain th e course and the
difficulty of th a t voyage in term s of n atu ral causes in stead of any symbolic
divine m eaning. F irst, "as th e Monsoones. or Trade-W inds, generally affect
th a t Country, blowing in m ost P a rts of th is Island one six M onths of a Year
one Way, an d th e other six M onths another Way, we concluded we m ight be
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able to bear the Sea well enough" (28). Crusoe or any optim istic C hristian
would th in k "the han d of providence opens the door" for Singleton and would
ju m p a t th e opportunity of sailing w ith the monsoons and th a n k the
benevolent signs of Providence. The thought about its su p ern atu ral m eaning
never occurs to Singleton. H e has to quit th e idea of sailing w ith the
monsoons to the Cape of Good Hope because they lack fresh w ater. They have
to go the opposite direction for th e m ainland of AfHca and sail along the coast
tow ard th e Red Sea, an d "venture we did, madly enough," for th e winds "blew
rig h t in our Teeth" (36). In th is case, Singleton does not reso rt to th e idea of
Providence sh u ttin g th e door against him, either. H e reads neith er of these
situations as assistance to th e ir voyage w hen they could have sailed w ith the
monsoons, or divine w arning on th e ir piracy w hen they choose the opposite
w ay and sail against the winds, because all is explained as n atu ra l causes
w ith Singleton’s knowledge of th e monsoons.
H um an knowledge m akes th e difference. W hat if Singleton had no
knowledge w hatsoever about the monsoons? The consequence is obvious.
Singleton fu rth e r illu strates his point on his second flight to sea in the Ceylon
episode, w here Singleton and his crew would fall into evil hands, which may
be th e resu lt of divine punishm ent, if it w as n o t for W illiam ’s knowledge of
th e Knox tale. H ere in th is episode, h u m an efforts, as in th e case of Crusoe,
play a n im p o rtan t role in deterritorializing signs of Providence or even
com batting divine punishm ent. H aving being attacked by "a violent Storm of
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Wind" th a t "blew in a m ost desperate an d furious M anner," Singleton’s ship
is driven ashore an d lan d s in th e sand by th e Island of Ceylon, w here Mr.
Knox used to be decoyed on shore an d k ep t in captivity for over nineteen
years. The b arb arian s entice Singleton an d his crew to come to shore, b u t
W illiam th e Q uaker ta lk s Singleton out of it an d proposes caution th a t
preven ts th e Knox tragedy from falling on Singleton an d th e whole crew. So
Singleton acknowledges th a t W illiam is "here ag ain th e Saving of all our
Lives" (222). W hile th e Knox family, a friend la te r tells Singleton, "thankfully
ador’d God’s w onderful providence" for th e ir escape from th e captivity on the
islan d (249), Singleton shows his g ratitu d e to W illiam, th e second causes, for
h is deliverance, an d rightly so. Singleton’s digression into th e Knox tale
serves to show "w hat it w as I avoided" (238), b u t th e juxtaposition of the two
incidents is tin te d w ith irony and strikes th e re a d e r as a m ockery of faith in
Providence. T he "violent Storm" th a t m aim s Singleton’s ship, th e "mighty
Storm" th a t disables Knox’s vessel, an d th e Knox fam ily’s thankfulness to
Providence for th e ir deliverance, the read er is fam iliar w ith all th ese religious
conventions. I t seem s th e read er ought to congratulate Singleton for being
delivered by Providence from settin g h is foot on th a t sam e island. B ut
Singleton does n o t th in k it is any business of Providence th a t saves him and
h is crew. I t is W illiam , or m ay be any other person who h as h eard of the
Knox tale before (like Singleton’s friend who la te r tells him th e story), who
delivers th e whole crew from possible captivity w ith h is little knowledge of
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th e history of Ceylon. (Had Mr. Knox known som ething about the barbarians
of th e island, even he would not have been tak en in and his fa th e r would not
have died in captivity; th en his family would not have been grateful to
Providence for deliverance from a non-existent captivity). If Providence does
im pinge on m an in th is incident, it m ay be th e storm th a t drives Singleton’s
ship ashore as a sign of punishm ent for his piracy, ju s t like the thunder
storm th a t sets fire on Singleton’s ship earlier or any of Crusoe’s storm s as
punishm ent for his "Original Sin." A sign of divine punishm ent it m ay be, b u t
W illiam’s precautions have tu rn ed it around. Providence has been placed in
m an’s own hand after all.
Besides mockeries of th e divine providence, Singleton’s line of flight is
also involved w ith a journey from identifying w ith a n all-powerful God-figure
to bringing the heavenly idol down to earth. All of Defoe’s reterritorializing
characters depend heavily on an external cause for in tern al transform ation
of th e self. Crusoe needs th e Bible for his P u rita n internalization on his
island in order to become a converted C hristian; even The F arth er
A dventures relies on the French p riest to rem ind Crusoe of reform ing his
island in accord w ith the law s of God and m an. Only after going through
ideologination by th e social institutions like New gate and by the prison
priest, h as Moll F landers started to become penitent. And Jack will not be
transform ed into a C hristian w ithout h is m entor on the V irginia plantation.
They all need a form of external ideological influence, usually social
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institutions or a God-figure, for th eir character development. The self needs
to be vitalized with the energy provided by the other, and th is interaction
between the self and the other accounts for th e issue of morality in Defoe’s
fiction. T h at is why Crusoe, Moll, and Jack all reterritorialize themselves,
guided by dom inant ideology. Singleton, and la ter Roxana, however, will take
a line of flight across the boundaries in such ideologination, push back this
interaction between the self and the other, and deterritorialize or jum p over
th e cultural territory of a pilgrimage from earth to heaven--in becoming a
C hristian who will be accepted by th e Holy Ghost.53 Singleton desires only to
be a m an, even w ithout any identity or place in society or in th a t future
blissful paradise.
First, Singleton sta rts out on his second voyage overseas, like m ost
other Defoenian characters, to identify w ith a religious person in his search
for identity. This identity figure of Singleton’s is his "never-failing Friend"
and "Ghostly Father," William the Quaker. C aptain Bob always lives in
William’s shadow ever since the Q uaker gets on board. W hatever the captain
does in the earlier p a rt of his p irate voyages, he feels the need to consult with
William. The Q uaker is th e captain of the ship in disguise because he is
always rig h t when it comes to pirate strategies and trading, the two most
im portant aspects on board the ship. T h at leaves Singleton the captain of the
ship only in nam e. For instance, one tim e w hen Singleton becomes captain of
a Portuguese m an of w ar they have tak en on the sea, William advises
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Singleton not to fight against the other m an of war, the Portuguese ship’s
partner, for he reasons "thou wouldst have had twice the Booty in a M erchant
Ship, w ith not one Q u arter of the Fighting" (154). Another tim e when
Singleton, being captain of his pirate ship and having enemies all over the
place, h as no idea where and how to sell a ship full of black slaves they have
taken as prisoners, "our old never-failing Friend W illiam help’d us out again,
as he had often done, a t a Dead-lift." In th is hopeless situation, William
proposes he lead a group of tw enty m en and "attem pt to trad e privately upon
th e Coast of Brasil, w ith th e Planters, not a t th e principal Ports" (164).
W illiam is even more th a n a qualified captain. To Singleton, he is also a
prophet. He foresees trouble on the Island of Ceylon and therefore saves
Singleton’s life (222); the supernatural also communicates w ith him in his
dream s, for his dream prophecizes a fortune on the Island of M adagascar
(177). As a surgeon, William also excels in medicine. In spite of the other
surgeons’ opinions, "William w ent to Work his own Way," saving a black
slave’s mortified leg (159). And initially when William is on his way to
Barbados "to get a Birth" (143), Singleton fatefully takes him as a prisoner,
who is supposed to give him a spiritual birth in the end. In short, William is
Singleton’s perfect God-figure to identify w ith to lead Singleton out of his
pirate life.
However, towards the end of the book, th e God-figure’s perfection
begins to fade. Singleton now begins to slip out of W illiam’s shadow, and his
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identity as the captain-in-name-only gradually wears off, and replaced in it
is his own identity, the real commander of the ship. This identity switching
process sta rts w ith th e failed m ilitary operation, with the "never-failing"
Q uaker in charge, to seize a tree-cave the savages use as th eir defense system
on an island in the Indian Ocean. Singleton tells the reader, "Never was a
Fortification so well defended, or Assailants so many ways defeated" (212).
William, the religious m an who serves as Singleton’s spiritual guide in the
novel, m ay be powerful in mind, b u t he is only a man. Ever since th a t defeat
by the savages, William finds him self in a position where Singleton can argue
w ith him. The first tim e Captain Bob ever disagrees w ith William is in the
Ceylon episode. As William advises him not to set foot on the island,
Singleton says, "I opposed him a great while, and told him, I thought he used
to be always right, b u t th a t now I thought he was not" (222). This tim e proves
William right again, b u t it is the first rebellious sign against the God-figure.
Later, when Singleton and William decide w hether to sell th eir goods to the
English m erchants nearby in S u rat or they should risk going all the way to
the Persian Gulf themselves where they can make as much money as the
English m erchants do, Singleton wins the debate and proposes play-it-safe in
S u rat (253). Now, Singleton is on his way to overruling William and becoming
the real captain of the ship. The identity switching process is not complete
until a final trading trip to Surat. "My Apprehensions prevailed w ith William.
w hether my Reasons did or no, and he submitted; and we resolved to try
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an o th er Ship's Loading to th e sam e M erchants" (253). Singleton sends his
m en to S u ra t w ith th e sloop an d th e crew in disguise: w hile th e sloop is "a
perfect C heat, disguised in every T hing th a t a S tra n g er could be supposed to
tak e an y Notice of," W illiam acts as one of "the Super-Cargoes, by a formal
P rocuration from one C ap tain Singleton" (254). C ap tain Singleton’s real
id e n tity em erges from a play of disguise, w here everything else is a fake,
except W illiam and th e other crew are tru ly acting "by a form al Procuration"
from th e real C ap tain Singleton. To obtain an id en tity of a "C aptain
Singleton" is to g et even w ith W illiam, who h as been actually in charge all
along. U nlike any of the reterrito rializin g characters in Defoe’s o th er novels,
C ap tain Singleton h a s surpassed h is God-figure and h is external ideological
influence. H e h a s become a personification of th e p rivate voice of th e self th a t
resists dom inant ideologination.
The p lay of disguise goes on to th e end of th e novel; only th is tim e
Singleton throw s aw ay his acquired id en tity an d even abandons h is identity
of a n E nglishm an in his native country w here he h as been "cheated and
im posed upon, an d used so ill" (257). If acquiring an id en tity as the real
com m ander of th e ship is Singleton’s cry for staying o u t of W illiam’s shadow
and influence, abandoning h is tru e id en tity as a n E nglishm an is his will
ag ain st convention and fu rth e r ideologination. W illiam, th e God-figure,
encourages Singleton to wipe th e slate clean an d tries to convert him into a
p en iten t C h ristian who will rep en t an d will a s well th in k about the after-life
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a t th e end of his p irate career, b u t Singleton replies "to th in k of D eath, is to
dye; and to be always th in k in g of it, is to be all one’s Life-long a dying" (2578). R epentance is th e fa rth e st th in g on Singleton’s m ind, b u t he does not like
to disappoint th e Q uaker an d says "Say an y Thing to me, W illiam, said I. I
will ta k e it kindly" (258). How kindly will he tak e it? He pays lip service to
W illiam ’s sp iritu al advice. F irst, afte r he w akes u p from his d ream of the
devil, Singleton seem s to rep en t a little th e n ex t m orning an d confesses to
W illiam he h as talk ed aloud in th e dream th a t "I am a Thief, a Rogue, by my
Calling; I am a P irate, and a M urtherer, an d ought to be hanged" (269). He
th e n says to W illiam he h ates him self and everything he h a s earned, and
points a pistol to his head. N ot to be so fa st to believe Singleton is going to
pull th e trigger; n eith er does he th in k W illiam will do th e shooting for him
as he says he will—Singleton h as p u t on a frau d u len t show. H e does n o t really
w an t to p u t an end to his life yet, an d he tells th e re a d e r "if any Body had
been n e a r m e to u n d erstan d E nglish. I h ad been undone, an d th e T hought of
shooting m y self forsook m e from th a t Time" (269). I t is a relief to Singleton
no by-standers, who m ay have h eard him , speak E nglish, an d therefore no
one is going to tu rn him in to th e gallows.
Second, Singleton knows "Repentance could n o t be sincere w ithout
R estitution" (267), b u t since he can h ard ly find th e victim s, restitu tio n is
im possible. So he th in k s his money "was due to th e Com m unity, and I ought
to d istrib u te it for th e general Good" (276). Ironically, Singleton never tu rn s
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out to be a community person as he claims he w ants to be; money distribution
is only w ithin the family: Singleton, W illiam, and his sister who finally gets
m arried to Singleton. He even refuses to accept th e society he lives in. Only
w hen W illiam agrees to his term s to w ear foreign vests, n o t to "shave off our
M ustaches or Beards" in order to pass for Grecians, and n o t to speak English
in public, will Singleton come home to E ngland w ith him . Thus, Singleton
comes back home not to repent or to reterritorialize b u t to become a
D eleuzian tra ito r to society; he is going to lose his identity, "to disappear, to
become unknown."54 Singleton and W illiam’s disguise and social apartness
have more m eaning th a n a simple m a tte r of escaping punishm ent, for the
Q uaker does not have to agree to the term s since he is a respectful C hristian
and h as nothing to be afraid of. Even though he m ay be accused of accomplice
to piracy on Singleton’s ship, he can easily shake off th a t accusation: when
he was first brought onto th e ship, he m ade Singleton sign a peculiar b u t a
life-saving statem en t th a t proved W illiam w as robbed and forced on board the
ship. W hatever th e reasons, William, th e God-figure and external ideological
influence in the novel, has compromised w ith th e insincerely penitent
Singleton, n o t the other way around, to refuse to accept society and be p a rt
of its system. Although Singleton refers to W illiam as the "Ghostly Father,"
he does not tak e him as his spiritual inspiration to raise him self up to a
religious altitude. If W illiam’s role in the novel is to be a n id en tity figure and
a spiritual guide to Singleton, he is a t the end of th e novel brought down to
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Singleton's own level. Singleton is not ideologinated, converted, or endowed
w ith a public voice b u t rem ains a traito r with a private voice who engages in
a line of flight, th a t is, in motionless travel a t th e end of the novel.

3.3. D eterritorialization in Roxana

Defoe's m ajor fictional characters from Crusoe to Roxana commit crime
against the laws of God and m an. B ut th eir crime differs slightly from person
to person. Crusoe commits his "Original Sin" against fatherly and divine
authority. Singleton, Moll, and Jack all have brushes mainly w ith the English
common law in piracy and robbery. Besides robbery, Moll is also engaged in
whoring, b u t h er goal in life is family oriented, because she believes in
m atrim ony and longs to find a husband and to settle down. Roxana, however,
first tread s on th e laws of God and m an by blasphem ing m atrim ony and
worshiping whoredom.56 Second,

unlike

the

other

characters,

who

reterritorialize themselves by coming to term s w ith social order and authority
in the end, Roxana, along with Singleton, flees across boundaries without
reterritorialization. Roxana’s flight is even more dynamic and more complete
th a n Singleton’s, for h er final line of flight cuts both ways, both geographical
space and motionless travel in deterritorializing cultural codes. H er later
rom antic affairs w ith foreign personalities and her passions for royal titles do
not reterritorialize h er along the lines of social order or reconciliation. They
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simply conceal her hostility toward the men’s world in w hat she deems as her
native country, toward the English "FOOLS" who tailor the laws of
matrim ony ordained by God to th eir own social and financial interests, a
tragedy to a woman as Roxana has experienced with the Brewer, her fist
husband.
Roxana’s private voice starts w ith h er first brush w ith the laws of
matrimony in h er affair w ith the Jeweller, her landlord. Roxana lives under
necessity in the beginning of the novel after her "Fool" husband the Brewer
goes bankruptcy and abandons her. Activated by h er maid, Amy, for selfpreservation, Roxana encourages the Jeweller’s advances and "marries" the
suitor: "We were to call one another M an and Wife, who, in the Sense of the
Laws, both of God and our Country, were no more th an two Adulterers, in
short, a Whore and a Rogue,"56 for both of them separate but are not divorced
from th eir spouses. The sham m arriage certainly goes beyond selfpreservation on Roxana’s side of the story. She does it for the enjoyment of
adultery. In order to show she is nothing b u t a whore, Roxana insists on Amy
sleeping with the "bridegroom." After initial modesty and resistance, "at last,
when she see I was in earnest," Roxana says, "she let me do w hat I wou’d; so
I fairly strip t her, and then I threw open the Bed, and th ru st her in" (46).
Roxana’s intention is obvious here as she looks on and comments, "Had I
look’d upon my m yself as a Wife, you cannot suppose I would have been
willing to have let my Husband lye with my Maid, much less, before my Face,
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for I stood-by all the while" (47). In fact, Roxana never once calls the Jeweller
"husband," not even after he is murdered in Paris and leaves her a wealthy
"widow." On the other hand, the patriarchal ideology may secure a less-picky
attitude toward the Jeweller’s p a rt in the adultery. The Jeweller is ju st like
Roxana in his m arital status, but his earlier advances to her may be in the
eyes of a woman all his own goodness and a sign from heaven. Roxana tells
the reader, "I shou’d have look’d upon all the Good this Man had done for me,
to have been the particular Work of the Goodness of Heaven; and th at
Goodness shou’d have mov’d me to a Return of Duty and humble Obedience"
(38). But Roxana does not return to her former duty and obedience, and this
rem ark tu rn s out to be an ironical mockery of "the Goodness of Heaven" and
those who may not think less of the Jeweller for his adultery, for as soon as
Roxana th ru sts the naked Amy into his arms, the Jeweller "held her fast,"
and has more of this farce several times after that.
The laws of matrimony, for Roxana, certainly side with m an rather
than woman because they are invented by man. When Roxana refuses to
m arry the Dutch M erchant after sleeping with him, she condemns the laws
of matrimony and reasons to him th at "the very N ature of the MarriageContract was, in short, nothing b u t giving up Liberty, Estate, Authority, and
every-thing, to the Man" (148) and th a t "the Laws of Matrimony puts the
Power into your Hands" (151). The deterritorializing aspect of Roxana’s
argum ents against matrimony lies in its radical departure from "what the
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receiv’d Custom h ad given us of it" in th a t she reg ard s a w om an as "a free
A gent, as well as a Man" (147). W hat she w an ts to do is to tak e a line of
flight an d carve u p th e custom ary territo ry of pow er an d freedom th a t belongs
to m en by stak in g h e r claim in i t an d by m ain tain in g h e r s ta tu s as a whore
to en su re it. U nder th e trad itio n al law s of m atrim ony, arg u es Roxana, while
"a Wife is look’d upon as b u t an U pper-Servant, a M istress is a Sovereign"
(132). H er preoccupation w ith h e r liberty is so strong th a t she cannot sacrifice
h e r personal desire for m oral principles. She even says she cannot "reconcile
m y Ju d g m en t to M arriage" after th e M erchant appeals to th e au th ority of
God an d asserts th a t "M arriage w as decreed by H eaven; th a t it was th e fix’d
S ta te of Life, w hich God h ad appointed for M an's Felicity" (151).57
E ven though she finally ties th e k n o t w ith th e M erchant, afte r she is
over fifty an d p a s t h e r prim e tim e as a whore, R oxana does not
reterrito rialize h erse lf in reconciliation w ith th e law s of m atrim ony she has
fought a g a in st so vehem ently. Instead, she uses h e r feigned obedience to
m an ip u late h e r h u sb an d an d secure h e r liberty as well as h e r estate, which
could have been given up to th e m an decreed by m atrim ony. F irst, as the
M erchant h as prom ised in his agreem ent w ith Roxana, he gives up his rig h t
to control h e r e state an d yields "the M anagem ent wholly your own." To
Roxana, of course, th is is nothing unexpected, and a s he "gave back all my
W ritings into m y own H ands again," Roxana secures th e rig h t to h er own
e sta te an d says "seeing you will have i t k ep t ap a rt, it shall be so" (259).
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G etting to m anage h er own estate is a vital aspect of a m arried woman’s
freedom, b u t Roxana will not forget to p u t up h er im age as a virtuous wife to
be envisioned by h er husband, for h er "Duty and Obedience" will never leave
h e r lips. As they are getting m arried, Roxana tries to sw eet-talk the
M erchant w ith a tongue-in-cheek flattery and says, "I hop’d he shou’d see I
knew how to act th e S ervant’s P art, and do every-thing to oblige my M aster;
th a t if I did not resolve to go w ith him w herever he desir’d to go, he m ight
depend I wou’d never have him" (233). "To oblige m y M aster"? "To go with
him w herever he desir’d to go"? Never. There is no way Roxana w ants to
oblige th e M erchant. M anipulation is h e r tru e colors, and she has to call all
th e shots w hen th e couple decides to do anything. T heir first decision soon
after th e ir wedding week, for example, is to give th e Q uaker, th e ir hostess
an d friend, a p resen t to show th e ir appreciation of all th e help she has offered
for th e wedding. The M erchant proposes "to settle a thousand Pounds upon
her, for h e r Life, th a t is to say, sixty Pounds a Year." B u t Roxana thinks th a t
is too m uch and w an ts to be in charge. She is for "a P u rse w ith a H undred
G uineas as a P re sen t first, and th en m ade h er a Com plim ent of 40 1. per
A nnum for h er Life" (250). A nother tim e when she does not w ant the
M erchant to m eet the C aptain and h e r dau g h ter S usan again, Roxana is
determ ined to m ake th e M erchant go out of town w ith h er for a few days. She
first "fix’d upon N orth-H all." and "he, who did every-thing upon the
F oundation of obliging me, readily came into it." Then, th e very n ex t m orning
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before they set out, she changes h er mind a t the la st m inute and w ants to go
to Tunbridge instead; and again "he, being entirely passive in the thing,
agreed to it w ith the greatest willingness" (209-301). Even th eir final decision
to settle down in Holland is in Roxana’s hands: "My Spouse, who was
perfectly easie, w hether in going or staying, left it all entirely to me" (318).
N ot only has Roxana taken a line of flight in deterritorializing the laws
of m atrim ony in conventional m arriages and safeguarding h er independence
and estate, she has also launched a flight across geographical space to leave
England a t th e end of the novel, unlike Crusoe, Moll, or Jack, who will come
back in the end to m ake peace w ith authority. There is no reterritorializing
for Roxana. Although bom in France and fluent in French, Roxana grows up
in England an d regards it as her native country. England is the center of the
novel, and action springs from and withdraws back to th a t center. When her
first rom antic affair ends in P aris after the death of th e Jeweller, Roxana
finds herself in "a strange Country" (54) and no longer thinks of French as
her own nationality. After the French Prince leaves her, "the first th in g th at
X resolv’d to do, was to go directly to England" and to be "among my
Countryfolks," for she says "I esteem’d myself an English-Woman" (111).
Then, h e r move to Holland in the end is a line of flight across geographical
space away from home, away from the center, and she never comes back.
Roxana m ay have some reterritorializing motives for the flight, as she herself
ad m its-to avoid the sham e if exposed by Susan and by h er old acquaintances
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and to repent for h er p ast by escaping from the place of her "old Station," etc.
However, those apparent motives are only disguises, for Roxana’s narrative
does not provide solid foundations for h er fears of exposure and repentance.
And even when she moves to Holland only for the title of a countess, she can
always move back to England again afterw ards, b u t she does not. H er real
motive for staying in a foreign country is her desire to flee from the English
"FOOLS" under the laws of matrimony and live with her foreign husband,
"the best Husband in the World" who can guarantee her absolute
independence. She is insistently against a woman m arrying a fool, for if so,
she will be stuck in "the Ditch" and starve and die in it (96).“ Roxana has
also developed an aversion to the Englishmen she is related to. H er first
husband, the English brewer, proves to be a fool, and a crook later in France;
she has an affair with h er English jeweller only for his money and for the
sake of evil; she is sick and tired of the old English lord she meets a t court;
even the king m ay be an object for h er to conquer. Also, w hat cannot be
offered by h er own country, she gets it and protects it from matrimony
through h er own individual efforts in a foreign land, the title of "the Countess
de

" besides h er liberty and estate. Roxana is a book about ingenuous

disguises: Roxana is disguised under m any circumstances, such as at court
and in the Quaker’s house; her motives for her final flight are disguises; her
repentance is a fake; the m urder of Susan is a deception; so is Roxana’s
punishm ent by God a t the end of the novel. H er final title of "the Countess
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de

," then, is a double disguise w ithout a nam e, a disguise

und er

ano th er

disguise th a t she is punished by divine w ra th in H olland while she continues
to succeed in spite of Providence. Y et to h e r English "Countryfolks," Roxana
h a s no identity. She is simply a D eleuzian tra ito r to th e law s of m atrim ony
and, out of th e grips of them , disappears in to th e su n set, leaving behind the
p riv ate voice of th e self echoing over a decentered territory.
F irst, h er reason for escaping from E ngland for fear of exposure is ju s t
a disguise. I t is tru e Roxana cannot sleep well w hen h er daughter, Susan,
fum bles in to h e r life. As S u san w an ts to recognize h er an d claim h e r as her
m other even i f she h a s to "ram ble in Search" for h er over th e whole country,
R oxana knows she is "safe no-where, no, not in H olland its e lf' (310). She does
n o t feel safe i f S usan does n o t q u it looking for h er, n o t in E ngland, n o t even
in H olland. E ven i f i t w as th e fear o f th e d au g h ter’s search for h er th a t
m akes th e m o th er long for a hide-out in a foreign country, Roxana would not
have to leave E n g lan d any more after she says Amy h as ta k en care of the
h au n tin g wench. S u san is not th e cause for h e r flight to Holland; n eith er are
R oxana’s old acquaintances who m ight expose her, if they have a chance.
R oxana is an expert in disguises. W hen she indulges h e rse lf a t court with the
E nglish royalties, she passes for a F rench lady. A lthough th e guests w ear
m asks a t spectacular balls, leaving Roxana, th e hostess, w ithout anything to
conceal h e r identity, Roxana han d les th is m asquerade w ith skill too, for she
is in a different w ay disguised, ju s t like h e r m asked royal guests, in h er
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"French Behaviour under th e M ahom etan Dress" (99). H er F rench behavior
an d T urkish apparel m ake it impossible for anyone to realize she is an
E nglish woman, so she can say "I appear’d, leaving th e World to guess who
or w h at I w as, w ithout offering to p u t m yself forward" (165). Even the
in sisten t Susan, once a m aid-servant a t Roxana’s house for two years, can
hardly recognize her. "I never saw my M istress in m y Life," says Susan,
"except it w as th a t publick N ight w hen she danc’d in th e fine T urkish H abit,
and th e n she w as so disguis’d, th a t I knew nothing of h er afterw ards" (206).
H er disguise as a Q uaker is even more impeccable. "I h a d not only le a m ’d to
dress like a QUAKER, b u t so us’d m yself to TH EE and THOU, th a t I ta lk ’d
like a QUAKER too, as readily and n atu rally as if I h ad been bom among
them " (213). A part from h er disguises, the difference in Roxana’s looks after
h e r sta y in the Q uaker’s house m ay fu rth er protect h er from being recognized
by h e r old acquaintances. While Roxana is active a t court, she says, "any-one
who look’d in my Face, m ight see I was above tw enty Y ears old, and yet,
w ithout flattering my self, I carried my Age, w hich w as above Fifty, very well
too" (187). In about two years, Roxana still does not look like h er age, bu t the
Q uaker com pliments h er th a t she cannot be "above Forty" (245), a twentyyear difference. H er false identity and h er age difference can surely
discourage an y attem p ts to expose h er by h er old relations in London.
Fleeing to H olland does not m ean Roxana has developed a sense of
repentance for h er rebellion against th e law s of m atrim ony, either. She is
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incapable of penitence. For instance, having escaped from the danger of the
Jew ’s blackm ail w ith help from th e D utch M erchant in P aris and protected
all h er money, Roxana does not regard h e r deliverance as due to Providence.
She says, "had I any Religion, or any Sense of a Suprem e Power managing,
directing, and governing in both Causes and Events in the World, such a
Case as th is wou’d have given any-body room to have been very thankful to
the Power who had not only p u t such a T reasure into my H and, b u t given me
such an Escape from the Ruin th a t th reaten ’d me" (121). She is not religious
and will not read anything into h er deliverance accordingly. Even if Roxana
was religious, she would consider it, she says, as the power of Providence th a t
puts the vast am ount of money into h er hand after her evil enterprise. It
would have been repentance in th e wrong way. All the money Roxana has
made in P aris is through h er affairs w ith the Jew eller and w ith the Prince,
the pay-off of h er whoredom. God should punish h er for h er gain b u t a t least
not p u t "such a Treasure" into h er hand. Paying gratitude to Providence for
w hat is good to oneself in spite of the n atu re of the thing itself is contrary to
Defoe’s idea of the function of Providence th a t "opens the door, or shuts it
against, our measures." Such an act of self-interested thankfulness for
Providence, in Roxana’s logic, is destroying the power of Providence, for w hat
deems to be divine power is turned into something she plays a t h er own
discretion, regardless of God’s will to approve or disapprove. Second, about
h er lucky deliverance, Roxana also says "I had indeed, a grateful Sense upon
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my Mind of the generous Friendship of my Deliverer, the Dutch Merchant;
by whom I was so faithfully serv’d, and by whom, as far as relates to second
Causes, I was preserv’d from Destruction" (121). In taking the M erchant as
her deliverer, Boxana equates the efforts of a hum an being to the "Supreme
Power." She is even more radical th an the young Crusoe, who initiates the
blurring of the difference between the first and second causes, and more
radical th an Singleton, who, like the young Crusoe, gives proper credit to
hum an prudence. Roxana simply ignores "the H and of Providence" and
worships a hum an being as the Deity, for whose service she repays by giving
him her own body.
Roxana m ay also seem to fear divine punishm ent for hiding from the
M erchant h er secret relation with Susan when she suspects he m ust have
known the tru th from the Captain. While repeating the Captain’s
miscomprehended story to Roxana, the M erchant is interrupted by the
candles Roxana deliberately throws off the table to cover her uneasiness. At
this juncture, she seems to realize how powerful the divine providence is and
says "what a glorious Testimony it is to the Justice of Providence..., th a t the
m ost secret Crimes are, by the most unforeseen Accidents, brought to light,
and discover’d" (297). The irony is th a t after hearing the Captain’s half-told
story about Roxana getting a daughter more th an she expects, th e Merchant
does not see the tru th of it b u t thinks it is about Roxana’s pregnancy th at he
knows is not true. The big secret is not discovered after all. Why repent if
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Providence does not govern the affairs of the world the way Roxana says it
does? Also, whenever Roxana claims she is repenting, h er repentance is only
a fake on all occasions, when she is a whore, when she is m arried, or when
she is in Holland a t the end of the novel. After Roxana finally goes to Holland
w ith her husband, she seems to have been penitent for her past wicked life,
including having Susan killed. The pleasures of m aterial riches and the honor
of royal titles do not have any more attraction for her. "Not all the Affluence
of a plentiful Fortune," Roxana says, "not a hundred Thousand Pounds
E state; (for between us we had little less) not Honour and Titles, A ttendants
and Equipages; in a word, not all the things we call Pleasure, cou’d give me
any relish, or sweeten the Taste of things to me" (264). Here, she seems to
have renounced w hat she has been striving for all h er life. Repentance is the
key note here in Holland. However, Roxana also tells the reader th a t her
repentance is "rather mov’d by my Fears of Vengeance." J u s t as a sense of
repentance moved by the fears of punishm ent and vengeance flashes through
Singleton’s mind when his ship is thunder struck, Roxana is experiencing the
same kind of repentance, which will vanish as the fears w ear off. W hat is
different is Roxana’s realization of its being a "lower kind of Repentance"
th an "a Sense of being spar’d from being punish’d, and landed safe after a
Storm" (261).
Even a realization of a higher kind of repentance is ironic. Roxana does
show a sense of being saved from a storm as she goes on a voyage with Amy

from P aris to H olland to settle h er bills earlier in th e novel. B ut th a t
supposedly h ig h er k ind of repentance tu rn s out to be ju s t a derision of
Providence an d "Heaven’s Goodness." D uring th e terrib le storm , Roxana cries
o ut "Lord have M ercy upon me" and vows to "live a single an d a virtuous
Life" if God can spare h e r life th is one tim e (126-7). As th e ship is finally
driven to th e coast of Suffolk in England, to th e ir "great Joy," both Roxana
an d Amy feel th e m ercy of God, an d Amy even "fell flat upon th e Ground, and
kiss’d it, an d gave God th a n k s for h er D eliverance from th e Sea" (128). This
scene can be a n illu stratio n of w h at R oxana calls a m ore sincere sense of
repentance, b u t it is n o t necessarily so. "For th e D anger being over," Roxana
tells th e read er, "the F ears of D eath v an ish ’d w ith it; ay, an d our F e a r of
w h at w as beyond D eath also; ...and w ith our re tu rn to Life, o u r wicked T aste
of Life re tu rn ’d, an d we w ere both th e sam e as before, if n o t worse"; thus,
Roxana says "D eath-bed R epentance, or Storm -R epentance, w hich is m uch
th e sam e, is seldom true" (128). As R oxana la te r im plies, she even should not
have rep en ted a t all, p u ttin g aside th e insincerity of repentance. T he religious
symbol of th e tem p est is problem atic again ju s t like it is w ith th e young
Crusoe. L ater, th e D utch M erchant m akes R oxana’s "womanish Fears" of the
storm a lau g h in g stock, for he tells Roxana, "it w as noth in g b u t w hat was
very ordinary in those Seas; b u t th a t they had H arbours on every Coast, so
n ear, th a t th e y w ere seldom in D anger of being lost indeed" (136). "W omanish
F ears" m ay be one cause for false alarm , a n d th e Crusoe-like "fresh W ater"
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sailor experience m ay be another. Back in th e storm scene, Roxana stares out
of h er cabin into the steerage room and sees "two Seam en on th e ir Knees, a t
Prayers," who obviously behave like th e "fresh W ater" Crusoe num bed by the
first big-waves he confronts on the sea. The more experienced sailor m ay also
look to th e frightened Roxana like doing his p a rt in praying, which is
definitely som ething else, for Roxana also sees "only one M an who steer’d,
and he m ade a groaning Noise too, w hich I took to be saying his P rayers, b u t
it seems it w as answ ering to those above, w hen they call’d to him, to tell him
w hich W ay to steer" (125). The praying act exists only in the eyes of the
beholder. Roxana tak es it to be divine punishm ent w hat it is to the
experienced sailors to be som ething ordinary. She h as learned from h er own
experience th a t she h as prayed to God for nothing. Even th a t more sincere
repentance is a b itter mockery; how can th e 'low er kind of Repentance" a t the
end of th e novel be sincere?
The m urder of S u san as th e interpolated ending of th e novel is also a
disguise. The controversial ending h as been problem atic for m any critics. In
P au la R. Backscheider’s view, on the one hand, lack of conclusions and of
poetic ju stice "reduced Roxana’s chance for popularity an d imitation."
M axim illian E. Novak also argues th a t "w hat prevents Roxana from being
Defoe’s m asterpiece is th e tru n cated ending." On the other hand, Robert D.
H um e posits th a t "Roxana m ay well have been left as Defoe conceived and
w anted it" w ithout th e actual exposure of Roxana’s ruin. For E v erett
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Zim m erm an, "the book’s ending is consistent w ith its heroine’s development
and w ith the development of Defoe’s fiction." Zim m erm an contends th a t "sin
an d repentance, th e conceptions th a t he used to order his works, gradually
diverged from th e ir traditional religious m eanings."69 F irst, Zim m erm an and
H um e are rig h t about Defoe’s intention to end th e novel the way it is. About
th is point, textual evidence in this first edition is clear. Before Roxana sta rts
to give a flash-back on th e episode about Susan, it is m ean t to be the la st one
in th e book. She says "I m u st now go back to an o th er Scene, and join it to
th is End of my Story" (265). Second, Zim m erm an’s reading is m ost convincing
in its argum ent about th e novel’s deviation from traditional religious
m eanings. Divine w rath apparently works in th e end, for Roxana tells us,
"the B last of H eaven seem’d to follow th e Injury done the poor Girl, by us
both" (330). B u t it is not w h at is really going on. F or one thing, th e reader is
never sure w hether S usan is m urdered. Roxana speculates th e m urder from
th e kind Q uaker, who reports th a t "she suppos’d Amy h ad m anag’d i t so well,
as to p u t a n E nd to it" (323). M urder is never on th e Q uaker’s m ind, and
n eith er Roxana nor th e read er h as th e satisfaction of confirming th e news as
Roxana chooses to see it. A t the end of th e novel, Roxana tells th e Q uaker
th a t Amy cannot join her in Holland unless th e suspected m urderer "gave full
Satisfaction to my Friend th e QUAKER, th a t she h ad not m u rth er’d my
Child." B u t w h at happens la te r is th a t Amy "came over afterw ards, w ithout

Ill
giving my Friend an y of th a t Satisfaction or any Account th a t she intended
to come over" (329).
Roxana never tells the reader in explicit term s w h at Amy has "put an
E nd to it" m eans perhaps because Susan is never m urdered. There m ight be
two possibilities. F irst, Roxana m ay have m istaken Amy’s half-told story for
a different story (or we as readers have done the same if we tak e the
Q uaker’s report of Amy’s story the way Roxana does), ju s t as th e M erchant
has m istaken th e ladies’ half-told story for something about Roxana’s
pregnancy a little earlier in this same episode. The read er can see a perfect
sym m etry an d parallel between these two incidents. In the earlier incident,
after m eeting w ith Susan, Roxana decides to make excuses to the C aptain for
cancelling th e plan to go to Holland w ith his family. She says vaguely to the
Q uaker th a t she is "very much out of Order" and sends h er to "insinuate to
them , th a t she w as afraid I shou’d not be able to get ready to go the Voyage"
(280). The C aptain hears the half-told story from his wife an d Susan. H e tells
the M erchant he hears the ladies say th a t "your Lady has got a D aughter
more th a n she expected" (296). The reader knows whom the ladies m ay be
referring to after the Susan scene. B ut the C aptain not knowingly tw ists this
half-told story into a completely different one and tells th e M erchant th a t he
knows "a D aughter" here refers to Roxana’s pregnancy. So Roxana la ter says,
"My H usband told me w hat the C aptain had said; b u t very happily took it,
th a t the C aptain had brought a Tale by-halves, and having heard it one way,
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had told it another; and th a t neither cou’d he understand the Captain,
neither did the C aptain understand h im self (297). The beauty of this parallel
of m isinterpretation is th a t the Q uaker plays a crucial role in both of the
incidents. In th e first, she delivers Roxana’s message th at has caused
m isinterpretation. In the second, she delivers Amy’s message th at may ju st
as well have caused m isinterpretation on Roxana’s part. Actually, Defoe has
reminded

the

reader

of other

interpretations

concerning

Susan’s

disappearance. The "innocent well-meaning" Q uaker "thought nothing of any
Evil herself, so she suspected none in any-body else." To her, it is "good
News" th a t "the Im pertinent Visitor" stops bothering Roxana again because
"she thought Amy had found some Way to perswade her to be quiet and
easie" (323). The disappearance of Susan is quite another story for Roxana’s
relatives in Spittle-Fields, for "they believ’d Amv had carry*d her to pay her
a Slim of Money, and th a t somebody had watch’d her after her having receiv’d
it, and had Robb’d and M urther’d her" (325). Everyone chooses to believe
w hat he or she is willing to believe, ju s t like the M erchant wishes Roxana is
w ith child in th a t "Tale by-halves" incident, "which he wish’d m ight be true"
(299), and the choice of w hat to believe is based on the believer’s personal
traits. The Q uaker does not suspect anyone because she is kind and
benevolent and will not think of anything rotten like murder. Roxana’s
relatives project on Susan’s disappearance w hat is ordinary the case on the
street, robbery and murder. In the same manner, Roxana herself interprets
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th e story according to w h at she (or th e reader) h as suspected Amy would do
to Susan. The only assurance Roxana (together w ith th e reader) can g et about
i t is "Amy h ad m ade h er away; and I believ’d it the more, because Amy came
no m ore n e a r me, b u t confirm’d h er G uilt by h e r Absence" (325). A ctually th e
read e r is not su re about S usan’s d ea th or th e cause of it if she is dead;
n e ith e r is Roxana. I f she is, it is only h e r illusory projection. Amy m ay have
persuaded th e girl into giving u p following Roxana, a s th e Q u ak er figures;
S u san m ay also have been robbed an d m urdered by highw aym en, as Roxana’s
relatives th in k so; of course she m ay also have been m urdered by Amy, as
R oxana sees it. W hatever happens to S usan, Roxana will n o t know exactly
u n til th e end of th e novel w hen Amy comes over to join h e r in Holland.
The second possibility m ay be even more surprising—Roxana has
know n everything all along. She h as p retended to tak e th e Q uaker’s half-told
story th e w ay th e read er m ay tak e it. If th e read er believes Amy has
m urdered S usan, it is only th e read er’s projection. T hen th e read er m ay have
been completely fooled by R oxana’s (or Defoe’s) a r t of concealm ent, through
th e m ysterious web of fabrication she h as weaved in to h e r n arrativ e, about
w h a t h a s exactly happened to th e trouble-m aker S usan.60 T hus, th e m urder
of S u san is only projection in th e first case an d fabrication in th e second.
T hen in both cases, "the B last of Heaven" a s p u n ish m en t for th e m urder is
only fiction. T he read er would n o t expect th e w rath of th e divine pow er to fall
on R oxana for som ething she h as n o t m ade h appen m uch less h as done by
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h erse lf in person. "The F o rtu n ate M istress" m ay finally m ain tain h e r sta tu s
u n d e r disguise in H olland w ith o u t any Divine Ju stice troubling her
conscience, since th e retrib u tio n , as Roxana sta te s in th e la s t sentence of the
novel, is for th e alleged m u rd er only, not for h er p a s t w horing career she lets
th e read er believe she is w orried about all th e tim e tow ards th e end of the
novel.

CHAPTER 4

SCHLEGELIAN IRONY AND TH E CHAOTIC WORLD
OF BECOMING IN MOLL FLANDERS

Discussions of th e use of irony in Defoe’s Moll Flanders (1722) have
often been focused on authorial intentions. For example, Moll moralizes her
necklace th eft about its instructive im plication, ju s t as Defoe him self points
o ut in th e preface, as a lesson to teach th e reader for th e sake of social good.
If th e read er tak es th is intention seriously, no a rtistry of irony can be
identified. W hat one m ay infer from th is incident is Defoe’s blindness to the
im m oral n atu re of his heroine’s crime. On th e other hand, if one tak es neither
Defoe’s rem arks in the preface nor Moll’s preaching a t face value, one can
locate Defoe’s intention for irony to indicate th e heroine’s m oral confusion,
th u s exonerating the au th o r from blam e.61 P erhaps Robert Alan Donovan’s is
th e m ost provocative study of Defoe’s use of irony in Moll F landers in term s
of th e "double function" of Moll, who serves as both "subject and object" or
"the Moll who perceives an d narrates" and "the Moll who acts and suffers."
The irony of th e book, for Donovan, lies in the disparity betw een Moll’s two
voices, one pertain in g to th e erring character and th e other to th e m oralizing
n arrato r. Donovan aim s to identify Defoe’s "potentially fruitful organizing
principle” in th e novel th a t "seems to say one thing and actually says
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another."62 One obvious weakness of these suggestions of authorial intention,
no m a tte r for irony or for m oral preaching, is th a t they all assum e a
traditional bond of certainty between th e au th o r and the reader, who knows
w hat th e au th o r m eans and knows how to in te rp re t w h at the character or the
n a rra to r says in th e text, while such relationships in th e novel sometimes
ren d er Schlegelian ironic am biguities, which d ep a rt from th e traditional claim
about th e certainty of authorial intention.
R ath er th a n assertin g a faith in a universal hierarchical order, the
private voice in Moll F landers about chaotic becoming indicates Defoe’s
insertion into radical historical outlooks of the disrupted universal order. The
presen t study will indicate th is private voice about a broken link of certainty
and account for ironic am biguities, a practical model th a t anticipates
Schlegelian irony. I t will focus on th e chaotic world of becoming th a t
perplexes Moll th e character’s finite perceptions and involves them in growth
an d dialectic tensions. It will also examine Moll th e n a rra to r’s ambiguous role
th a t draw s th e read er into the chaotic textuality of th e novel. The ambiguous
relationships u n d er discussion have som ething to do w ith a paradoxical
bifocal vision, w ith multi-level roles of the character, the n arrato r, and the
read er interm ingled in th e reading process. C aught up in th is terrain of
uncertain ty or even chaotic confusion, the read er is experiencing Schlegel’s
aesthetics of rom antic irony instead of having a clear picture of authorial
intentions. Schlegelian irony also challenges the Iserian shared autonom y of

117
th e author and the read er in his theory of read er response. Paradoxically, the
Schlegelian fictional world in an ideal work of a rt th a t the finite a rtis t creates
is infinite and chaotic. The reader’s participation in the literary text m ust
likewise fluctuate between th e waves of the chaotic textuality of the fictional
world. While Iser bases his notions of reader response on the grounds th a t
are slanted for the interaction between the author’s artistic "guidelines" or
"controls" in the te x t and the reader’s imagination, Schlegel’s theory of
rom antic irony tilts tow ard the chaotic textuality of a work of art, which
defies the certainty of authorial intention. The uncertainty of authorial
intention cuts both ways. First, the ironic ambiguities in Moll Flanders
indicate an unconscious anticipation of Schlegel’s rom antic irony and Defoe’s
insertion into radical ideology about disorder and chaos. This reading of
rom antic irony is th e n m ade possible w ith the joint production by authorial
ideology as the unconscious private voice and the reader who m akes the
connections in the text between rom antic irony and th a t radical ideology.
Second, authorial intention about th e n arrato r’s role to moralize her actions
is jeopardized by Moll’s double role as the character and the n arrato r and by
the reader’s dual perspectives as a resu lt of the narrato r’s ironic ambiguities.

4.1. Schlegelian Irony
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Friedrich Schlegel’s notions ofirony developed in his literary fragments
(1797-80) m ark a striking departure from the traditional mode. In classical
irony, ironists, assured with the security of knowledge in saying the opposite
of w hat they mean, know w hat they mean and hope the reader will know
w hat they w ant to attain. For Schlegel, the difference between traditional
irony and his philosophical irony lies in the demarcation between sophist
polemics and poetry. He states th a t there is "a rhetorical species of irony
which, sparingly used, has an excellent effect, especially in polemics." But it
is nowhere to be compared to "the sublime urbanity of the Socratic muse."
H ans Eichner holds th a t in Schlegel’s view "when Socrates asserted th a t he
knew nothing, he not only knew more th a n his interlocutor, bu t knew enough
to know th a t he did not really know anything properly." Socratic irony,
Schlegel writes, "contains and arouses a feeling of indissoluble antagonism
between the absolute and the relative, between the impossibility and the
necessity of complete communication." This form of irony in the romantic
mode Lilian R. F u rst calls "an irony of uncertainty, bent prim arily on the
perplexities of searching."63
Schlegel’s poetic world corresponds to his ontological view of the
universe, which he deems as "infinite and inexhaustible." Schlegel contends
th a t poetry "alone can become, like the epic, a m irror of the whole
circumambient world, an image of the age," b u t it can also be "free of all real
and ideal self-interest, on the wings of poetic reflection, and can raise th a t
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reflection again an d ag ain to a higher power, can m ultiply it in an endless
succession of m irrors." In o th er words, infinity is captured in rom antic poetry
which, Schlegel w rites, "is still in th e sta te of becoming."64 The universe is
chaotic an d infinite, b u t th e h u m an being’s conceptions, in contrast, are finite.
W hile th e ta sk of th e a rtis t is "to transform th e finite into the infinite," yet
Schlegel also sta tes th a t "never will th e m ind th a t knows th e orgies of the
tru e M use journey on th is road to th e very end, nor will he presum e to have
reached it." A rtists are sandw iched betw een th e im m ediate finite and th e
potential infinite an d encounter the Schlegelian paradox of "the im possibility
a n d th e necessity of complete communication" w ith th e infinite in th e ir
work.66 O ut of th is system of th e infinite, Schlegel defines irony as "the clear
consciousness of etern al agility, of an infinitely teem ing chaos" and as
"continuously fluctuating betw een self-creation an d self-destruction." Such a n
execution of creation an d de-creation, for Schlegel, resides in a rtis ts ’
paradoxical m ission of both attac h m en t to an d detachm ent from th e work of
a r t th e y create. As Schlegel asserts, "in order to w rite well about something,
one shouldn’t be in terested in it any longer."66 T h a t is, in rom antic irony, one
is perfectly aw are of one’s own lim itations in th e infinite chaos an d a t th e
sam e tim e is exposed to ever-new experiences in th e reality of becoming an d
grow th, experiences in w hich one overcomes one’s lim itations an d transcends
oneself an d produces "an endless succession of m irrors." In so doing, th e
iro n ist is able to create w h at Schlegel calls "transcendental buffoonery." By
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"transcendental," Anne K. Mellor points out, "Schlegel refers to a poetry th a t
hovers betw een th e real and ideal, betw een th e chaos of becoming and the
order of being," while the Italian buffo in Schlegel is "a dram atic character
who both controls th e plot and mocks the play" w ithout im peding the plot
from moving forward. Thus, "transcendental buffoonery" is an ironic tw ist
generated by a dram atic character who "is sim ultaneously affirm ing and
mocking its own creation" or is creating and de-creating th e play. In short,
ironists possess a paradoxical dual perspective of attach m en t to and
detachm ent from th e ir creations.67
Moreover, the continuous oscillation betw een self-creation and selfdestruction is a paradox th a t can be specified as a dialectic fusion of
opposites. Even Hegel owes his indebtedness to Schlegel’s dialectic thought.68
The alternation betw een creation (the thesis) an d de-creation (the antithesis)
is a dialectic fusion th a t consists of sim ultaneous attach m en t and detachm ent
(the H egelian synthesis th a t incorporates both th e thesis and the antithesis).
T hen the dialectic process moves on to th e th ird stage, re-creation of a new
conception of th e self, as Schlegel m ain tain s th a t "confusion is chaotic only
w hen i t can give rise to a new world."69 As the p resen t chapter will la te r
show, Moll th e character is im m ersed in a chaotic world of becoming, where
h er finite conceptions are ironically involved in growth through a dialectic
process of creation, de-creation, and re-creation. Moll th e character may
transcend the dialectic tensions betw een creation and de-creation and
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trium p h through to re-creation, b u t due to Moll the n arrato r’s paradoxical
attach m en t to and detachm ent from p arts of h er narrative, the characternarrato r-read er relationships are throw n into ironic bifocal am biguities th a t
resist any clear and stabilized categorization.
One m ay find the juxtaposition of rom antic irony and Moll Flanders
chronologically problematic. Critics have identified ”a glaring area of
am biguity w ith regard to establishing reliable chronological param eters" in
rom antic irony. In his survey of this ambiguous tim e frame, Jo h n Francis
F etzer holds th a t Schlegelian irony, for some critics, is exemplified after the
advent of G erm an romanticism startin g from the 1790’s onwards, and for
others, it reaches back as early as Cervantes’ Don Quixote (1605).70 In fact,
chronology of the theories of rom antic irony would never have been a problem
w ith Schlegel, for he intended to universalize them . In Schlegel’s view,
rom antic irony can be present, to use E ichner’s words, "in any product of the
h um an m ind th a t displayed adequate aw areness of th e paradoxical position
of m ankind itself." For instance, Schlegel points out in the Lyceum (the
Critical Fragm ents) (1797) th a t "there are ancient and m odem poems th a t
are pervaded by th e divine breath of irony throughout and informed by a
tru ly transcendental buffoonery." In the A thenaeum Fragm ents (1798),
Schlegel also finds in the epic of Homer full of the ironic combination of
"intention and instinct," a tendency of "continuously fluctuating between self
creation and self-destruction." Furtherm ore, F u rst regards Schlegelian irony
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as being derived from "the practical models he acknowledged in Socrates,
P etrarch, D ante, Cervantes, Shakespeare, S terne and Diderot." Schlegel’s
achievement, F u rs t argues, "lies in his insights into the significance of their
irony and his ability to crystallize those insights into a palpable, albeit
complex theory."71
Besides the universal and trans-historical crystallization of Schlegel’s
theory to justify Defoe’s practice, not necessarily conscious practice, of
rom antic irony in Moll Flanders, socio-historical considerations about a
radical ideology against the established order m ay also render parallel
conditions th a t may make Defoe’s private voice possible in th e novel. As
Schlegel states in the A thenaeum Fragm ents, "the French Revolution,
Fichte’s philosophy, and Goethe’s M eister are the g reatest tendencies of the
age." Critics have established this trio as three sources of potential influence
on Schlegel. F etzer contends th a t the French Revolution "undermined the
sanctity of an established order"; Fichte’s Theory of Knowledge modified
K ant’s "analysis of m an's fervent but futile attem p t to attain absolute truth"
by challenging th e very existence of the "thing-in-itself' and postulating th a t
"the ego, and not some mysterious transcendent force, is responsible for our
perceptions of the empirical world"; and Goethe’s novel Wilhelm M eister’s
Apprenticeship proved the "discrepancy between conception and execution,"
for "man’s highest aims were forever to be frustrated by his innate
shortcomings."72 One can also find sim ilar background conditions in Defoe’s
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tim e. Mellor argues th a t "romantic irony is a way of thinking about the world
th a t embraces change and process for th eir own sake" and th a t several
background factors in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries contributed
to the formulation of rom antic irony. Chief among them w ere socio-political
revolutions, loss of faith in th e hierarchical order in the universe, and John
Locke’s denial of any necessary connection between objects in An Essay
Concerning H um an U nderstanding (1690).73 These factors approxim ate the
Schlegelian famous trio mentioned in the Athenaeum F ragm ents.
Kevin L. Cope’s recent insightful study of th e English Enlightenm ent
sheds more light on the seventeenth-century paradoxical outlook on the
infinite chaotic world. Cope argues th a t Halifax, for example, is preoccupied
w ith a zest for a moral certainty th a t "is itself a stabilizing psychological
response to instabilities in evidence." Stability and instability are a
paradoxical formation in Halifax. Rules m ay capture and encompass the
undercurrent of th e unstable and the uncertain, b u t when one focuses on "the
variable, unstable character of evidence," instability and incoherence loom so
large th a t they reject any dictates of totalizing rules. Although Halifax is
ard en t about his use of the maxim to account for instabilities, the Halifaxian
explanatory system, Cope argues, "stabilizes the boat not in order to sail
tow ard a single tru th , but in order to provide a platform for the free-floating
clash of m any drifting interests." Hence, Halifax’s notion about a nation as
"a M ass of Dough" to be molded into one systematic form is only, writes Cope,

124
"the nourishing bread of a but not the stable state." Halifax’s thinking of the
flexible and unfixed state and of th e paradoxical n atu re of stability and
instability anticipates the K antian denial of absolute tru th and the
Schlegelian notion about one’s view of poetry as only one tru e b u t limited
view of th e infinite n atu re of poetry.74 Finally, critics have also examined and
evaluated Defoe’s view of m an as a short-sighted creature, his visions of the
uncertain hum an lot and disorder of life, and the context of Defoe’s age in
term s of its doubt about the existence and natu re of Providence in the
universe.76 The chaotic world of change, process, and becoming in the
Schlegelian sense of th e word m ay likewise be reflected in Moll Flanders, as
the private voice th a t strikes a dissonant tone about th e m ainstream belief
in a universal order.

4.2. Chaotic Becoming and U ncertainty of A uthorial Intention

T h at Moll as a finite hum an being drifts along tow ard growth in the
chaotic world of becoming is not surprising to the reader. At the end of her
m arriage career, Moll expresses a sense of lim itation in th e infinite chaotic
world, b u t she also indicates an enthusiasm for discovering h er power to
transcend herself and overcome h er lim itations in th e process of becoming
and growth. F irst, Moll knows h er own inadequacies and is not certain about
w hat exactly she can do to face the dilemma of a forty-eight-year-old widow,
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who has lost h er allure to recommend for any m arriage proposals. H er
descriptions about the dreadful state prior to her career as a th ief indicate
her self-awareness. "I sa t and cried and torm ented my self N ight and Day;
wringing my H ands, and sometimes raving like a distracted Woman; ... my
U nderstanding was sometimes quite lost in Fancies and Im aginations.”76
Reduced to a state of distress, Moll has no capacity to do anything b u t to cry
and to bury h erself in her own fancies as if she has lost contact w ith reality.
P erhaps Moll is so much in her own finite subjective world th a t she does not
know she has to do something about h er predicam ent or to design a way-out.
I t is no wonder she "LIV'D Two Years in this dismal Condition" (190). Then,
as soon as Moll reveals h er self-consciousness, she moves beyond it by
conquering h er stasis and getting into action. "For a little Relief I h ad p u t off
m y House and took Lodgings, and I was reducing my Living so I sold off most
of my Goods, which p u t a little Money in my Pocket" (190), an ironic touch
about Moll’s self-awareness of h er lim itations and h er power to transcend
them . Such a tendency sets the tempo for another cycle of th e process. After
she realizes the present crisis, Moll has to face another reality, still unable
to have the slightest idea about w hat to do. Again acknowledging her
lim itations, she tells th e reader, ”1 am very sure I had no m anner of Design
in my Head, when I w ent out, I neither knew or considered where to go, or
on w h at Business" (191). In this fashion, Moll is depicting herself as
w andering in the chaotic world where she knows nothing about how to
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respond to th e ever-changing reality. H aving accepted h e r inadequacies once
again, Moll sets o u t on th e move to search for open possibilities, an d the act
of Btealing in th e chaotic outside world is ironically a m eans of overcoming
th e inadequacies in th e process of becoming.
Such a process of becoming also ta k es form in a dialectic of creation,
de-creation, an d re-creation, w hich b ears a resem blance to Hegel’s dialectic
m ethod. Jo h n J . Richetti, in his stim u latin g book Defoe’s N arratives, has
studied th e H egelian dialectic in Moll F la n d e rs. F or instance, Richetti
considers th e Colchester elder b ro th er’s seduction as one such process. The
young, naive, an d spontaneous Moll is regarded as th e th esis or th e self, the
elder b ro th er as th e an tith esis or th e other, w hile th e n a rra tin g Moll is the
th ird te rm or th e synthesis " th a t resu lts from th e collision of self and other,
th e calculating se lf able to operate w ithin th e other, seeing th e old
spontaneous p a rt of itself as m erely obeying th e determ ination of th e other."
T his dialectic process perfectly supports R ichetti’s th esis about th e m ovem ent
of Defoe’s novels "tow ards the depiction of a dialectic betw een self and other
w hich h as as its end a covert b u t triu m p h a n t assertio n of th e self,"77 a strong
arg u m en t ag ain st th e se lf s dependence on th e o th er or th e external world for
definition. However, it is precisely th is external n egating other th a t
differentiates from de-creation in th e dialectic process of rom antic irony. The
negatin g other or de-creation in rom antic irony ta k es place in th e world
w ith in n o t w ithout, for residence of the other in external circum stances will
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n o t be p a r t of th e a rtis t’s self-destruction, th u s sh o rt of th e paradox of the
iro n ist’s sim ultaneous a ttac h m en t and detachm ent.
M arriage to th e V irginia p la n ter is an em blem of Moll’s attach m en t to
a n d detachm ent from h e r own creation of th e self th a t is involved in a
dialectic process. F irst, th e m arriage is one of th e fru its of Moll’s creation of
a m asterfu l a rtist. Moll is equally a t hom e in cheating an d p u ttin g up a moral
im age of th e self and tricks a m an into m arriag e w ithout, paradoxically,
losing h e r in teg rity in th e eyes of th e victim . From th e outset, Moll is fully
aw are of th e disadvantage a w om an h a s to face, th a t is, th e sm all num ber of
m en available "for a wom an to v en tu re upon." They have been occupied w ith
overseas businesses an d carried aw ay by w ar, so th a t "there is no Proportion
betw een th e N um bers of th e Sexes; an d therefore th e W omen have the
D isadvantage" (74). B u t Moll, having a sm all fortune of about 500 pounds,
p asses for a lad y w ith a n estate of over 1500 to a ttra c t potential adm irers,
w ith th e help of th e C ap tain ’s Wife, who comes u p w ith th e plan an d helps
spread th e word around. Moll does indeed succeed in singling out h e r m an
am ong a sw arm of suitors. Moll’s a rtis try in cheating w ith o u t losing integrity
lies in h e r p rep arin g th e groom-to-be for u n p le asa n t surprises. W ith her
m an ’s diam ond ring, Moll w rites on th e window pane in h e r cham ber th a t
"Fm Poor: L et’s see how kind you’ll prove." A nticipating th e possibility of h er
te stin g him , th e V irginia p la n ter engraves a prom ise on th e glass, "Be mine,
w ith all vour Poverty" (79). This is th e prom ise Moll h a s expected of him , ju s t
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in case he is disappointed in discovering th e tru th la te r about Moll’s
fraudulence, and he will find it h ard to e a t h is own words. H aving th u s not
been pretentious h erself or lying to him about the figure of h er estate from
h er own m outh, Moll m arries h er desirable Virginia husband, who has a
steady income of 1200 pounds a y ear from his plantations. The dowry he
gains is Moll’s 500 pounds, m uch more th a n Moll h as prepared him for but
m uch less th a n w h at th e rum or h as m ade him expect. The beauty of this
m arriage is th a t th e groom has to adm it to th e bride, "I m ay perhaps tell the
C aptain he h as cheated me, b u t I can never say you have cheated me" (83).
However, the a rtis t’s creation of a m oral self in th e handsom e m arriage
bears th e seed of de-creation in itself, as Moll’s husband tu rn s out to be her
own brother. The H egelian assertive thesis (the m oral self) is confronted with
th e negating an tith esis (the incestuous self) a t th e very m om ent of creating
th e im age of a m asterful a rtis t in th e m arriage arrangem ent. Moll th e a rtist
is sim ultaneously attached to and detached from h er own creation. The
assertive self h as artfully gained a husband suitable to h er w ithout losing
integrity in h is eyes, b u t a t the sam e tim e th e idea of incest m eans to decreate th e b rig h t side of th e m arriage, to mock Moll’s m oral self, and to
negate self-creation, th u s becoming a fusion of opposites or the Hegelian
synthesis. The m oral self has been proved to h er brother/husband, b u t the
negating incestuous self m u st not be exposed to him. So th e dialectic fusion
of creation and de-creation w ithin th e domain of m arriage does not stagnate
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here b u t moves further into her plan to cover up the incest, w here both the
thesis and th e antithesis are also paradoxically incorporated. As "a good
Husband" is "the m ost necessary Thing in th e World" to Moll (76), she decides
to save h er m arriage, in spite of the incest. After hearing h er mother(-inlaw)’s nam e and story, Moll cannot recognize h er right away due to mixed
motives, partly because "it m ight be difficult to convince h er of the
Particulars" and partly because she thinks the suggestion of incest "would
have im m ediately separated me from my Husband" (89). Moll is so desperate
to protect the m arriage, a p a rt of h er artful creation, th a t she wishes she had
not known the sibling relationship w ith h er husband, for she says, "O had the
Story never been told me, all had been well" (88). Knowing while hoping for
not knowing h er tru e identity itself is an ambiguous fusion of opposites-bound w ithin the incestuous shame b u t wishing to rem ain outside with
conscience. Then, knowing b u t refusing to confirm, Moll "liv’d w ith the
greatest Pressure imaginable for three Year more, b u t had no more Children"
(89). "The g reatest Pressure" and "no more Children" in the three-year coverup suggest h er ambiguous dispositions and indicate a paradoxical m ixture of
moral confusion and a troubled conscience. Thus, the continuation of incest,
a synthesis of both the thesis and the antithesis, is another indication of
Moll’s ironic instinct of sim ultaneous attachm ent to and detachm ent from her
own creation of a moral self.
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Finally, the dialectic tension between creation and de-creation dissolves
in re-creation, a higher level of creation and a new conception of the self. This
stage of re-creation is different from the first stage of creation, where Moll
creates her moral self in the eyes of the m an on whom she has played a trick.
In re-creation, she not only convinces her brother-husband and h er mother(in-law) of h er moral self b u t also shows to the reader the finite hum an being’s
moral awakening and growth. Tormented by h er conscience, Moll says, "I
loathed the Thoughts of Bedding with him, and used a thousand Pretences
of Illness and Humour to prevent his touching me" (90). She also proposes to
go back to England, knowing he would not go w ith her, because "it would be
ruinous to his Affairs, would Unhinge his whole Family, and be next to an
Undoing him in the World" (91), th u s hoping to end "the worst sort of
Whoredom" and "Misery and Destruction." Since Moll has eventually "refus’d
to Bed w ith him," the husband thinks she is insane and threatens to confine
h er to a mad-house, which, Moll says, "would a t once have destroy’d all the
possibility of breaking the T ruth out, whatever the occasion m ight be; for th a t
then, no one would have given Credit to a word of it" (92). All these details
suggest to the reader th a t Moll has gained some moral conscience after three
years of hesitation to reveal the tru th because of h er mixed motives—initial
uncertainty about her convincing power and her love for h er brother-husband.
She w ants to p u t an end to the incestuous m arriage before it is too late.
Having convinced her mother of all "the Particulars," she alleviates her
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brother-husband’s terrible shock by preparing him for the news of incest,
which dem onstrates her concern and love for him as a brother. After all, Moll
says, "I m ight love him well enough for a Brother, tho’ I could not for a
Husband" (99). Any "Mystery yet unfolded" about Moll th a t is in the brotherhusband’s suspicion, it goes w ithout saying, is demystified in the end, for the
real cause for her recent aversion to sleeping with him and her desire to
retu rn to England is not lack of passion nor evil craving; it is b u t the tragedy
of incest. This re-creation of the self or the awakening of moral conscience in
th is la st stage of the ironic process corresponds to w hat Richetti calls Moll’s
"dialectical transform ation of disastrous social circumstances into personal
affirmation and freedom" and h er "new consciousness and a refined skill in
the a r t of survival."78
Moll also acts as an ironic a rtist who creates, de-creates, and re-creates
her image as a m oralist in the necklace robbery, her second theft. In such an
ironic procedure of Moll’s m aturation, one can employ John Locke’s natural
law to m easure the stages of growth. Three of the Lockean principles of
n atu ra l law m ust be considered: (1) m an’s right to self-preservation, (2)
leaving enough for the preservation of others, and (3) not appropriating more
th a n needed. N atural law for Locke governs not only the state of nature, an
im aginary pre-historical state, but also society and political governments,
because it is used to indicate "what is and w hat is not" and because "without
n atu ral law there would be neither virtue nor vice, neither the reward of
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goodness nor th e p u n ish m en t of evil." Political pow er for Locke is justified
only in so far as it preserves m an ’s n a tu ra l rig h ts, an d Locke indeed insists,
"the binding force of civil law is dependent on n a tu ra l law."79
The ironic process of grow th to re-creation th ro u g h creation and selfdestruction is clearly in Moll’s reflections on th is second theft. F irst, Moll is
perform ing a self-creation ta sk w hen she rem arks, "my own N ecessities m ade
m e reg ard less of any thing: The la s t Affair left no g re a t Concern upon me, for
a s I did th e poor C hild no harm " (194). Moll is h ere creatin g a self-image of
a widow who, w ith a m oral conscience, steals only w hen driven by necessity.
Any re a d e r who is fam iliar w ith n a tu ra l law can see m orality in Moll’s act
an d will accept h e r justification. Yet, th e key words h ere are "I did th e poor
Child no harm ." O n th e one hand, they serve to reinforce Moll’s denial of the
im m orality of th e theft, for she has done no h arm to th e child physically. On
th e oth er h an d , such a sta tem en t requires a ratio n al clarification, which Moll
is going to offer to th e read er, a clarification th a t em braces th e danger of selfdestruction. I f h er justification for h er crime on th e basis of necessity is to
create a m orally acceptable im age of th e self, Moll’s follow-up reflections only
de-create th is very im age, an d th is self-destruction is embodied w ithin h er
a tte m p t to m oralize an d to create th e self image. The a r tis t is sim ultaneously
bound to an d distanced from h e r own creation: "I only said to my self, 1 had
given th e P a re n ts a ju s t Reproof for th e ir Negligence in leaving the poor little
L am b to come hom e by it self, and it would teach th em to ta k e more C are of

it an o th er time" (194). However w itty an d ratio n al, th is self-creating
com m entary no doubt contradicts Moll’s m oral self, as though she is mocking
h e r m oral conscience or de-creating the self. I t is d e a r th a t th e read e r will
n o t judge, a t le a st n o t in lig h t of n a tu ra l law , Moll's robbery of the child as
m orally acceptable u n d er th e p retex t of acting for th e good of th e victim or in
Moll’s excuse th a t h e r stealin g will prev en t fu tu re crim es of th e kind. T h at
is why critics in sist upon h e r ironic confusion w ith a m oral vision.80 I t is
w orth noting th a t w hen critics regard Moll’s preaching as ironic in the
trad itio n al sense, th ey are ta k in g i t as a product of Moll’s (or Defoe’s)
inten tio n s and are isolating th is self-destruction stage from th e whole ironic
dialectic process, functioning to underm ine Moll’s creation of a m oral self. For
Schlegelian irony, self-deBtruction stem s from th e ironist’s finite perceptions
in th e chaotic world of becoming, and irony grows o u t of th is disparity
betw een th e finite and th e chaotic ra th e r th a n th e in ten tio n s of th e finite.
Finally, th e fusion of self-creation and self-destruction gives w ay to a new
conception of th e self. Moll th e n m akes a n endeavor to re-establish h er image
as a th ie f w ith a m oral conscience. By focusing on th e needs of th e victim,
Moll is im plying a n arg u m en t for th e acceptability of h e r robbery since she,
having been throw n back to th e sta te of n a tu re u n d er necessity, has tak en
only w h at is m ore th a n th e child needs, leaving enough for h e r preservation.
A bout th e necklace she h a s robbed, Moll says it "m ight have been form erly
th e M other’s, for it w as too big for th e Child’s wear" (195). Moll is justifying

134
th e th e ft by appealing to h er n atu ral rights since she steals for selfpreservation, takes w h at is more th a n th e child needs, an d leaves enough to
th e preservation of the victim.81
The character’s finite perceptions can hardly capture th e fictional world
of becoming in Moll Flanders, b u t so far the read er is w atching the heroine
suffer and is certain about h e r shortcomings as a finite being. A part from
this, th e novel m ay also draw the reader into th e fictional chaotic world of
uncertainty, w here th e reader is w hirled into it to join th e character and the
n a rra to r on a ride through th e "perplexities of searching" in th e text. T h at is,
th e ironic am biguities in th e novel n o t only repudiate th e certainty of
autho rial in ten tio n b u t also challenge Wolfgang Iser’s phenomenological
theory of read er response. Iser’s theory of a r t "lays full stress on the idea
th a t, in considering a literary work, one m u st tak e into account not only the
actual tex t b u t also, and in equal m easure, th e actions involved in responding
to th a t text." Iser stresses an "author-reader dialogue," w hich is a n interplay
betw een th e authorial "pre-intentions" or "schem atised views" in th e text and
th e reader’s im agination or participation. In other words, n eith er th e author
n o r th e read er h as total autonomy. W ithin th e scheme of the dialogue, the
au th o r invents certain controls to prevent the read er’s subjectivity from
"playing too dom inant a part" and "gives him guidelines as to how he is to
view th e proceedings." Here, the au th o r’s guidelines, "pre-intentions," or
"expectations" are intended for the implied reader, the read er who is
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constituted by the text. Such a reader, having the authorial guidelines a t his
disposal, enjoys some degree of autonomy and m akes his own choice, and
"then he will fill in the picture accordingly" to the extent th a t he never has
"the feeling th a t the author w ants to lead him by the nose." In this light, Iser
argueB th a t in Fielding’s Joseph Andrews, for example, the author’s
guidelines about th e differences between his novel and th e repertoire of the
established genres disappear as the novel moves along, "so th a t th e reader is
left to discover th e differences for himself." The Iserian reader shares
autonomy w ith the author, and "the distance between the story and the
reader m u st a t tim es be made to disappear, so th a t the privileged spectator
can be m ade into an actor."82
However, Schlegelian irony disrupts such Iserian shared autonomy of
the author and the reader in Moll Flanders, and the narrator, who performs
p a rt of th e author’s artistic guidelines, distances the reader from herself. In
fact, the n arrato r’s role is underm ined by h er Schlegelian ambiguous dual
perspective, and the reader is throw n into the chaotic textuality of the
narrative. F irst, it is im portant to note Defoe the editor’s intention behind the
n arrato r’s voices in the novel, intention th a t never falls into clear boundaries.
One can find various degrees of moral preaching of the first-person narrators
in Defoe’s m ajor novels, b u t Moll Flanders is specially designed for this
purpose. U nlike th e prefaces to Defoe’s other novels in which Defoe intends
to le t "a ju s t H istory of Fact" speak for itself,83 the preface to Moll Flanders
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states in explicit term s th a t the famous lady "is made to tell h er own Tale in
modester Words than she told it a t first" and th a t "the Copy which came first
to H and, having been w ritten in Language, more like one still in Newgate.
th an one grown Penitent and Humble, as she afterwards pretends to be" (1).
So behind the n arrator’s persona, there masked the editor's (Defoe’s)
intention. To reflect the "Penitent and Humble" side of Moll, Defoe m akes her
pose as a n arrato r in the book and, approaching seventy years of age,
moralize her actions while delineating the history of h er bumpy earlier years.
CriticB have noted Defoe’s narrative method involves two techniques th a t are
derived from the major writing techniques of the seventeen-century Royal
Society scientists Robert Boyle and Robert Hooke: precise description of
details with brief emotional response. The function of emotional responses or
reflections or preaching is to show the narrator’s sincerity in repentance or
her endeavors for the effect of sympathy.84
The ambiguous double role of the narrator in Schlegelian irony can be
discerned in the bundle episode, where Moll, driven by necessity, commits her
first theft. Reality for Moll a t this juncture of h er career is no longer a
prew ritten text with a fixed pattern b ut an infinite flux of uncertainties. One
way of identifying romantic irony in this episode is through the narrator’s
reflections on the theft. As a finite hum an being, her perceptions can never
completely capture the chaotic world. Moll, as an ironic memoir narrator,
shows such a disparity in her narrative and performs an ambiguous double
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role of th e ch aracter and th e n a rra to r w ith both h e r involvem ent in and
disengagem ent from th e story she is telling. W ith fear an d rem orse in the
w ake of th e incident, Moll rem arks, "Perhaps, said I. it m ay be some poor
Widow like me, th a t h ad pack’d up these Goods to go an d sell them for a little
B read for h erse lf an d a poor Child, and are now starv in g an d breaking th eir
H earts" (193). H ere Moll th e ch aracter tells h erself th a t she m ay have robbed
a poor widow who is in desperate need for food.
N evertheless, th e read er cannot tak e Moll’s w ords too seriously. In the
beginning of th e th eft scene, Moll describes th a t beyond th e bundle "stood a
M aid S erv an t w ith h er Back to it" (191), im plying th e m aid is se n t by the
"poor Widow" to sell th e goods. The widow th e n cannot possibly be starving
a t th e tim e, for she still h as the financial capacity to h ire a m aid. If the maid
is th e "poor Widow" herself, Moll finds more th a n eighteen shillings together
w ith th e silverw are an d linen in th e parcel, w hich suggests th a t th e "poor
Widow” would be foolish to have packed those goods in th e bundle for sale
w ith th e h ard -earn ed money in it. Also, w hen th e widow h a s th a t much
m oney on h and, she would n o t sell the bundle only to alleviate h er family’s
sta rv a tio n in th e first place. The read e r h as been told in th e midwife’s first
charging table th a t te n shillings can cover Moll’s m eals an d lodging for a
week in th e midwife's house (164). I t is also in te re stin g th a t even ju s t before
h e r reflections on th is theft, Moll rem inds th e re a d e r th a t a lo af of bread
costs six pence (190). According to th e calculations of Gregory King, an
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econom ist of Defoe’s tim e, th e average yearly income an d expenses o f servants
an d common laboring people in E ngland in the y ear of 1688 (two y ears after
Moll’s 1686 d ated memoir) w ere about fifteen pounds in a fam ily of four.85
T h a t comes down to roughly 6 shillings a week. E ighteen shillings and sex
pence in a fam ily of two, then, could la s t six weeks to support both th e widow
a n d h e r child in th e sta n d a rd of living of th e w orking-class family. A lthough
Moll feels th a t she h a s robbed a starv in g poor widow ju s t like her, h er
discovery of th e m oney in th e bundle proves h e r perceptions false.
Such a discrepancy indicates Moll’s am biguous double role as both a
ch aracter an d a n a rra to r in th e novel, who is engaged in a paradox of
sim ultaneous attach m en t to an d d etachm ent from h e r n arrativ e. The
c h aracter’s voice an d th e n a rra to r’s reflections often have distinctive
boundaries in n arrativ e point of view. One exam ple will suffice. A fter Moll
gives h e r V irginia h u sband h e r estate th a t am ounts to less th a n h a lf of his
expectations, "he accepted it very thankfully." Moll th e n says, "And th u s I got
over th e F ra u d of passing for a F ortune w ith o u t Money, an d cheating a M an
in to M arrying m e on pretence of a Fortune; which, bv th e wav. I tak e to be
one of th e m ost dangerous Steps a W oman can take" (84). H ere, th e first "I"
is Moll th e character’s persona, and th e second th e preaching n a rra to r’s. B ut
th e boundaries are n o t alw ays so clear-cut. The n arra to r's voice m ay even be
im plicit in th e character’s actions. F or instance, in th e fire robbery episode,
Moll p reten d s to rescue th e lady of the house b u t comes w ith a m ind to h er
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valuables. A t th e very m om ent of securing th e booty, Moll m eets w ith another
w om an who offers help to Moll and who, Moll says, "was one of th e same
B usiness w ith m e, an d w anted nothing b u t th e Bundle" (205). No one doubts
th a t Moll is breaking th e ethical code h ere robbing th e d esperate lady, b u t
th e n a rra tiv e cunningly suggests th a t h a d Moll n o t tak en advantage of the
fire an d com m itted crime, people like th e o th er w om an would have done th e
sam e an y w ay—she is only seconds behind Moll. T his is not a justification for
crim e b u t is a plausible excuse to alleviate Moll’s guilt. So w hen Moll
w hispers "go Child" into th e new-comer’s ear, th e read er can sense the
n a rra to r’s voice hovering over th e scene, a forgiving voice hidden in the
n a rra tiv e of th e robbery itself, although th e n a rra to r h a s never said a word
ab o u t th a t excuse.
In sim ilar fashion, Moll the n a rra to r carries over h e r role in re 
presen tin g th e story an d th ru sts through th e mode of n a rra tio n and
p articip ates in th e plot o f actions h erself in th is bundle episode. Moll the
character, h av in g discovered w h at is w rapped u p inside th e bundle, is "under
such dreadful Im pressions of Fear" w hen she says, "W hat am I now? A Thief!”
(192). A fter a long n ig h t w ith a troubled conscience, Moll is "im patient to h ear
some N ew s of th e Loss; and would fain know how it was, w h eth er th ey were
a Poor Bodies Goods, or a Rich" (193). She th e n th in k s she m ay have robbed
a poor widow like her, who w as going to sell th e bundle. T he "I" in "perhaps,
said I. it m ay be some poor Widow like me" is clearly m e an t to be the
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character’s voice. B u t one can hardly a ttrib u te the voice of "some poor Widow
like me, th a t h ad pack’d up these Goods to go and sell them" to th e same
Moll. Speculating on th e polarity between "a Poor Bodies Goods" and "a Rich,"
th e suffering Moll surely h as a motive to im agine a robbery of "a Rich" in
order to bleed some of h er g u ilt and to soothe h er troubled conscience. As she
h as already discovered th e money in th e package, th e logical progression of
h e r expectations in th is context ought to be developed in the direction th a t
Moll th e character, w ith th a t motive in m ind, rules out the possibility of
having robbed a poor widow w ith a starving child. So Moll’s rem arks about
the "poor Widow" do not fall into the character’s reflecting space b u t into a
space preserved for the n arrato r, the artist, who h as stepped in and
speculates th e opposite, in spite of th e character’s worries. The n a rra to r does
not do th is for nothing. On th e one hand, she is showing h er m oral aw areness
in accord w ith h er "Penitent and Humble" n atu re. On the other hand, by
having Moll th e character identify h erself w ith h e r victim, th e n a rra to r is
able to im agine a figure to sim ulate th e very predicam ent the heroine is
reduced to, so th a t th e n a rra to r can gain the reader’s sym pathy for the
character and for h erself as if she were th is im aginary poor widow whose
"bundle" or social security h as been robbed.86
Only a n a rra to r w ith a n am biguous double role can attem p t this
sym pathizing accomplishment. Sym pathy, one of th e passions for Edm und
B urke th a t can be a source of th e sublime, is "a sort of substitution, by which
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we are p u t into th e place of another m an, an d affected in m any respects as
he is affected." Following this B urkean idea of th e "im aginary change of
situation," Adam Sm ith develops his theory of w h at he calls "moral
sentim ents." For Sm ith, w hen one is suffering, "there m ay be some
correspondence of sentim ents between th e spectator an d th e person
principally concerned." B urke’s idea is still valid here, in th e sense th a t for
S m ith th e spectator m u st endeavor "to p u t him self in th e situation of the
other, and to bring home to him self every little circum stance of distress which
can possibly occur to th e sufferer." B ut Sm ith doubts a complete consolation
from spectators because of "the thought th a t they them selves are not really
the sufferers." The sufferer is aw are of th is possibility an d "passionately
desires a more complete sympathy."87 Moll th e n a rra to r picks up a sim ilar
scheme. After describing th e character’s melancholy fram e of m ind on the
brink of starving to d eath and pleading for th e read er’s sym pathy on the
grounds of necessity, th e n a rra to r knows she needs to win more of the
read er’s compassion for th e character. She sym pathizes w ith Moll the
character an d places h e r in a position to sym pathize w ith the "poor Widow"
and to obtain a correspondence of sentim ents between w h at she calls "the
prospect of my own Starving" an d th a t of th e poor widow’s. The role of the
spectator or the sym pathizer, on the n arra to r’s p art, th en tu rn s into th a t of
th e sym pathizee who desires a more complete consolation from the reader,
th e ultim ate spectator. In other words, by pitying th e victim for h er desperate
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circumstances in which th e character is lodged, the n arrato r’s voice, under
the persona of the character, is perm eating into the emotions of the victim,
as an im aginary insertion into the sufferer’s situation, in order to secure
sym pathy for th e character’s desperate action and ultim ately for the n arrato r
herself. So far, the n arrato r’s design m ay be clear to the reader. However, the
a rtist’s involvement in h er own creation a t this stage is balanced
sim ultaneously by detachm ent from it. W ith the n arrato r’s reflections, under
th e disguise of th e character, on the possibility of having robbed a desperate
poor widow, she also disrupts h er task of sympathizing and de-creates the
character, for th e n arrato r can hardly justify harm ing someone in an
outrageous situation like the alleged poor widow.88
Furtherm ore, believing in the alleged identity of the poor widow and
la te r discovering h er fictitious status, th e reader, too, is imposed upon him self
an ironic two-fold role of the Active reader (attached to the narrator) and the
actual reader (detached from the narrator), as a resu lt of the ambiguous
ironies of the n arrato r’s double vision. From the outset, the n arrato r expects
th e Active reader, th e contrived reader h er narrative intends to guide and
influence, to be attached to h er tale. She actually reaches out to such a reader
before she presents the bundle episode: "O let none read this p a rt w ithout
seriously reflecting on the Circumstances of a desolate State...; it will
certainly m ake them think not of sparing w hat they have only, b u t of looking
up to Heaven for support, and of the wise M an’s Prayer, Give me not Poverty

least I Steal" (191). The fictive reader may sympathize w ith the heroine,
considering her desperate circumstances, and may also show further
compassion for the starving th ief when she is identified w ith a poor h eart
broken widow w ith a devastated child crying for food a t home. But when the
actual reader, whose response is not always w hat the narrato r expects,
recognizes the injustice of one desperate widow robbing another, the reader
is then detached from the n arrator’s mission of sympathizing and may argue
against h er immorality. Another layer of ironic am biguity also resides in the
fact th a t this detached reader then tu rn s attached again and becomes a
victim of the ironic ambiguity when taking the widow’s identity as authentic.
From this attached reader, by the time the reader discovers the fabricated
identity of the alleged "poor Widow," then emerges a reader who is once again
detached from the sentim entality of the narrator, a n arrato r who herself is
disoriented by the chaotic world of the literary text. The narrato r distances
and drives the reader away from herself, and the only thing th a t draws the
reader’s attention is th e chaotic textuality of the narrative.89 Such freefloating and indefinite movements of involvement and disengagement defy
any conviction of certainty on the reader’s p a rt about authorial intention
masked behind the narrato r’s persona: to show Moll’s repentance or to
disorient the reader?

CHAPTER 5

DEFOE’S "MAN-WOMAN" ROXANA:
A STUDY OF GENDER, REVERSAL, AND ANDROGYNY

A feminist reading of eighteenth-century fiction can take one (or a
combination) of the following popular approaches: exposing the male ideology
in its oppression of women,90 transcending ideology and delineating female
true experiences,91 engaging a power struggle and moving inside the male
dominance,92 or resisting patriarchy and moving outside the male order.93
Critics have provided us with insight by demonstrating these methods in
eighteenth-century studies, b u t the emphasis characterizes a disruption of the
male order by highlighting female power. This tendency marks a pattern of
the distinctive either/or thinking in gender studies; it is w hat K. K. Ruthven
calls an attem pt, in saving the Kristevan system in feminist criticism, to take
the m aternal Semiotic as an alternative to the paternal Symbolic instead of
concentrating on the Kristevan interplay between the two. For instance, such
an emphasis can be seen in Laurie Langbauer’s reading of romance as a move
to the m aternal chora and of the female body as discourse in the subject’s
struggle for power, and in Patricia Meyer Spacks’ discussion about the female
usurp of the male oppressors’ power from the supreme power.94 Drawing on
the Lacanian and Kristevan insights of feminist theory, the present chapter
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tak es a som ew hat different direction and d ep arts from th e popular
approaches to fem inist criticism after incorporating them . I t will examine
Defoe’s Roxana (1724) in term s of female power, w hich m ay be a force th a t
d isru p ts th e m ale monopoly an d th re a te n s p atriarch y w hen perceived as the
K ristevan m atern al chora. T his fem inist force, however, is n o t totally
destructive as to p erp etu ate th e dom inance of the m atern al. Instead, not
conceiving fem inism as oppositional practice for its u ltim ate goal as shown
in th e o th er approaches, th is study will indicate Defoe’s "Man-Woman"
Roxana as th e epitom e of th e reversal of th e L acanian Androgyny-Im aginarySymbolic triad . This is a fem inist m ission th a t moves beyond th e Im aginary
or th e Semiotic m atern al chora into th e prim ordial an d degenderizing
androgyny before th e h u m a n being ever experiences th e L acanian sexual split
or "lack." Defoe’s novel m ark s a d ep a rtu re from m ale ideologies and stirs a
ripple of dissonance from his trad itio n al ideas in nonfiction, b u t it never
p erp etu ates th e dom inance of fem ale power. R oxana is, tow ards th e end of
th e novel, a paradoxical figure w ith a hom eless voice who rejects the
distinctive either/or th in k in g in gender and is b oth subjected to m an’s laws
of m atrim ony and a t th e sam e tim e capable o f d rain in g his power th a t is
m andated by those laws.
Roxana invites different readings for fem inist stu d ies and provides the
read e r w ith a n exam ple of th e L acanian three-com ponent model in reverse.
To focus on only one p a r t of Roxana’s three-stag e m a tu rin g process will not
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do justice to th e im port of th e whole novel. F irst, th e ideologies of th e m ale
self can be exposed in th e ir function to hold Roxana, th e fem ale other, in
place as an ideal wom an and a caring m other in the beginning of th e novel;
so can th e b ru ta l reality of h er experiences as a whore be delineated by
focusing on h e r m aterial existence as a dependent commodity reified by m en
w ith th e ir financial an d social superiority in th e p atria rc h al system . The
re a d e r can th e n locate a fem inist m a tern al chora w here Roxana reverses h er
trad itio n al fem inine role and engages in a pow er struggle ag ain st the m ale
monopoly. M ore im portantly, if th e L acanian model involves th e progression
of a tria d from th e prim ordial sexual Androgyny to th e (m aternal) Im aginary
a n d th e n to th e (paternal) Symbolic, Roxana launches a reversal of such a
progression. W h at m akes th e p resen t study different from o th er approaches
is th a t Roxana's dynam ic m atern al force after th e in terp lay betw een the
Symbolic an d th e Im aginary does n o t rem ain inside th e m atern al chora nor
m oves back into th e p atern al order from w hich she is fleeing in th e first
place. I t in stead progresses into the prim ordial sexual androgyny, tow ards the
end of th e novel, w here th e degenderization of th e h u m a n being and the
deconstruction of cu ltu ral gender codes a re achieved.
The th ree kinds of the voices of th e self in th e public, private, and
hom eless com ponents correspond to the L acanian tria d in reverse and to the
th ree p a rts of th e novel w ith Roxana’s relationship w ith th e D utch M erchant
in th e middle. Before h er liaison w ith th e M erchant in th e first p a rt of the
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novel, Roxana is fixed in th e traditional fem inine role prescribed by culture
in its p atern al Symbolic (her youth, h er first m arriage to th e Brewer, and her
early career as a courtesan to the Jew eller and to the Prince), which
constitutes Roxana’s public voice about th e female other dependent on the
m ale ideology for definition.95 Following this is th e second phase, the
Im aginary, in which th e self envisions a terrifying b u t blurring other in the
"mirror" as symbolized in the m om ent w hen the Jew fixes his horrible gaze
upon Roxana’s face, which renders th e other as an opaque reflection of the
self. H ere Roxana has h e r private voice by establishing a period of the
m atern al chora an d reversing the cultural gender codes in h e r affair w ith the
M erchant. Finally, th e "Man-Woman" Roxana in h er m arriage to the
M erchant pushes back into th e sexual unity w ith th e m issing p a rt of the
prim ordial whole an d degenderizes the hum an being in sexual androgyny,
w here she defies and deterritorializes a distinctive cultural gender orientation
and orchestration. As Roxana disappears from the fictional world in the end,
she disappears from both h er "public domain" and "private sphere" and
rem ains alien to the distinctive dichotomy betw een m ale ideology and
fem inist politics. The "Man-Woman" Roxana does not epitomize Defoe’s notion
of a n ideal woman b u t a homeless androgynous figure who vanishes from the
ideological arena.

5.1. L acanian "Symbolic" and Roxana’s C ultural G ender Roles
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According to Jacques Lacan, the hum an being experiences two "lacks"
in the process of becoming a subject. The first is conceived to be a t the
mom ent of birth in th e m other’s womb, which is "situated a t the advent of the
living being, th a t is to say, a t sexed reproduction." This is the moment, Kaja
Silverm an explains, "of sexual differentiation w ithin the womb, b u t it is not
realized until the separation of the child from the m other a t birth." Silverman
also m aintains, "the subject is defined as lacking because it is believed to be
a fragm ent of something larger and more primordial," a sexual androgyny or
the original whole from which the hum an subject is derived. The subject’s
existence is "dominated by the desire to recover its m issing complement." The
second lack "suffered by the Lacanian subject," Silverm an continues, "occurs
after birth, b u t prior to the acquisition of language." This is a loss "inflicted
by w hat m ight be called the *pre-Oedipal territorialization’ of the subject’s
body," th e "orchestration" or cultivation (by the m other or nurse) of the
infant’s regulated "drives around sexual difference" in culture’s genital
economy. T his second "lack" takes place between w hat Lacan calls the "mirror
stage" or th e "imaginary state" and the language-acquisition "symbolic order"
in the process of hum an subject’s psychological development. It takes place,
according to Lacan, before the subject is "objectified in th e dialectic of
identification w ith the other, and before language restores to it, in the
universal, its function as subject." "The child," according to Lacan, "at an age
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w hen he is for a time, however short, outdone by the chimpanzee in
instrum ental intelligence, can nevertheless already recognize as such his own
image in a mirror." In this pre-Oedipal or the Im aginary "mirror stage," the
self, for the first time, perceives the other and th u s forms the blurring notion
of "the specular I," which is p a rt of the other (usually the mother). For Lacan,
the Symbolic is the "moment in which the m irror-stage comes to an end" and
which inaugurates "the deflection of the specular I into the social I" with a
distinctive sense of the self and the other. "It is this moment," writes Lacan,
"that decisively tips th e whole of hum an knowledge into m ediatization
through the desire of the other."96 The second "lack" or the Im aginary also
corresponds to Ju lia Kristeva’s feminist notion of the semiotic chora or the
m aternal rhythm of "uncertain and indeterm inate articulation." where the
infant’s sexual "drives involve pre-Oedipal semiotic functions and energy
discharges th a t connect and orient the body to the mother." It is the opposite
of Symbolic meaning, a period where the bond between the child and the
m other is experienced through infantile babbling and jabbering and non-sense
baby talk before the regulation of the paternal Symbolic through the child’s
acquisition of language. Kristeva associates h er "semiotic" to Lacan’s
Im aginary, the stage prior to the Symbolic. For Kristeva, the Lacanian
"phallus," the supreme signifier in the Symbolic, "totalizes the effects of
signifieds" and dominates hum an society in language. B ut the Semiotic, for
Kristeva, precedes the Symbolic, and the mother’s body, associated with the
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Semiotic or the Imaginary, is "what mediates the symbolic law organizing
social relations and becomes the ordering principle of the semiotic chora."97
As th e hum an subject participates in language, the Symbolic apparatus
disorients it from its flows of instinctual or libidinal drives and shoves them
into repression. This way, the Symbolic functions to hold the "social I" or the
subject in perpetuation, and the subject’s alignm ent to appropriate gender
roles is one of th e aspects of subjection and fits right into traditional gender
stereotypes. From now on, the child, through language acquisition,
differentiates in its sexual roles and acquires a gender identity designed and
imposed upon it by cultural codes. "A cultural code," Silverman states, "is a
conceptual system which is organized around key oppositions and equations,
in which each term is aligned with a cluster of symbolic attributes." For
example, in the case of "men" and "women," those symbolic attributes are
m ost likely to be dispersed around the dichotomy between "rational," "firm,"
"strong" and "emotional," "pliant," "weak."98 The eighteenth century sees an
abundant manifestation of the public voice about such gender distinctions in
its literature. N ussbaum notes John Hill’s acknowledgement of the cultural
gender codes in On the M anagement and Education of Children (1754): "Boys
ru n , girls walk; boys swim in the pond, girls wash in th eir chamber. Much
attention is directed toward the protection of girl’s pale and delicate
complexions, and natu ral and symmetrical shape." Nussbaum points out th a t
eighteenth-century m ale ideologies also work to m aintain the status quo, for
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w om en "were encouraged to accept public perceptions as th e ir ‘character,’"
a n d "discouraged from ‘knowing’ th e ir own ch aracter or recognizing th e ir
intelligence" because to "know" one’s ch aracter is to th re a te n "the possibility
of m ain tain in g th e heterosexual gender system." Besides m ale w riters, women
novelists in th e eighteenth century too, according to Spacks, "define a heroine
by h e r w eakness, showing how w eakness an d passivity become social
resources," an d she h as identified th e gender differentiation of the period
along th e lines of E dm und B urke’s distinction betw een th e beautiful and the
sublim e. The beautiful is associated w ith th e fair sex ("sm allness, delicacy,
curving lines") w hile th e sublim e w ith th e au th o rity of a fa th e r and of God
("fortitude, justice, wisdom"). N ot only is personality gendered b u t formal
featu res such as fictional endings are supposed to be m ale/fem ale distinctive.
Following N ancy K. M iller’s arg u m en t about gendered plots and stories in
fiction, Schofield sorts o u t those two kinds of endings in eighteenth-century
fiction. She contends th a t "male w riters te n d to favor ‘happy,’ w hitew ashed,
p atriarch ally approved endings, w hereas fem ale w riters su b v ert happy,
satisfying closures an d in stead p resen t unfulfilling, nagging, worrisome,
tragic endings th a t underscore th e sense of sep araten ess in w hich women
exist an d write."99
Sim ilarly, R oxana’s role in th e first p a r t of th e novel is gender
distinctive, p ertain in g to th e public voice of th e self defined by m ale ideology.
Before tu rn in g into a n in d ep en d en t she-devil, R oxana is fixed in th e grips of
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th e cu ltu ral g ender codes as th e (female) other of th e (male) self:100 an ideal
w om an in h e r youth, a caring m other in h e r first m arriage, and m en’s
dependent commodity in h e r in itial career as a whore. F irst, R oxana sta rts
o u t to be w h at Defoe an d h is contem poraries would call a n ideal woman.
"Sharp as a H aw k in M atters of co m m o n Knowledge; quick an d sm a rt in
Discourse..., BOLD, tho* perfectly Modest" in deportm ent, Roxana sings
beautifully and dances "naturally" and "w anted n e ith e r W it, B eauty, nor
Money..., h aving all the A dvantages th a t any Young W oman cou’d desire."101
T his description o f R oxana w hen she is fourteen covers alm ost everything
Defoe said about a n ideal woman nearly th irty y ears earlier in his 1697
proposal for "an Academy for Women." One m u st n o t m istake Defoe’s idea of
a n ideal wom an in th a t pam phlet, however, as fem inist in n atu re . Although
Defoe is a n advocate for a women’s college an d believes th a t "the Capacities
of W omen a re suppos’d to be g reater, an d th e ir Senses quicker th a n those of
th e Men," he does perceive women from a "male gaze" an d proposes th a t "the
Ladies m ig h t have all th e Freedom in th e W orld w ith in th e ir own W alls and
yet no Intriguing, no Indecencies, nor Scandalous Affairs happen; and in
order to th is, th e following C ustom s and Law s shou’d be observ’d in the
colleges...." We know w h at women’s "Freedom" m eans w ith in th e ir own walls
an d u n d e r custom s an d law s. Besides, th e purpose of educating women for
Defoe in th a t proposal is "to breed them u p to be suitable and serviceable."
for he arg u es "not th a t I am for exalting th e Fem ale G overnm ent in the least:
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B ut, in short, I wou’d have Men tak e Women for Companions, and educate
them to be fit for it ." Defoe even satirizes women for th e ir inability to govern
in a fictional female take-over of the governm ent depicted in h is Review.102
Roxana’s gender distinctions also m anifest in h er role as a caring
m other early in th e novel. After th e Brew er, h e r first husband, abandons her
an d h er five children, Roxana, driven by necessity, has to give up th e children
to h er relatives, b u t she shows a good im age as a caring m other and says "if
I h ad b u t one Child, or two Children, I would have done m y Endeavour to
have work’d for th em w ith my Needle" (15). No luck w ith th e relatives and
w hen she is told to tak e h er children into "the P arish keeping," h er response
fu rth e r reinforces the caring m other figure. "A hundred terrible things came
into Thoughts; viz. of Parish-C hildren being S tarv’d a t N urse; of th eir being
ru in ’d, le t grow crooked, lam ’d, and the like, for w ant of being tak en care of;
an d this sank m y very H ea rt w ithin me" (19). The la s t thing she would do at
th is moment, she m akes u s believe, is to p a rt w ith h e r children. B u t she tells
th e reader th a t she is definitely in a difficult situation w ith them . "When I
consider’d they m u st inevitably be S tarv’d, and I too, if I continued to keep
them about me, I began to be reconcil’d to p a rtin g w ith them all, any how and
any where, th a t I m ight be freed from th e dreadful Necessity of seeing them
all perish, and perishing w ith them m yself' (19). She is desperate and ready
to grasp anything for a life-saver. B ut she m akes it perfectly clear th a t she
does not w ant to h arm h er own "Flesh and Blood."
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Besides being an ideal woman and a caring m other from th e outset,
being held in place by male ideologies, Roxana is also a dependent commodity
in m en’s possession in the early p a rt of h er career as a m istress. The notion
of women as commodities is not a new one. For M arx and Engels, "the
bourgeois sees in his wife a m ere in stru m en t of production." This is the fate
n o t only for women; in fact, everyone in capitalist societies, for Marx,
confronts th is sam e dehum anizing dilemma. Georg Lukacs extends M arx’s
idea of objectifying the social character of m en’s labor into a concept of
"reification" (or "thingification"), a process in which a person is transform ed
into a thing. F or Lukacs, th e capitalist society, through its ideologies, conceals
th e social relations of m en w ith each other, which "appear as things and the
relations of things w ith each other."103 Also in terestin g are L angbauer’s
comments on critical

readings of th e female body or prostitution as a

m etaphor for th e conditions of women’s reality. L angbauer m aintains th a t
sexuality in whoring, which is "relocated in term s of b ru te m aterialism and
economics—th e violence done to th e body of th e pro stitu te, th e money paid
her," becomes in some critics* readings "a crucial m etaphor for th e treatm en t
of women in general."104
The alignm ent of th e m ateriality of th e female body with her
dehum anizing m aterial conditions is relevant here for Roxana, who, through
h er self-commodification as a whore, participates in m an’s desire a t the price
of h er own and "solidifies h er bondage to the p atriarch al system."105 The
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power to reify is first retained in the hands of a male in this p a rt of the novel.
Reification of woman's body as a commodity by m en finds its way into
Roxana’s liaisons w ith th e Jew eller and the Prince th a t all s ta rt out as
financial transactions to the m ale’s advantage, unlike her la ter romance with
the M erchant. J u s t as Moll Flanders, who gets five guineas from the elder
brother of the Colchester family for his initial "assault" on her, Roxana
receives somewhat th e same treatm en t from the Jeweller, h er landlord. "After
kissing me tw enty tim es, or thereabouts, [the Jeweller] p u t a Guinea into my
H and; which, he said, was for my present Supply, and told me, th a t he would
see me again, before 'tw as out" (31). Reification lies in Roxana’s body as a
commodity th a t th e Jew eller can purchase. He can win h er over w ith money
and la te r w ith th e house (rent-free) and the furniture in it. Roxana’s body is
reified in the form of a "product" and is ju s t another thing th a t the Jeweller
can buy w ith money. The money th a t he pays h er is deceitfully m eant to be
a token of love or kindness while the relationship is not so sacred and pure
a t all, for Roxana throw s Amy, h er maid, into the Jew eller’s bed, which is a
confession of whoredom th a t the Jew eller accepts by complying. The female
body, money, love, and kindness are objects th a t all depend on the male
dom inated society for identification and realization. Roxana is certainly aware
of herself as such a reified object having been made by a m an, for she tells
us: "he had made me w hat I was, and p u t me into a Way to be even more
th a n I ever was, namely, to live happy and pleas’d, and on his Bounty I
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depended” (35). Roxana, the person both in her present and in her perceivable
future, and h er gratitude for his love and kindness are all peripheral around
the center of "his Bounty," around the center of reification of herself.
The French Prince’s money also turns Roxana’s body into an object of
reification, consolidating the relationship between the male self and the
female other, b u t th is relationship deteriorates as Roxana draws close to her
next phase, to the m aternal chora. Her affair with the Prince begins with "a
Black Box ty d with a Scarlet Ribband, and seal’d with a noble Coat of Arms"
delivered by the Prince’s gentleman. "There was in it a G rant from his
Highness...with a W arrant to his Banker to pay me two Thousand Livres a
Year, during my Stay in Paris" (60). Of course, Roxana, as the inferior other
should, receives the royal gift "with great Submission, and Expressions of
being infinitely oblig’d to his Master, and of my showing myself on all
Occasions, his Highness’s most obedient Servant" (60). Roxana at this stage
as a reified object of the male is not as passive as when she is with the
Jeweller. It turns out th a t she somehow has managed to tu rn the Prince’s
process of reifying her into an act of her own artful control. After she grants
the Prince the ultim ate favor, Roxana tells us, "he gave me Leave to use as
much Freedom with him, another Way, and th a t was, to have every thing of
him I thought fit to command" (66). Money, love, and sex are still changing
hands in favor of the male as the agent who desires the female body.
Although she cannot yet reverse the process of reification and thus disrupt
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the gender codes by purchasing a m an’s labor, as she will later try to do to
her Merchant, Roxana can now objectify herself as a commodity in the male
gaze a t her own artful command. She does not m ature as a more skillful and
more demanding whore aiming a t greater material gain; she simply
progresses onto the road of becoming a character of the m aternal chora and
later an epitome of the degenderization of man in the novel.

5.2. Lacanian "Imaginary" and the Reversal of Gender

The Lacanian Imaginary "mirror stage" or the Kristevan Semiotic
m aternal chora as a reversal of the paternal order in subverting the paternal
Symbolic meaning characterizes Roxana’s second phase in the noveldisruptions of the paternal cultural codes. Defoe’s fictional characters suffer
immensely from fear, real or imaginary, a t some stage in their lives. The fear
th a t Robinson Crusoe and Roxana suffer in his surprising discovery of the
footprint and in her excruciating confrontation with the Jew has striking
similarities in relation to the Lacanian Imaginary. Crusoe tells the reader
about a "new Scene" of his island life: "I was exceedingly surpriz’d with the
P rint of a Man’s naked Foot on the Shore, which was very plain to be seen in
the Sand." While a rational hum an being would, in David Hume’s view,
logically conclude th a t the other print may have been "effaced by the rolling
of the sands or inundation of the waters," the sight of this single footprint
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tak es Crusoe’s reason away. "I stood like one T hunder-struck, or as if I had
seen a n A pparition."106 H om er O. Brow n’s reading of th is scene illum inates
th e possibility of linking Crusoe’s discovery to th e L acanian "m irror stage."
About th e possible causes of th e m ysterious footprint, Brown argues, Crusoe’s
"specu latio n s-th e chim era, his own foot, his own shadow, a n evil conscience,
th e curious ability to see him self as an o th er would see him —am ount to a
confusion betw een th e self an d the other." F o r Brown, fear of the other
determ ines "the need for concealment" of th e id e n tity of Defoe’s n a rra to rs in
relatio n to th e ir play of nam es. He also contends th a t "unable to accept the
given definition of him self, th e will and legacy of h is father, th e world of law,
Robinson experiences him self as incomplete and searches m istakenly for
com pletion in th e world outside."107 However, Brow n never explicitly connects
th e confusion of th e self an d the other to th e L acanian "m irror stage"; he
never looks a t th e footprint as th e L acanian "mirror" im age of th e self as an
incom plete subject after the sexual division. The o th er p a rt (the other
footprint) is perm anently missing. F irst, Brown’s idea of "allurem ent of the
world offering some form of completion to th e self' can never happen in
L acan’s notion of th e h um an subject after th e "lack." The self rem ains
incom plete since it cannot find com pleteness or u n ity w ith th e m issing
com ponent of th e sexual androgyny or th e original whole o f th e prim ordial
being from w hich th e gendered subject is derived. E ven heterosexual union
an d procreation, which Silverm an considers to be th e "only resolution to the
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loss Buffered by th e subject as the consequence of sexual division," are far
from possible for Crusoe on h is island because there is no sex w hatsoever
involved in his w andering life in th e outside world, for women, W att points
out, have only th e economic, not th e sexual, role to play in the novel.108
Second, i t can be argued th a t th e footprint symbolizes the "mirror" image or
Crusoe’s own "Shadow" and th u s reflects th e self in th e Im aginary. The
obscure difference between the self and the other also applies. Crusoe can
hardly distinguish th e self and the other, which, as he speculates, can be the
"Shadow" of him self or the other things th a t he thinks m ay be th e work of his
own im agination.
In sim ilar fashion, Roxana and the Jew confront each other w ith the
sam e sort of fear th a t highlights Crusoe’s scene of m ystery and horror. This
confrontation in Roxana indicates th e beginning of th e heroine’s private voice
an d h er reversal of the Lacanian model from the Symbolic in the first p a rt of
th e novel to the Im aginary in th e second part. W hen th e M erchant decides to
help Roxana w ith the tran sferral of h er estate to a London bank and asks the
Jew to appraise h er jewels, th e scene goes as follows:
As soon as th e Jew saw the Jew els, he falls a jabbering in
D utch, or Portuguese, to the M erchant, and I could presently
perceive th a t they were in some g reat Surprize, both of them;
th e Jew held up his H ands, look’d a t me w ith some Horror, then
ta lk ’d D utch again, and p u t him self into a thousand Shapes,
tw isting his Body, and w ringing u p his Face th is way, and th a t
Way, in his Discourse; stam ping w ith his Feet, and throwing
abroad his H ands, as if he w as not in a Rage only, b u t in a m eer
Fury; th e n he wou’d tu rn , and give a Look a t me, like the Devil;
I thought I never saw anything so frightful in my life. (112-3)
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incom prehensible to Roxana approxim ate th e semiotic rhythm betw een the
in fa n t an d its m other in th e m aternal chora. H ere th e self confronts the other
for the first time. The self and the other in th is scene work both ways and
reflect each other as th e devil, ju s t as Crusoe thinks th a t he h as seen "an
Apparition" in his other, th e footprint. The self can first be the Jew , for he
looks a t Roxana "with some Horror" as though he envisioned th e devil, while
th is devil m ay ju s t be a "mirror" im age (Roxana’s face) or th e other th a t
reflects th e self (the Jew ) who is looking into th e "mirror." The self can also
be Roxana, who tells us th a t "I thought I never saw anything so frightful in
m y life." She m ay have ju s t seen, in th e Jew ’s face, in th e "mirror" image, or
in th e other, a reflection of herself who is ju s t as terrifying to th e Jew as he
is to her. T his blurring and horrible self in the Semiotic or the Im aginary
m akes th e reversal of the Lacanian model possible in the novel w ith one
differentiation: Roxana fears and abhors th e other and refuses to identify
w ith it, while th e other in the L acanian "mirror" is alw ays "a pleasing unity"
th a t th e narcissistic self finds and som ething w ith w hich the ego can
identify.109 L acan’s self moves from th e Im aginary to th e Symbolic in the
sense th a t th e self is held as the gendered subject in language or the male
symbolic order. Accordingly, Crusoe finally tu rn s into th e symbolic order
"through th e desire of th e other" by recognizing th e au thority of the F ath e r
and accepting the divine power after his isolation an d alienation on the
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island. Roxana, however, establishes a reversal of th e L acanian model by
inverting th e gender codes and defying the (male) divine power, which can be
characterized as th e initiation of th e m aternal chora or the disruption of the
m eaning of th e (male) Symbolic. Roxana, a t th is point, is like a tru e fem inist
w ith a private voice hailed by Helene Cixous, who calls for a re tu rn of the
repressed of the p atern al culture by "breaking th e codes th a t negate her."110
T he disruption of cultural codes begins w ith th e reversed role th a t a
diabolical m istress plays in th e m ale-dom inated society. In th is m aternal
chora, th e gender stereotypes have th eir opposite boundaries, and Roxana is
no longer weak, dependent, and sentim ental. In a word, she is not fixed in a
space in w hich the m ale would like to visualize her. R ath er th a n being a
fem inine prey to m en in the p atern al order, Roxana undergoes a
m etam orphosis and occupies a power zone th a t is generally reserved for men.
She becomes a n evil woman, a victimizer who is empowered w ith m asculine
qualities such as reason and th e ability to govern and is able to pose a th re a t
to p atriarch y by w h at Backscheider would say "feminizing" and w eakening
th e m ale and robbing him of his reason and will.111 F irst, Roxana is no longer
depicted in th is second phase as an affectionate m other w hen she is fixed in
the Symbolic. F or one thing, th e M erchant rightly accuses h e r of having no
"common Affection of a Mother" because she decides to "ruin" h er baby she
h a s from th e M erchant and to b ear it out of wedlock. Also, Roxana h erself
tells th e reader, "I wou’d willingly have given te n Thousand Pounds of my
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Money, to have been rid of th e B urthen I had in m y Belly" (163). One can see
no trace of a caring m other figure left in her.
Second, in contrast to h er early career, Roxana’s position w ith a m an
in th is m atern al chora h as been reversed. W hile th e Jew eller and the Prince
reify h e r body w ith th e money they pay for h er sexual services, Roxana is in
a position to reify th e M erchant’s labor, when she m akes a financial offer to
th e M erchant, for rescuing h e r out of the d isaster w ith th e Jew in Paris: "If
he w anted Money, I would le t him have any Sum for h is Occasion, as far as
five or six thousand Pistoles" (141). O f course the M erchant refuses the
money because he h as som ething else in m ind. Thus, th e focus is once again
switched to th e issue of sex. I t tu rn s out to be no less dehum anizing for the
M erchant. The reversed roles of both sexes are clear here in th is love affair.
The M erchant succumbs to Roxana’s charm and is feminized and weakened.
Toppling from m ale power, he is actually begging h er to throw him a bone
an d pleading "since you have been so kind as to tak e me to your Bed, why
will you not m ake me your Own, and tak e me for good-and-all?" (145),
w hereas Roxana reasons to h erself th a t "to resist a M an, is to act with
Courage and Vigour" (152). Roxana h as thw arted th e M erchant’s plan to
m arry h er through sleeping w ith h e r first. A lthough Roxana used to be
dehum anized by the Jew eller and th e Prince, rig h t now she tu rn s the table
around an d is dehum anizing th e M erchant and reifying h is labor. Sex, though
still a reifying act here, is no longer a game in which th e m ale calls the shots,
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no longer a game played to the m ale’s advantage. Roxana designs the sexual
encounter to "balance accounts," which is more th a n the money Roxana has
proposed to repay the M erchant in reifying his labor. "The Favour of Lying
w ith a Whore," says Roxana, is equal to "all the Debt I ow’d him for saving
m y Life, and all my Effects" (144). D ehum anization on the M erchant’s p a rt
lies in Roxana’s question: "Where is the M an th a t cares to m arry a Whore,
tho’ of his own making?" (145) and in h e r upsetting his plan: "his Project of
coming to-Bed to me, was a Bite upon himself, while he intended it for a Bite
upon me" (144). For th e M erchant, to plot such a scheme in order to
consum m ate a m arriage is dehum anizing enough, and to fail in the scheme
is even more sham eful.112
Moreover, a p a rt from the fact th a t Roxana is endowed with such male
strength as "subtle reasoning" and reasoning strongly on h er argum ent about
m atrim ony as th e M erchant has more th a n once acknowledged, she is also an
antithesis to the idea of women’s inability to govern. The D utch M erchant, in
his public voice, is perhaps referring to th a t gender stereotype depicted in
Defoe’s Review, for he w arns Roxana th a t women are not capable of
m anaging estates; "their Heads were not tu rn ’d for it, and they had better
choose a Person capable, and honest, th a t knew how to do them Justice...;
then th e Trouble w as all taken off th eir Hands" (153). However, Roxana’s
private voice disapproves him immediately. "It w as a dear Way of purchasing
th eir Ease;" says she, "for very often w hen the Trouble was taken off their

164
H ands, so was th eir Money too; and th a t I thought it was fa r safer for the
Sex not to be afraid of the Trouble, b u t to be really afraid of th eir Money"
(153), and she has proved her point. Roxana rebels against traditional female
financial disabilities by "her shrewd investm ent and financial m anagem ent
as a ‘she-m erchant.’"113 Having left P aris, Roxana bids a farewell to her old
days as "a Lady of Pleasure" and welcomes the advent of "a Woman of
Business" (131). W ith h er experience of having successfully handled bills and
dealt w ith jewelers and bankers, Roxana is confident to say th a t "by
m anaging my Business thus myself, and having large Sums to do with, I
became as expert in it, as any She-M erchant of them all" (131). Besides her
lengthy descriptions about how she has secured h er transferred estate in
Holland, Roxana’s business w ith Sir Robert Clayton in London gives the
reader a picture of a woman who is in control of her own estate while keeping
h er eyes open to advice. Sir Robert advises Roxana to stow away 1000 pounds
as a long-term C.D. so th a t th e am ount will double in ten years (167). About
this handsome financial proposal, Roxana first tells him th a t she has not
been completely sold to the idea of long-term banking. She complains to him,
"you are contriving how to make me a rich Old Woman, b u t th a t won’t
answ er my End; I had ra th e r have 20,000 1. now th a n 60,000 1. when I am
fifty Year old" (168). She does not w ant to invest so m uch in banking, so
w hen she accepts the offer, she shows h er businessm an-like restrain t and
caution by cutting down the lay-up to seven hundred pounds a year. Roxana
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does show a little of her managem ent in term s of accepting sound financial
judgm ent and modifying expert opinion.
Roxana’s banking business is only p a rt of her means to m ake money.
If this avenue involves the help of a m an like Sir Robert, her career as a
courtesan is solely done on her own. The later m arried Roxana for one time
compares herself in h er past life of crime to "a Passenger coming back from
the Indies.... after many Years Fatigues and H urry in Business," and this,
interestingly enough, parallels to and equates the M erchant’s "all the
Fatigues of so many Years H urry and Business" (243-4). Lois A. Chaber notes
th a t Moll Flanders has escaped from "the feminine cycle of reproduction into
the historical social cycle of production," and Carol Houlihan Flynn has
studied the infamous body economy in Roxana as a struggle against
m ateriality.114 Like Moll, Roxana devotes herself to a business th a t also
involves a social cycle of production, a business of whoredom and of a body
economy. While Chaber considers an unwed m other like Moll as the producer
(of babies) and the governess as the capitalistic entrepreneur, both the
producer (the female body) and the entrepreneur (the pimp) are incorporated
in Roxana herself. The physical Roxana (her body) is the producer of sexual
gratification, the "product" purchased by the consumer (the whoremaster),
who is brought to the site of production by the m arketing Roxana, the
capitalistic entrepreneur. Moreover, like Flynn’s Roxana who presents her
body for a m aterial gain, "to overcome a fundam ental fear of bodily needs,"
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both th e producer an d th e businessw om an (here all in one) also profit
financially from th e body; in some cases, th e producer Oike Jo h n Cleland’s
F a n n y H ill) also sh ares th e pleasu re and th u s splits th e "product" for which
th e consum er pays. However, Roxana here in th e second phase is not a t a
stage, w here, as F ly n n contends, she h as to "feign compliance and
subm ission" in order to m ain tain independence. F lynn exam ines how Defoe
"creates characters driven by desire an d necessity to express them selves
th ro u g h bodies th a t eventually betray." T he p rese n t study, by contrast, is
m ore concerned about th e w ay th e body w orks for th e fem inist Roxana.
W hile S ir Robert helps Roxana w ith h e r b an k investm ent, which
eventually am ounts to 2,000 pounds la te r on, h e r "Principal" (35,000 pounds)
comes from the m ain in d u stry which is k ep t back from S ir R obert w ithout
an y of hiB assistance. "He applauded my Way of m anaging my Money, and
told m e, I shou’d soon be m onstrous rich; b u t he n eith er knew, nor
m istru sted , th a t w ith all th is W ealth, I w as y et a W hore, an d w as n o t averse
to adding to m y E sta te a t th e fa rth e r E xpense of m y V irtue" (171). The
reason w hy R oxana is "not averse to" continuing h e r reliance on w horing as
h e r m ain stock is th a t it is th e only w ay th a t answ ers h e r end w ithout any
help from or jo in t venture w ith a m an like S ir Robert, for she is both the
producer an d the businessw om an. T h a t is why she does n o t w an t to totally
depend on S ir Robert; th a t is why she rejects even th e tru stw o rth y and
shrew d S ir Robert’s idea of m arry in g a well-to-do m erch an t h e introduces to
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her, hoping to increase h er w ealth, n o t to m ention h e r earlier refusal of the
M erchant’s proposal for m atrim ony. The sole rationale behind all her
m arriage refusals, a point th a t she h as so painstakingly tried to establish in
th e novel, is obviously to m ain tain h er financial independence, for she asserts
th a t "a M istress m akes the Saying tin e , th a t w h at a M an has, is hers, and
w hat she has, is h e r own" (132). O r i t is even more th a n th a t, to prove her
argum en t th a t "a W oman w as as fit to govern an d enjoy h er own E state,
w ithout a M an, as a M an was, w ithout a Woman" (149), and she really is
such a woman.
Finally, Roxana’s repudiation of cultural codes in the m atern al chora
resides in h e r denial of the (male) divine order. In contrast to Robinson
Crusoe, who evolves from th e Im aginary into th e Symbolic "through the
desire of th e other" in his recognition of God’s p lan and his religious
conversion, Roxana rejects th a t Symbolic an d openly disobeys th e power of
God in h e r m atern al chora. Defoe in his early years was surely educated in
Calvinistic principles, and in m any of his conduct books he adhered to those
values. However, it is not surprising th a t Defoe, other th a n dealing w ith
accepted ideas in his fiction, m ay develop a different voice in it. Such a voice
tends to be dissonant from th e public voice in his nonfiction. M any critics
have identified Defoe’s private voice about religion in his novels. W att points
out th a t im potence of religion or secularization an d de-horrification of
C alvinist notions of physical labor contribute a g reat deal to individualism in
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Robinson Crusoe. In contrast to J . P aul H u n ter’s linking Crusoe’s "original
sin" to stories of Jo n ah and th e prodigal son, (which "were frequently used as
exem plar by th e P u rita n preachers to w arn ag ain st restlessness, filial
disobedience, an d failure to follow one’s calling"), Leopold Damrosch argues
th a t "Defoe’s story curiously fails to su stain th e m otif of th e prodigal."115 In
sim ilar m anner, Roxana rejects the divine power w hen it comes to the laws
of m atrim ony.
Once again as th e voice of reason, an d public opinion, th e M erchant
presents to Roxana the traditional views of m atrim ony after h earing her
lengthy infam ous argum ent about the difference betw een a wife and a whore.
"He first hinted, th a t M arriage was decreed by Heaven; th a t it was th e fix’d
S tate of Life, which God had appointed for M an’s Felicity" (151). The
M erchant’s rem arks surely echo Defoe’s idea of m atrim ony in his Conjugal
Lewdness (1727), w here Defoe defines m atrim ony as

"GOD’s holy

O rdinance."116 B ut Defoe’s private voice is different in fiction from his public
voice in non-fiction. Declining to m arry and determ ined to give b irth to the
baby out of wedlock, Roxana renounces th e law s of m atrim ony and says "I
cou’d not reconcile my Ju d g m en t to M arriage" because, as she argues w ith
th e M erchant, "the Laws of M atrim ony p u ts th e Power into your H ands; bids
you do it; commands you to command; and binds me, forsooth, to obey" (151).
Roxana’s rem arks here are a h arsh criticism of the eighteenth century
m atrim onial law th a t h as troubled her, which puts a wom an in a financially
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and social inferior position, for in th e early century, once a woman "entered
into m arriage h er husband had legal rights to any real or personal property
th a t she owned."117 W hat is im p o rtan t here is th a t Roxana implies injustice
in w h at th e M erchant deems as th e sacred laws of m atrim ony. N ot only is it
the m ale subject in a husband th a t Roxana w ants to reject, b u t also the
(male) divine power th a t she disobeys. T h a t is why th e M erchant w arns her
ag ainst blasphemy. "You re stra in yourself from th a t Liberty, which God and
N ature h as directed you to take; and, to supply the Deficiency, propose a
Vicious lib e rty " is "neither honourable nor religious" (157). B ut Roxana
insists on doing it in spite of his religion.
Furtherm ore, th e divine power, according to Spacks, is th e ultim ate
extension of the fath er’s authority, power, and terror. The suprem e power,
which bestows th e power of th e patom al, belongs to H is p atern al nature. This
p atern al connection betw een God and m an, Spacks finds it in B urke’s notion
of sublim ity, w hich is "an essentially ‘m asculine’ quality, associated w ith ‘the
authority of a fath er.’" This p atern al bond between the divine and th e hum an
perfectly corresponds to the C alvinist doctrine th a t m an was created in His
own image, for Jo h n Calvin believes th a t m an is "the m ost noble and m ost
excellent m asterpiece, in whom the justice, wisdom, and goodness of God
appears."118 The p atern al figure in the image of God, for instance, is no
stran g er to Defoe’s C aptain Singleton. He reveres W illiam the Q uaker and
calls him "my Ghostly Father." The title rightly suits him , as discussed in
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C hapter 3. Besides William’s foresight and prophetic power in his dream
about m eeting w ith C aptain Avery, he has for m any tim es saved Singleton
from disasters; one among them is the narrow escape (Singleton thinks it is
God’s deliverance) from the Island of Ceylon w here the savages try to entice
Singleton and the crew to come ashore, a would-be catastrophe for Singleton.
Also as C hapter 3 indicates, Roxana takes h er M erchant as such a male
incarnation of the suprem e power. After the M erchant, who she la ter thinks
is a prophet and h as more th a n hum an knowledge (160), has helped her
through the Jew ’s attem pted blackmail, Roxana tells th e reader: "Had I had
any Religion, or any Sense of a Suprem e Power managing, directing, and
governing in both Causes and Events in this World, such a Case as this wou’d
have given any-body room to have been very thankful to the Power who had
not only p u t such a Treasure into my H and, b u t given me such an Escape
from the Ruin th a t th reaten ’d me" (121). H ad Roxana any sense of the
"managing, directing, and governing" God, she would in terp ret the message
as a rew ard, not punishm ent, by the suprem e power for all her "mischiefs,"
quite opposite to the standard religious revelation. Even worse th a n that,
Roxana juxtaposes the supreme power w ith the hum an power and shows her
gratitude to the M erchant for her deliverance while she is aw are th a t the
religious creed ordains th a t power solely in God. O ther th an being
unreligious, Roxana here ensures the paternal link between the divine and
the hum an only to defy such paternal power in h er m aternal chora.
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5.3. Roxana’s Androgyny and the Degenderization of Man

In the late seventeenth century, as David Blewett points out, "the idea
th a t m utual affection was an essential ingredient in m arriage emerged and
prevailed" against the patriarchal idea of property trading. The idea of
m utual affection is advocated in Defoe’s conduct books, where Defoe states
th a t "the M atrimony Duty is all reciprocal" and th a t the union of the sexes
is for "compleating their m utual Felicity."119 In sim ilar fashion, the Dutch
M erchant, a representative of the public voice, tells Roxana about matrimony
th a t "where there was a m utual Love, there cou’d be no Bondage; b u t th a t
there was b u t one interest; one Aim; one Design; and all conspir’d to make
both very happy" (149). Roxana’s m arriage to the Merchant, however,
complicates such an ideal. The m arriage is not a symbol of m utual affection;
the discussion about Roxana’s feigned obedience in C hapter 3 proves that. If
Roxana as a whore in the second phase, in the m aternal chora, poses a th reat
to patriarchy, the m arried Roxana is no longer such a figure in the last p art
of the novel. Roxana knows th a t she cannot solve th e problem of injustice in
gender hierarchies by sustaining the terrifying Medusa’s face to m en as an
evil woman, perpetuating the m aternal chora and reversing the gender roles,
preserving "herstory" in place of "history," or subsum ing the other sex under
dominance.120 It is also far from tru th th a t Roxana in m arrying the M erchant
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re tu rn s to th e proper sphere for women designed by th e p atern al order—losing
h e r id en tity , as W illiam Blackstone sees it in C om m entaries on the Laws of
E ngland (1753): "By m arriage, th e h u sb an d and wife a re one person in law:
th a t is, th e very being or legal existence of the w om an is suspended during
th e m arriag e, or a t le a st is incorporated an d consolidated into th a t of
husband."121 Instead, Roxana d ep arts from those ideologies an d idealizes her
m an-wom anhood. R a th er th a n incorporating "the very being of woman" into
th a t of husband, or vice versa, h er aim is tru ly to carve u p m en’s te rrito ry of
liberty, for she says "I knew no Reason th e M en h ad to engross the whole
L iberty of th e Race" (171), an d to claim h er equal sta tu s in it. In so doing she
ends up a s an androgynous "Man-Woman" who embodies th e cultural
a ttrib u te s of both sexes as an interplay, deterritorializes the either/or
th in k in g in gender hierarchies, an d degenderizes th e h u m a n being.
W hile Roxana’s interplay betw een th e p atern al an d the m atern al is
sim ilar to L angbauer’s discussion of th e w om an’s double role in M ary
W ollstonecraft, degenderization should be distinguished from such a double
role. Roxana, w hile engaging a n interplay, does n o t fall back into the
Symbolic for a struggle for total control b u t is degenderized into th e sexual
androgyny sta te of th e L acanian triad . Such a degenderization does not
consist in th e reversed role of a woman, as in R oxana’s m a tern al chora, or in
a re tu rn to th e p atern al, b u t in th e heroine’s androgynousness th a t unifies
both gender boundaries w ithin one individual. According to L angbauer, the

m other in W ollstonecraft’s novel The W rongs of W oman (1798) is a h a lf m an
and carries o u t a double role, both outside an d inside romance. Romance,
"female" in n atu re (a patriarchy-designated sphere proper only to women) and
a n inferior genre as th e other of th e novel, is derided ju s t as woman is in
patriarchy. L angbauer regards romance as a world of m aternal chora and
outside th e m ale order. She re-evaluates th is genre and gender subordination
of rom ance and women as being excluded from the p atern al power structure
b u t re-inserts th e dynam ic force of genre and gender back into th e p aternal
or th e Symbolic to struggle for power in relation to the subject’s use of
language. The m other in W ollstonecraft, Langbauer w rites, is both inside the
K ristevan Symbolic (outside romance), a phallic m other "in command of
language even to speaking new term s for h e r own self-definition," an d a t the
sam e tim e outside it in th e m aternal chora (inside romance), "subverting the
order and m eaning of language, p artak in g of th e romance of the infantile and
unutterable." T his double role or th e K ristevan interplay betw een the
p atern al and th e m atern al is recognized in M aria’s desire "to be a father, as
well as a m other." However, Langbauer’s half-m an woman, after the
interaction betw een th e p atern al an d th e m aternal, progresses in the
direction of th e L acanian tria d not to the prim ordial sexual androgyny b u t
back to th e p atern al Symbolic, for the double role, w rites Langbauer, allows
th e w om an w riter "to m ake sense—and n o n sen se-w ith in th e p atern al order."
J u s t as she tries to establish "the novel’s connections to th e romance it
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rejects" in positing th a t "women an d romance also collapse back into th e male
order" (the novel) in C harlotte Lennox’s T he Fem ale Quixote (1752),
L angbauer h as th ru s t the dynam ic in teip lay betw een th e p atern al and the
m atern al into th e p atern al order as a (female) subject’s power struggle w ithin
th e p atern al Symbolic by using th e subject’s power of representation through
language. The fem inist power struggle w ithin th e p atern al Symbolic is the
inevitable outcome of L angbauer’s genre and gender study, for she deems
subordinating women and romance as p atriarch al "local power" a t b est b u t
women’s "system o f construction and representation" in the Symbolic as "total
control."122 After th e interplay betw een th e Im aginary an d th e Symbolic,
fem inist characters in Langbauer’s reading move in one direction, b u t Roxana
moves in th e other along th e line of the Lacanian triad.
F irst, Roxana's m arriage to the M erchant stan d s a sharp contrast to
Pam ela's to M r. B., w here Pam ela m akes all efforts to reconcile w ith the
family an d to get accepted finally by Lady D avers, Mr. B.’s sister. Sim ilar to
L angbauer’s project, Richardson’s novel in th e first p a rt creates a Pam ela who
obtains h e r social mobility through th e subject’s use of discourse (the paternal
Symbolic), through h er le tte rs and th e stories told in them ,123an d h er desire
for reconciliation an d acceptance in th e second p a rt secures h er place in the
p atern al order. Roxana, however, does not m arry th e M erchant ju s t to move
back into th e p atern al order b u t to m aintain h er fem inist self-government
and be a m arried woman a t th e sam e tim e w ithout coming to term s with the
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laws of matrimony. She no longer w ants to be a "She-Devil" to men as she
used to be in h er m aternal chora, b u t she still preserves p a rt of it and
borders on h er past devilish independence (masculinity) and her p ast virtues
as a wife and a m other (femininity). She is both inside and outside a paternal
institution like m arriage and becomes a subverting force to the either/or
thinking in gender studies, for to rem ain inside the paternal order or stays
outside is to reinforce th a t distinctive thinking p attern or to reside in th a t
gender "home." A M arried woman in traditional views, as Roxana says to the
M erchant when she refuses to tie th e knot w ith him in h er m aternal chora,
is "a m eer Woman ever after, th a t is to say, a Slave" (148). The m arried
woman envisioned in patriarchy is only the other to h er husband. W hat
Roxana longs to become is an androgynous being, for she asserts, "I wou’d be
a Man-Woman: for as I was bom free, I wou’d die so" (171). H er m arriage to
the M erchant epitomizes h er ideal fem inist vision of such an androgynous
"Man-Woman" state.
By the tim e Roxana gets m arried again she is "pretty n ear Fifty, and
too old to have any Children" (245). A woman already passing h er child
bearing age and no longer performing her physiological function as a woman
participating in the patriarchal reproduction cycle, Roxana tells her M erchant
th a t she would like to offer w hat she h as left w ith her--to "join Stocks" or
combine the "two Pockets" w ith him. This is because, she says, "he had offer’d
and promis’d th a t I shou’d keep all my own E state in my own Hands; yet,
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th a t since I had taken him, I wou’d e’en do as other honest Wives did, where
I thought fit to give myself, I shou’d give w hat I had too" (250). It is m istaken
to consider Roxana is surrendering control of h er estate to the M erchant.124
While she still clings to her idea of independence and reminds the M erchant
of his early promise not to touch her estate, Roxana is aware of the
consequences of m arriage th a t she has chosen to enter into; th a t is, she is
aw are of w hat expectations a husband has for a woman who is already inside
matrimony. The laws of matrimony enable the m an to take control of the
woman’s possessions, but since she has achieved economic independence
outside m arriage, Roxana can manage to rem ain outside his control. Even
before h er proposal for mixing the "two Pockets," Roxana has already given
the reader a sign of being both inside and outside the paternal order, for she
h as had about eight thousand pounds in reserve and has kept it back from
the M erchant, to provide for her two daughters (260). On the one hand,
Roxana is not a n honest wife after all as she protests in w hat is later shown
as h er faked attem pt to join estates. H er cheating about the reserve reminds
the reader of h er wicked past, the demonic m aternal side of h er th a t is
frightening to the male. On the other hand, she is also attached to the heart
of an affectionate m other who worries about the fate of h er two daughters
(before the troublesome Susan tu rn s up in her narrative), ju s t as she is
supposed to do as a caring m other when she is in the symbolic order in the
first p a rt of the novel.
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Judging from the M erchant's promise and his character, Roxana knows
she will not have to "join Stocks," b u t h er tongue-in-cheek proposal is not
risk-free. As Roxana shows the M erchant all the mortgages and rents she
owns, all laid down on the table for him to take, she says "I trembled every
Jo in t of me" because for her "all this was acting." Thank goodness, the
M erchant "look’d a t them a-while" and says "I will not touch them" (259).
Roxana’s estate, the M erchant says as he has promised as one of the term s
of m arriage (244), is "for your own Use, and the M anagem ent wholly your
own." Given the fact of Roxana’s "acting" and of h er early equation of
whoredom w ith business, the reader cannot miss the irony here when Roxana
reasons to herself for not insisting on mixing her tinted money with the
M erchant’s honest estate: "Shall my ill-got Wealth, the Product of Prosperous
Lust, and of a vile and vicious Life of Whoredom and Adultery, be
interm ingled

with

the

honest will-gotten

E state

of this innocent

Gentleman...?" Besides this pretension, Roxana also, as Spiro Peterson notes,
uses "the machinery of the trust" th a t was sanctioned in the late seventeenth
century by the courts of equity, to acknowledge h er right denied by common
law ,125 by declaring to the M erchant, "All the Pretence I can have for the
making-over my own E state to me, is, th a t in Case of your Mortality, I may
have i t reserv’d for me, if I outlive you" (259). No m atter w hat pretensions
she puts on, Roxana has successfully struggled to stay outside the paternal
grips of m arriage while inside it. Paradoxically, she works within the order
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of m arriage while accepting no rules like a free-woman m istress in her
m atern al chora, th u s m aintaining h er balance betw een th e p atern al and the
m atern al an d deterritorializing distinctive gender boundaries. H aving now
k ept th e "two Pockets" separated and preserved h er rig h t to govern h er own
estate, Roxana, out of h er duty as a "good wife," asks th e M erchant to save
all his money and offers to use h er own two thousand pounds a year readym oney as th e spending for "the m utual Subsistence of the Family" (259). As
a provider an d a n independent woman, Roxana is also a p t to contribute to the
p atern al family; she is both a m arried woman subjugated to p atriarch y and
a m asculine "independent m istress" free to m anage h e r own estate.
A nother indication of Roxana’s man-woman sta tu s h as to do w ith her
relationship w ith Susan, h er daughter, who is a reintroduction of Roxana’s
p a st to h e r peaceful m arried life. In response to the symbol of h e r past,
Roxana dem onstrates both h er ten d er fem ininity and h er evil m asculinity
th a t rejects such tenderness, revealing h er degenderized id en tity of a manwoman. F irst, for Roxana, the p resen t represents h e r virtuous life as an
"honest wife" and th e p ast h er life of wickedness as a she-devil. Trying to
prevent th e M erchant’s "discovering, th a t he h ad in his Arms a She-Devil,
whose whole Conversation for twenty-five Y ears had been black as Hell,"
Roxana tells th e reader th a t "all th e Satisfaction I could m ake him, was to
live virtuously for th e Time to come, not being able to retrieve w h at had been
in Time past" (301). The she-devil in h er p a s t m aternal chora h as reversed
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h e r gender role as a female, b u t th a t m asculine p a st alw ays sneaks up on her
so th a t she is ever locked in th e past/present predicam ent, w andering
betw een (masculine) wickedness an d (feminine) virtuousness an d embodying
degenderization. H er dilem m a w ith h er p a s t is clearly shown in her first
decision for social ap artn ess, which springs from h er desire for breaking w ith
h er wicked past, "retiring from my old Acquaintances, and consequently from
th e vile abom inable T rade I had driven so long" (207). She finds h er "perfect
R etreat" in the Q uaker’s country house. B u t th e p ast keeps creeping back on
her, and she says she is "like a F ish out of W ater" while having a little peace
an d quiet in the country (214). W hat Roxana m isses is th e "tenderest"
M erchant who, she is sure, is still under h er control after eleven years since
they broke off in P aris. "I flattered to myself, th a t if I cou’d b u t see him I
could yet M aster him" (214). Through h er maid, Amy, who ru n s an errand for
h e r in P aris inquiring about all h er p ast acq u ain tan ces-th e Brew er her
husband, the Jew , the Prince as well as the M erch an t-all th e bits and pieces
of inform ation about Roxana’s past, besides th e "principal E rrand" to find the
M erchant, keep coming in, despite h er in itial desire for retirem ent. The
interaction between the p ast and th e present is a never-ceasing process in her
seclusion.
Since Roxana h as experienced both h er fem inine role of subjection (in
th e Symbolic) and h er m asculine role of power (in th e Semiotic) in the novel,
th e p a s t can designate both of these gender attrib u tes. Hence, the
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reintroduction of Susan complicates the m other’s reaction to her past.
According to Jo h n Richetti, "Susan’s reappearance is the direct and ironic
resu lt of Roxana’s attem p t to retu rn to h er ‘n atu ra l’ (i.e. institutional) past
w ithout losing h er apartness from its implications and responsibilities."
Richetti is interested here in Roland B arthes’ formulation of the social th a t
is transform ed into the natural. B u t Richetti’s notion of "a novelistic
dialectic," in H egelian term s, is more relevant for the present scene. For
Richetti, th e "natural" (feminine) biologiral and psychological ties between
Roxana and Susan can be regarded as the Hegelian thesis th a t has been
negated by Roxana’s (masculine) "freedom a t the expense of social forms and
institutions," th a t is, the antithesis. Roxana’s retu rn to the "natural" past
th en justifies the Hegelian synthesis where both the self (thesis) and the
other (antithesis) are incorporated--the re-establishm ent of the motherdaughter ties w ithout sacrificing the negating freedom.126
Roxana’s degenderization or androgyny involves a synthesis of both her
feminine "natural or biological destiny" (her virtuous feminine past) and h er
m asculine negating freedom (her masculine evil past), instead of h er mere
re tu rn to h er feminine "institutional" p a st in which the male ideology
allocates her. Such an interaction between h er feminine and masculine p ast
resides in the play of passion and judgm ent or emotionality and rationality
in the climax of the episode w hen she kisses Susan. R ather th a n a retu rn "to
th e only real identity women are granted, the n atu ral or biological destiny
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contained in the social forms of m arriage and the family," as Richetti
m aintains, the emotional climax here indicates th a t Roxana embodies within
herself both a desire for the re-establishm ent of w hat Schofield would call her
"female emotionality" and a desire for masculine judgm ent.127 The eighteenth
century was fascinated w ith such a gender distinction. H annah More in
E ssays on Various Subjects (1791), for example, w rites th a t "one sex will
th in k it betrays a w ant of feeling to be m oderate in th eir applause, the other
will be afraid of exposing a w ant of judgem ent by being in rap tu res w ith any
thing. —Men refuse to give way to the emotions they actually feel, while
women sometimes affect to be transported beyond w hat the occasion will
justify." The notion about lack of judgm ent in women, though rendered as
m an's own making, is always on Defoe’s fancy. In his Review. Defoe states
th a t "we always thought the Women had the quickest and ju ste st Notions of
things a t first sight, tho* we have rob’d them of the Judgm ent, bv denying
them earlv Instruction." Defoe’s contemporaries, such as th e sa tirist and
philosopher B ernard de Mandeville, also think along sim ilar lines. Lucinda,
a fictional character in Mandevill’s The Virgin U nm ask’d (1707), adm its th a t
"a sound and penetrating judgem ent only belongs to m an, as the m asters of
reason and solid sense."128 One can identify a fusion of these gender
distinctive qualities, passion and judgm ent, in Roxana as she kisses Susan.
F irst, Roxana tells the reader, "it was secret inconceivable Pleasure to me
w hen I kiss’d her, to know th a t I kiss’d my own Child; my own Flesh and

Blood, bom of my Body" (277). Roxana’s past femininity she has experienced
in the first p art of the novel in the paternal Symbolic retu rn s to her, and
secret passion takes over her. The pleasure, the child, and her own flesh and
blood and body all suggest the "institutional" past to which the patriarchal
system intends to nail her by the ideology th a t conceives the family as her
proper place in society and her biological and psychological destiny w ith her
daughter as the "natural" bond between women. However, Roxana does not
retu rn to h er "natural" past, for th is p art of h er feminine p ast contradicts her
masculine one th a t enables her to enjoy power. H er masculinity has to keep
her femininity in secrecy and in balance. H er passion for Susan or her
feminine "Disorder had almost discover'd itself," Roxana says, and "I rous’d
up my Judgm ent, and shook it off' (277). Here Roxana employs her reason or
judgm ent to control her passion and feelings towards Susan, feminine feelings
balanced by masculine judgm ent, feminine feelings she has to entertain for
the re st of h er life. T hat is one of the reasons why she cannot approve of
Amy’s proposal to m urder the troublesome wench.
The hum an being’s sexual androgyny is a homeless voice in Defoe’s
fiction, for it has never been articulated in the W estern civilization until now
in critical theory, a t least not as articulated as it is in the phenomenon of the
"berdache" in American Indian culture. A "berdache" is an American Indian
boy raised up as a girl and has both male and female qualities. This is a
n atu ral phenomenon for American Indians because "the G reat Spiritual
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Being" in In d ian trib al religions is conceived as an androgynous com bination
of both m ale an d fem ale.129 The closest th in g to th e degenderization of m an
in th e W estern civilization is perhaps in Jo h n Locke's political thinking. For
Locke, m a n an d wom an have an equal place in th e eyes of God and therefore
in th e ir political rights, b u t he never conceives m an a s an androgynous being
in gender term s. Placing a n em phasis on th e sole political rig h t of th e m ale
is for Locke "half Reason." In his critique of Robert Film er’s arg u m ent for
p atria rc h al m onarchy "to confirm th e N a tu ra l R ight of Regal Power in
P atriarch a . Locke w rites "I hope ’tis no Injury to call a n h a lf Q uotation an
h a lf Reason, for God says, H onour th y F a th e r an d M other; b u t our A uthor
contents him self w ith half, leaves out th v M other quite, as little serviceable
to h is purpose." H is stance is certainly not fem inist, for Locke resorts to a
distinctive gender hierarchy in the domestic life of family. Locke argues th a t
if God gives "any Pow er to Adam, it can be only a Conjugal Power, not
Political, th e Pow er th a t every H usband h a th to order th e things of private
C oncernm ent in his Family." Locke also considers th e h u sband as "a M aster
of a F a m i l y w ith all these subordinate R elations of Wife. C hildren. Servants
a n d Slaves united u n d er th e Dom estick Rule of a Family." Locke still w ants
to preserve p atern al authority. W hat he renounces is Film er’s analogy
betw een th e au th o rity of th e king in th e sta te and th e au th o rity of the father
in th e fam ily.130
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The hom elessness of th e voice also applies to a n im plication of the
degenderization of God as an androgynous Being. The religious notion of m an
created in th e im age of God enables A lthusser to asse rt th a t while God’s
people are subjects, God is th e Subject: "the Subject needs to become a
subject, as if to show empirically, visibly to the eye, tangibly to th e hands (see
S t Thom as) of th e subjects, th a t if they are subjects, subjected to the Subject,
th a t is solely in order th a t finally, on Judgem ent Day, they will re-enter the
Lord’s Bosom, like C hrist, i.e. re-enter th e Subject." Inherently, both th e m ale
and th e female subjects, for A lthusser, will eventually "re-enter" th e Body of
th e Subject on Ju d g m en t Day. Also Spacks has a sim ilar notion about the
subjects as an in teg ral p a rt of th e Subject in h e r in terestin g critical
observation about th e sentim ental novel after the m iddle of th e eighteenth
century. In lig h t of A dam Sm ith’s distinction betw een "soft power" and
"stronger power" ag ain st Edm und B urke’s analogy betw een fath ers’ authority
over sons an d the lin k of God to hum anity, Spacks argues th a t sentim ental
novels of th e period sometimes do not correspond to B urke’s elucidation. "If
God reta in s the power of the father, H e m ay assum e also attrib u tes of the
m other." Spacks notes in H enry Brooke’s novel The Fool of Q uality (1766) this
degenderizing aspect of God: the female "sunshine and gentle dews of his
providence and benignity" in contrast to his m ale "lightnings an d thunders,
his clouds and his tem pests." W oman’s disguised form of soft power, for
Spacks, is associated w ith God’s "sunshine and gentle dews."131 Although
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Spacks still th in k s of th e female as distinct from th e m ale, h er argum ent
about God’s two sides of gender implies His androgynous qualities. Thus, the
m ale He God should have the female She attached to H im an d be rew ritten
as a She/He God or w ith th e She/He combined as a SHe God. Even if there
w as no such th in g as a SHe God, th e degenderized h um an subjects, following
A lthusser’s logic, would eventually re-enter th e Subject and b rin g to It the
she/he attrib u te s on Ju d g m en t Day.
U nlike h er denouncem ent of th e (male) divine order in h e r m aternal
chora, Roxana’s a ttitu d e tow ards Providence undergoes a modification in the
la s t p a r t of th e novel, and th is modification also shows th e homeless voice
about a SH e God. Roxana no longer defies the m ale suprem e power; instead,
she relies on h er benign female God ("the sunshine and gentle dews") w ithout
denying th e punishing m ale God (His "thunders" and "tempests"), a
degenderization of the Suprem e Subject in whose im age the hum an subject
h a s been created. C alvinist apologists of Defoe’s tim e, who h ad exerted
enormous influence on Defoe, justified God’s role as governor of th e universe
and of h u m an affairs. Likewise, m any of Defoe’s fictional characters, a t some
point in th e ir lives, sense the governing power of Providence. A fter Robinson
Crusoe is driven by the violent storm s to th e island, he contem plates th a t "I
h ad g re a t R eason to consider it as a D eterm ination of H eaven, th a t in this
desolate Place, an d in th is desolate M anner I should end my Life." Having
been kidnapped to Virginia plantations by slave smugglers, Colonel Jack, too,
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believes "God had order’d every thing, the most Minute, and least Transaction
of Life, insomuch, T hat not a H air of our Heads shall fall to the Ground
w ithout his Permission."132 B ut Providence in Roxana works on the benign
female side, providing Roxana with "soft power" to escape the "tempests" and
the "lightnings" of the male side of the Supreme Subject th a t punishes evil.
The om nipresent God who governs the least as well as the greatest affairs of
men more th an once has delivered Roxana from w hat would otherwise be
disasters and the ruin of h er in the la st p art of the novel. First, before setting
out for Holland by boat, the Captain invites Roxana and the M erchant to dine
with his family on board the ship. T hat is the climax scene where Roxana and
Susan confront each other. The la st thing Roxana would see happen to her
is Susan’s recognition of h er a t th a t critical moment. Roxana tells the reader,
"it is hardly possible for me to conceive w hat wou’d have been our P a rt in this
Affair, had my woman Amy gone with me on-board this Ship; it had certainly
blown-up th e whole Affair, and I m ust for-ever after have been this Girl’s
Vassal" (280). Amy, who has been in charge of handling Roxana’s children
and has m et with Susan before for m any times, is luckily "not a t home when
we accepted th is Invitation, and so she was left out of the Company" (275).
If God’s "tempests" have arranged Susan coming out of nowhere to this
meeting to ruin Roxana, His "sunshine and gentle dews" have reduced the
punishm ent and prevented the key witness from being p art of the company.
L ater on when Susan and the Captain’s wife barge into Roxana’s house to see

her, the benign God is on Roxana’s side again. "Had not the kind QUAKER,
in a lucky Moment, come running in before them, they had not only clapp’d
in upon me, in the Parlour, as it had been a surprise, but, which wou’d have
been a thousand times worse, had seen Amv with me" (282). After Roxana
separates from Amy and retreats to another abode unknown to Susan, the
troublesome "Hound" somehow manages to find it and stops by for the last
time, and Roxana has to sneak out of the back door and hide in the neighbor’s
house. B u t "it was a very good Chance in the middle of a bad one, th a t my
H usband had taken out the Coach th a t very Morning, and was on to London"
(318), so the M erchant will not be able to know anything about it. Even the
ending is vague about punishm ent for Roxana’s crime (see C hapter 3). It says
nothing about punishing h er for h er p ast wicked life as a whore. Roxana only
savs the divine w rath falls on her for th e m urder of Susan, which is obviously
not her own doing. Time and time again God has forgiven Roxana whom the
reader would see punished for poetic justice. "The Fortunate Mistress" finally
m aintains h er "Man-Woman" identity and disappears, so to speak, out of the
la st page of the novel into a distant no-home land.

EPILOGUE

A final word about th e th ree "vocal" modes of in te rp retatio n in the
altern ativ e M arxist approach. Since th e public an d p riv ate voices of th e self
a re related to dom inant and radical ideologies, it is im p o rta n t to distinguish
betw een th e ideologies th a t are dom inant an d established an d those th a t are
n o t in a p articu lar historical period, an d th is distinction can be m ade by
historical studies. D om inant an d radical ideologies, for instance, can be
distinguished by a historical study of th e a ttitu d e s tow ards religion in the
la tte r h a lf of th e sixteenth century, w hich are related to the dom inant
C alvinistic doctrines an d a radical E picurean revival. According to E picurus’s
principle of happiness, th e gods will not b o th er to interfere w ith th e affairs
down below. "Now h u m an happiness," E picurus w rites, "consists of the
absence of worry or, a t least, th is absence of w orry is its condition.... The
sam e considerations apply to th e gods. I t is absurd, th en , to im agine th a t the
gods constantly concern them selves w ith th e governm ent of th e universe and
h u m a n affairs." In refu tatio n of this E picurean revival, Jo h n C alvin asks, "to
w h at end serveth i t to confesse a s E picure doth, th a t th ere is a God which
doth onely delight him self w ith idlenesse, having no care of th e world?".133
A bout th e issue of religion in Defoe’s day, one can also discern its dominance
over secular beliefs through evidence in Defoe’s other w orks such as Religious
C ourtship. Conjugal Lewdness, his Review, etc. Especially in Religious
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C ourtship, m arriage to an ath eist or a truly religious m an determ ines a
wom an’s fate of m isery or happiness in life. Concerning the dom inant place
of religion in Defoe’s works and his time, critics like Backscheider, H unter,
and S tarr, am ong others, have offered us convincing and stim ulating insights.
As for th e homeless voice of th e self, it indicates an obliteration of relations
w ith Defoe’s ideology and historical ideas, although the p resen t study
exercises only p a rt of its implications, its over-lapping w ith th e influence of
the in stitu tio n al discourse over the reader’s in terp retatio n s of Defoe (e.g.
deterritorialization, rom antic irony, and fem inist theory). It would be
senseless for any critic to suggest th a t he or she is a n "initiator of discursive
practices" and h as established a new paradigm of critical thinking. Critics
m ay consciously d ep art from one paradigm or another, to argue ag ain st the
established notions in a p articular held, b u t th eir critical consciousness, as
Said h as noted, often fluctuates between "filiation" and "affiliation" or
betw een different modes of the institutional discourse. Theoretically speaking,
th ere is no way critics them selves would know they have reached th e d istan t
real th a t is shaped by the future reader’s interpretive paradigm s, which is for
th e fu tu re critic to assess, and also theoretically speaking, the homeless voice
of the self may exist outside the constraints of the "interpretive community,"
which characterizes the alternative n atu re of the current M arxist approach.
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during th e Life and Surprising Adventures of Robinson Crusoe w ith his
Vision of th e Angelic World (1720) (New York: AMS Press, 1974), 181.
45. The Paracelsian new medicine insisted on a direct bond between God and
the physician and emphasized the C hristian origins of "the herm etic a r t of
healing." However, th e church supported th e separation of theology and
medicine, because, according to th is view, an illness was deemed as a
visitation from God upon the transgressor since the Fall in the Garden of
Eden; therefore one should tu rn to th e sacred realm of the spiritual for
healing, not to the lower science of medicine. For an appraisal of the
seventeenth-century views, both learned and popular, on theology and
medicine, see P eter Elm er, "Medicine, Religion and th e P u ritan Revolution,"
in The Medical Revolution of th e Seventeenth Century, ed. Roger French and
Andrew W ear (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 16-9, 31.
Doreen Evenden Nagy, Popular Medicine in Seventeenth-Century England
(Bowling Green: Bowling Green S tate U niversity Popular Press, 1988), 35-42.
46. Defoe, Review, intro. A uthur Wellesley Secord (New York: Columbia
U niversity Press, 1938), Ju n e 7,1771, vol. VIII, 130. A Jo u rn al of the Plague
Y ear (1722), ed. and intro. Louis Landa (London: Oxford U niversity Press,
1969). Landa, "Introduction," xviii. The page num bers in the text are
references to this edition. Rodney M. Baine, Daniel Defoe and the
S upern atu ral (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1968), 6. The F arth er
A dventures of Robinson Crusoe, ed. George A. Aitken (New York: AMS Press
Inc., 1974), 27. Virginia Ogden Birdsall argues th a t Crusoe "engages in a kind
of power struggle involving careful m anipulation in his dealings w ith God and
Providence," and behind his "godlike capacity to dominate th e earth and its
people" lies the power of the hum an brain. Defoe’s Perpetual Seekers: A
Study of the Major Fiction (London: Associated U niversity Press, 1985), 27,
33.
47. D ream s for Defoe can be "a kind of communication w ith the invisible
world, and a converse between the spirits embodied and those unembodied."
Serious Reflections. 186. D ream s prove to be prophetic in C aptain Singleton.
for W illiam and th e Cockswain dream about discovering a fortune on the
Island of M adagascar, and th e crew’s la te r experience on the island
corresponds to th eir dreams.
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48. The problem of disadvantage on the p a rt of the rescuer in cases of
deliverance is perhaps best resolved in the m utiny episode in Robinson
Crusoe, where the m utual deliverance them e is highlighted. F irst, Crusoe is
a God figure to the English Captain, who is about to be delivered from the
m utineers on Crusoe’s island. Shocked when the he h ears Crusoe’s voice and
sees him disguised in "a Spectre-like Figure.” the Captain speaks to him, "Am
I talking to God, or Man! Is it a real Man. or an Angel!" (254). Crusoe saves
the C aptain and his men, and the rescued ends up to be Crusoe’s rescuer, for
the C aptain consigns his ship to the command of his savior. Thus, Crusoe
says, "I look upon him as a Man sent from Heaven to deliver me" (273).
49. For studies of Crusoe’s conversion and th e fortunate fall, see S tarr, Defoe
& Spiritual Autobiography (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 106,
and Defoe & Casuistry. 93. It is perhaps misleading to suggest, in Birdsall’s
words, th a t Crusoe is one of Defoe’s perpetual seekers and th a t "the action
of Robinson Crusoe concerns not only the hero’s search for a home, b u t his
failure to find one" (39-47). Crusoe does in the end find his home in the
embrace of divine authority. The themes about Crusoe as an economic man
and as a restless traveller are also insightful, b ut they do not constitute lines
of flight the present study is concerned about. See W att, The Rise of the
Novel. 86-7. Novak, Economics and the Fiction of Daniel Defoe (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1962), 44-8.
50. Price, 10. Christopher Hill, The World Turned Upside Down (New York:
The Viking Press, 1972), 34-8. For Crusoe’s reinvention of the civilization and
his political leadership, see Backscheider, Daniel Defoe: Ambition &
Innovation (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1986), 235. Manuel
Schonhom, "Defoe: the L iterature of Politics and the Politics of Some
Fictions," in English L iterature in the Age of Disguise, ed. Maximillian E.
Novak (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 31-9.
51. Defoe, The Life. Adventures, and Pvracies. of the Famous Captain
Singleton, ed. and intro. Shiv K. Kumar (London: Oxford University Press,
1969), 10. All subsequent page references are to th is edition.
52. P eter Earle, The World of Defoe (New York: Atheneum, 1977), 29-39.
53. Marx and Engels once criticized German "critical criticism" or "speculati ve
idealism," represented by the subjectivist views of the Young Hegelians and
Hegel’s idealist theory, as a philosophical stance to substitute '"selfconsciousness* or the ‘spirit* for the real individual m an." Speculative idealism
transcends the m aterial into the spirit, from the here to heaven, or from the
particular to the abstract. Marx and Engels set th eir goals to reverse the
priority of the spirit to th a t of the m aterial and to bring th e spirit or heaven
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down to earth, from the abstract to the particular. In the literary arena, Marx
and Engels particularly renounced the French novelist Eugene Sue for his
tendency to sacrifice the hum an individual to Christian dogma. See Marx and
Engels, The Holy Family. 7, 59-60, 164-87. For M arxist views about self
creation in the basic work processes th a t does not emphasize "the derivation
of most hum an activity from an external cause: from God, from an abstracted
N ature or hum an nature" and about the transformation of the essence of
religion to the essence of m an in his materialistic social relations, also see
Williams, Marxism and Literature. 206-12; Dollimore, Radical Tragedy. 18,
153-4, 250.
54. Deleuze and Parnet, 45.
55. For the relationship between religious authorities and the social order, see
Jerem y Collier, A Short View of the Immorality and Profaneness of the
English Stage (New York: AMS Press, reprint from the 1698 3rd ed., 1974),
129. Faller, "In Contrast to Defoe: The Rev. Paul Lorrain, H istorian of
Crime." H untington Library Quarterly 40 (1976): 66-7. Christopher Hill, "The
Necessity of Religion," The Collected Essays of Christopher Hill. Vol. Two
(Brighton, Sussex: The H arvester Press, 1986), 11-8.
56. Defoe, Roxana: The Fortunate Mistress, ed. and intro. Jane Jack (London:
Oxford University Press, 1964), 43. For discussions about natural law on selfpreservation, see Novak, Defoe and the N ature of Man. 2-14; "Conscious Irony
in Moll Flanders." College English. 26,3, 200-3.
57. Defoe defines matrimony as "God's holy Ordinance." Conjugal Lewdness:
or. Matrimonial Whoredom: A Treatise Concerning the Use and Abuse of the
M arriage Bed (1727), intro. Maximillian E. Novak (Gainesville: Scholars’
Facsimiles & Reprints, 1967), 21. But the laws of matrimony put women in
an inferior position. See Leo Kanowitz, Women and the Law (Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 1968), 36. Shirlene Mason, Daniel Defoe and
the S tatus of Women (St. Alban’s, Vermont: Eden Press Women’s
Publications, Inc., 1978), 30. Spiro Peterson, "The Matrimonial Theme of
Defoe's Roxana." PMLA LXX.l (1955): 185-90. J. Karen Ray, "The Feminine
Role in Robinson Crusoe. Roxana, and Clarissa." Emporia State Research
Studies 24 (1976): 25.
58. For Defoe, "the worst thing a sober Woman can be married to, is a
FOOL." Defoe’s Review. Saturday, October 4, 1707, vol. iv, #101, 404.
59. Backscheider. Daniel Defoe: Ambition & Innovation. 214. Novak. Realism.
Myth, and History in Defoe’s Fiction. 119. Robert D. Hume, "The Conclusion
of Defoe’s Roxana." Eighteenth-Century Studies 3,4 (1970): 489-90.
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Z im m erm an, 186-7. For a sum m ary of critical readings of th e ending, see
H um e, 186-9.
60. Such a read in g of th e disappearance of S u san differs from M arshall’s
figure of th e a te r as exposure in Roxana. M arshall believes th a t "despite h er
atte m p ts to cover h er track s and create a new figure for herself," Roxana "is
found out, figured out, seen through.... T he girl [Susan] rep resen ts a read er
who would n o t tak e Roxana a t face value; such a read er would see too much,
go too fa r-a n d therefore m u st be stopped" (132, 152). The p rese n t reading
also differs from Ja m e s H . Maddox’s arg u m en t about Roxana’s "self
underm ining" in th e m u rd er scene. Maddox arg u es th a t R oxana’s n arrativ e
about th e m u rd er "becomes more an d m ore violently disrupted," w hich is "a
replica of h e r agonized consciousness." See "On Defoe’s R oxana." ELH 51,4
(1984): 679.
61. W att, The Rise of th e Novel. 121-27 an d "The R ecent C ritical F ortunes of
Moll F landers." E ighteenth-C enturv Studies 1 (1967): 119-24. E lizabeth Drew,
T he Novel: A M odem Guide to Fifteen E nglish M asterpieces (New York: W.
W. N orton & Company, Inc., 1963), 31-3. D orothy V an G hent, "On Moll
F lan d e rs." rep rin ted in Tw entieth C entury In terp retatio n s of Moll F landers.
ed. R obert E llio tt (Englewood Cliffs, N .J.: Prentice-H all, Inc., 1970), 38.
H ow ard L. Koonce, "Moll’s M uddle; Defoe’s Use of Irony in Moll F lan d ers." in
E lliott, 50. Novak, "Conscious Irony in Moll F landers." 26,3 (1964): 200-03;
Defoe an d the N atu re of M an. 66-80; Realism . M vth. and H istory in Defoe’s
Fiction. 87.
62. R obert A lan Donovan, The S haping Vision: Im agination in th e E nglish
Novel from Defoe to Dickens (Ithaca: Cornell U niversity P ress, 1966), 34-45.
T he d isp arity betw een Moll th e ch aracter an d Moll th e n a rra to r, Donovan
argues, is th a t w hile th e first is "reaching tow ard th e m eans of subsistence"
th e second is creating an im age of "w hat society would constrain h e r to be"
because of "her desperate need to escape from the confinem ent of h e r nakedly
acquisitive self."
63. F riedrich Schlegel, C ritical F ragm ents (1797), in F riedrich Schlegel’s
Lucinde an d th e F ragm ents, tran s. an d intro. P eter Firchow (M inneapolis:
U niversity of M innesota P ress, 1971), 148, #42, 155-6, #108. H an s Eichner,
F riedrich Schlegel (New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1970), 71-2. L ilian R.
F u rst, Fictions of Rom antic Irony (Cam bridge, H arv ard U niversity P ress,
1984), 127-28.
64. Schlegel, Dialogue of Poetry (1799-1800), in Dialogue on Poetry and
L iterary A phorism s, tran s. an d intro. E rn s t B ehler and Rom an S truc
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(U niversity P ark: Pennsylvania S tate U niversity Press, 1968), 53. A thenaeum
Fragm ents, in Firchow, 175, #116.
65. Schlegel, Ideas (1799-80), in Firchow, 242, #16. Dialogue on Poetry. 53.
66. Schlegel, Ideas. 247, #69. A thenaeum Fragm ents. 167, #51. Critical
Fragm ents. 146, #37. For a discussion of th e a rtis t’s attach m en t and
detachm ent, see F u rst, 26.
67. Schlegel. Critical Fragm ents. 148, #42. A thenaeum F ragm ents. 195, #238.
Anne K. Mellor, English Romantic Irony (Cambridge: H arvard U niversity
Press, 1980), 17, 24. Also see F u rst, 193-99, and Jo h n F rancis Fetzer,
"Romantic Irony," in European Romanticism: L iterary Cross-Currents. Modes,
and Models, ed. G erh art H ofim eister (Detroit: W ayne S tate U niversity P ress,
1990), 21-2. Both F u rst’s and F etzer’s views of the n a rra to r’s "multi-level
persona" and the read er’s "dual perspective" or "bifocal or double vision" are
helpful for u n d erstanding Schlegel’s concept of sim ultaneous self-creation and
self-destruction or attach m en t and detachm ent.
68. Eichner, 92. E ichner notes th a t Hegel attended Schlegel’s lectures on
"Transcendental Philosophy" presented a t the U niversity of J e n a betw een
October 1800 and M arch 1801, an d Hegel "seems to be indebted to them for
a startin g point in th e development of his dialectics." B u t Hegel criticized
Schlegelian irony for disrupting classical aesthetics upon which Hegel’s
theories of representation and th e Absolute were based. See M arike Finlay,
The Rom antic Irony of Semiotics: Friedrich Schlegel an d th e Crisis of
R epresentation (Berlin: Mouton de G ruyter, 1988), 142-57,154. Finlay argues
th a t Schlegelian irony, contrary to Hegel’s Phenomenology, "rem ained w ithin
the dialectical tensions as opposed to transcending these antitheses of
representation an d arriving a t the level of th e philosophical Idea." For Hegel,
w rites Finlay, "the negative m u st also become th e positive" and transcend
"the negative to reach th e Absolute."
69. F u rst, 28. Schlegel, Ideas. 247, #71. For Hegel’s theory of the dialectic
process or the u n ity of opposites, see Georg W. F. Hegel, Logic, tran s. W illiam
Wallace (London: Oxford U niversity P ress, 1975), 116-17, 128. Also see Ira
Gollobin, Dialectical M aterialism : Its Laws. Categories, and Practice (New
York: P e tra s Press, 1986), 112-13, 120. The dialectical process in Schlegel’s
irony is sim ilar to Hegel’s dialectic in m ethod b u t different in goal. The
tension betw een self-creation (the H egelian thesis or th e positive or Being)
an d self-destruction (the H egelian an tith esis or the negative or Nothing) in
Schlegel is a fusion of dialectic opposites or th e H egelian synthesis or
Becoming th a t incorporates both th e positive and the negative. Such a fusion
does transcend th e negative and progress into re-creation, a new conception
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of th e positive, b u t does n ot reach the Hegelian Absolute and will beget other
cycles of th e continuous process of becoming. Also see Jam eson, M arxism and
Form. 171,331. A lthusser, For Marx. 101-04. For Jam eson, Hegel’s notion of
a r t is its self-transcendence into pure thought. In Hegel’s scheme of things,
"art ultim ately tends to transcend itself by becoming theology and philosophy,
and abolishes itself a s sensuous play as it grows increasingly nearer to th a t
full self-consciousness which is Absolute Spirit." A lthusser argues th a t in
each term of th e H egelian dialectic (thesis, antithesis, and synthesis),
"consciousness lives an d experiences its own essence (the essence
corresponding to th e stage i t h as attained) through all the echoes of the
essence it has previously been, and through the allusive presence of the
corresponding historical forms." This essence, or the Idea or the Absolute, is
the center of the dialectic process and pre-exists in all concrete historical
contents, engulfing th e past, perm eating th e present, and surpassing the
future.
70. Fetzer, 22-3. Donald Meucke, The Compass of Irony (London: M ethuen,
1969), 185-86. F u rst, 189-223. Ingrid Strohschneider-Kohrs, Die romantische
Ironie in Theorie und G estaltung (Romantic Irony in Theory and Form )
(Tubingen: Niemeyer, 1977), 70. For Donald Meucke, Thomas M ann’s Doctor
FaustuB (1947) embodies th e "most thoroughgoing, alm ost program m atic
examples" of rom antic irony. In F u rst’s investigation, Schlegelian irony starts
w ith Lawrence Sterne’s pre-rom antic novel T ristram Shandy (1760). For
Strohschneider-Kohrs, F etzer notes. Don Quixote characterizes a high degree
of th e irony in the rom antic mode in th e novel as a "self-conscious work
commenting on its essence and existence."
71. Eichner, 74. Schlegel, Critical Fragm ents. 148, #42. A thenaeum
Fragm ents. 167, #51. F urst, 24, 29.
72. Schlegel, A thenaeum Fragm ents. 190, #216, 233, #424. Fetzer, 24-5. For
a study on file influence of th e French Revolution, Fichte’s philosophy, and
Goethe’s M eister on Schlegel, also see P aul Ham ilton, "Romantic Irony and
English L iterary History," in The Romantic Heritage: A Collection of Critical
Essays, ed. K arsten Engelberg (Copenhagen: University of Copenhagen, 1983),
14-5.
73. Mellor, 3-4.
74. Kevin L. Cope, C riteria of Certainty: T ruth and Judgm ent in the English
E nlightenm ent (Lexington: U niversity of Kentucky, 1990), 45-55. Halifax,
Moral Thoughts and Reflections. The Complete W orks of George Savile. F irst
M arquess of Halifax, ed. W alter Raleigh (Oxford: Clarendon, 1912), 230,
quoted in Cope, 46-7. Schlegel, Dialogue on Poetry. 54. For Schlegel,
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"everyone’s view of poetry is true and good as far as th a t view itself is poetry.
B ut since one’s poetry is limited, ju st because it is one’s own, so one’s view of
poetry m ust of necessity be limited."
75. W att, The Rise of the Novel. 106. David Blewett, Defoe’s A rt of Fiction
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), 9, 22. Backscheider, "Defoe and
th e Geography of the Mind," Tennessee Studies in L iterature 29 (1985): 52.
76. Daniel Defoe, The Fortunes and Misfortunes of the Famous Moll
Flanders, ed. G. A. S tarr (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 190. All
subsequent page references are to this edition.
77. Richetti. Defoe’s Narratives: Situations and Structures (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1975), 103-04, 96.
78. Ibid., 112, 113. Also see Ellen Poliak, "Moll Flanders. Incest, and the
Structure of Exchange," The Eighteenth Century: Theory and Interpretation
30,1 (1989): 16. For Poliak, the incest manifests Moll’s transgressiveness (in
h er quest for female power against the cultural gender codes) and its lim it (in
h er ultim ate repudiation of the incest). Moll’s transgressiveness can be looked
a t as h er de-creation of the moral self while h er repudiation of the incest as
her re-creation of the self in alignment with the cultural codes.
79. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. P eter L aslett (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1970), 304, 311-2. Locke, Essays on the Law of
N ature. I l l , 119, 189. Also see John W. Yolton, Locke: An Introduction
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1985), 70-1. W. von Leyden, "John Locke and
N atural Law," Philosophy 31 (1956): 25-6. S. B. D rury, "John Locke: N atural
Law and Innate Ideas," Dialogue 19 (1980): 531. Novak, "Conscious Irony in
Moll Flanders." 200-3. Novak, Defoe and the N ature of Man. 1-14. John Z.
Zhang, "Defoe’s Moll Flanders." Explicator 47,3 (1989): 13. Robinson Crusoe
certainly is aware of Locke’s theory of appropriation when he says "we enjoy
ju s t as much as we can use, and no more" although "I possess’d infinitely
more th an I knew w hat to do with." Defoe, Robinson Crusoe. 129.
80. V an Ghent, 38. Koonce, 50. W att, The Rise of the Novel. 124. Novak,
Realism. Myth, and History in Defoe’s Fiction. 87.
81. Zhang, 14.
82. Iser, The Implied Reader. 274-78, 32-55. For more insight into readerresponse criticism, see the Active reader versus the actual reader, in Iser, The
Act of Reading. 27-30.
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83. Defoe, Robinson Crusoe. 1. Also see Captain Singleton. 1. Roxana. 1. The
first paragraph of Captain Singleton serves as the preface to the book, in
which Singleton claims th a t he is going to "give full Accounts" and to record
actions like "great Persons" do, w ithout obvious intentions to preach. "The
Preface" of Roxana also begins w ith "THE History of this Beautiful Lady, is
to speak for itself."
84. M alinda Snow, "The Origins of Defoe's First-Person N arrative Technique:
An Overlooked Aspect of the Rise of the Novel," Journal of N arrative
Technique 6 (1976): 181-84. H enry N. Rogers IH, "The Two Faces of Moll,"
Journal N arrative Technique 9 (1979): 122-23. S tarr. Defoe & Casuistry. 118.
In the burning house scene of Moll Flanders, for example, besides drawing
the reader's attention to the objects in the bundle, Moll, Snow points out,
"indicates h er own emotional responses, saying ‘It is w ith H orror th a t I tell
w hat a Treasure I found there.’" Rogers argues for Moll’s honesty and
repentance as a narrato r looking back on her p ast life. For S tarr, Moll’s
preaching is aimed for the effect of sympathy.
85. Gregory King, "A Scheme of the Income and Expense of the Several
Families of England Calculated for the Year 1688," in Seventeenth-Centurv
Economic Documents, ed. Joan Thirsk and J. P. Cooper (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1972), 780-81. "The common annual subsistence of working
people" anywhere in the country, according to the B ritish M erchant in 1713,
was four pounds per head. See Bridget Hill, Eighteenth-Centurv Women: An
Anthology (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), 168.
86. Critics have noted signs of sympathy in Defoe for his fictional
protagonists. See Starr, Defoe & Casuistry. 111-15,151-52; Novak, Realism.
Myth, and History in Defoe's Fiction. 73. Novak states th a t Defoe "excused
m any of Moll's acts on the grounds of poverty and necessity." Sympathy for
Moll, S ta rr argues, lies in Defoe’s use of casuistry in th a t circumstances may
alter cases. As for this bundle episode, Defoe adopts the technique of detailed
realistic depiction of Moll’s escape through lanes and streets to sympathize
with her. S ta rr holds th a t "an atmosphere of moral perplexity thus gives way
to one of physical alarm . We are caught up in the pace and perils of her
flight, and in wishing her good speed we move still further towards being her
accomplices."
87. Edm und Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of
the Sublime and Beautiful (1757), ed. and intro. Jam es T. Boulton (Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1968), 44. Adam Smith, The Theory
of Moral Sentim ents (1759), reprinted from the London 1853 ed. and intro.
E. G. W est (New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1969), 22-3.
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88. See Novak’s comments on Defoe’s principles of excusing crime on the
grounds of self-preservation b u t making restitution and not robbing a
destitute person in "Conscious Irony in Moll Flanders." 200-3, and "The
Problem of Necessity in Defoe’s Fiction," Philological Q uarterly 40.4 (1961):
516-17.
89. Such a reading of the narrato r who drives the reader away from herself
is different from Nicholas Hudson’s notion of Fielding’s technique of "negative
orientation" in Tom Jones. Hudson argues th a t the response of the "good" or
"grave" reader to the novel stems from the reader's "spontaneous impulses of
the good-heart" activated by Fielding’s rhetorical device of driving readers
away from the "bad" or "profane" reader addressed in the text. The "good"
reader is created by the author w ith the Iserian "controls" in the text. Here,
Hudson assum es a connection between authorial intention and the reading
activity. See Nicholas Hudson, "Fielding’s H ierarchy of Dialogue: ‘MetaResponse’ and the Reader of Tom Jones." Philological Q uarterly 68,2 (1989):
179, 187-88. Also, there is a vital difference between the double role of the
Schlegelian n arrato r and the lack of control of the picaresque narrator. The
Schlegelian narrato r keeps the narrative moving and draws the reader into
the chaotic world so th a t the reader’s world identifies w ith the narrator’s
chaotic fictional world, b u t the reader for the picaresque novel stays above
the chaotic world of th e picaro and laughs a t the narrato r’s blunder in his
inability "to keep his narrative on the path." See Miller, 106.
90. For instance, Nussbaum notes th a t "oppression based on gender, mediated
by testimonies of benevolent domination, cuts across class lines." Also see
N ussbaum ’s discussion of William Blackstone's passage about how a woman
is "held in place by a domination based on gender." H er politics of class and
gender means to show th a t although women can disrupt social power
relations, they still reflect the male social formation and are still fixed as
subjects by the dom inant male ideologies (52, 137-41, 146-49). M ary Anne
Schofield also m aintains th a t "women are to rem ain virtuously immobile and
undefined, w hereas m en actively seek self-definition and justification, and
tangentially provide women w ith a self," and th a t "this controlling ideology
firmly fixes a woman to her subordinate, second-class state." (Masking and
Unm asking the Female Mind: Disguising Romances in Feminine Fiction.
1713-1799. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1990,19). Patricia Meyer
Spacks has also exposed the male fantasy of fixing an ideal woman in
Pamela, Fanny, or Amelia as a changeless character in virtue, as a toy for
pleasure, or as a manageable Other. (Desire and Truth: Functions of Plot in
Eighteenth-Century English Novels. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1990, 93-9).
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91. Schofield’s discovery of the female disguised voice in eighteenth-century
romance, for example, indicates a transcendence of ideology and an
expression of women’s true experiences. She "attem pts to reveal the power
th a t lies beneath the disguise of feminine submission and m arital compliance,
rom antic love and female powerlessness, the controlling ideologies of the
eighteenth century" (10).
92. Laurie Langbauer has focused on women’s power to "move w ithin and use
the language and structure of dominance itself, simply by operating as
subjects who use language." She argues th a t "subordinating women and
romance grants those ranked above them a t best local (although effective and
destructive) power, for total control resides in the system of construction and
representation in which all term s are determined." One such system of
construction and representation, ensuring women’s implication of authority
and control, is the female body as the site of discourse ra th e r th a n the site
of disease. (Women and Romance: The Consolations of Gender in the English
Novel. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990, 9, 120-26).
93. According to Nussbaum, H ester Thrale’s resistance to prescribed
identities lies in her recording the "’trivial’ details of a woman's lived
experience" and in insisting on "an inverted hierarchy of values in th a t
private sphere" (xxi). K. K. Ruthven notes th a t resistance of the male order
can find one form of transcribing "history" as "his story” and th en "countering
it w ith the neologism ’herstory’ as a feminist righting of a patriarchal wrong."
(Fem inist Literary Studies: An Introduction. Cambridge, Cambridge
U niversity Press, 1984, 57-8). Langbauer argues th a t romance is "an
appropriate sphere" for women; it is a world of female power ra th e r th an
prison; i t is a world outside the male order and out of boredom, seclusion, and
submission (85). Living outside the m ale order is also crucial for a woman in
eighteenth-century fiction. Spacks writes th a t "only in isolation and social
alienation can she function effectively. Then she can dem onstrate her
fortitude, her faithfulness-even her sexuality, denied and obscured before."
Imagining a Self: Autobiography and Novel in Eighteenth-Century England.
Cambridge, Mass.: H arvard University Press, 1976), 61.
94. Ruthven, 99. Since Kristeva focuses on the interaction between the
m aternal Semiotic or le semiotiaue ("an alternative mode of signification to
the Symbolic") and the paternal Symbolic, Ruthven argues th a t from
Kristeva's position, "it would be somewhat naive to conceive of the
relationship between m en and women as oppositional, for if women can be
’masculine’ and m en ’feminine’ in negotiating the transaction between le
semiotiQue and the Symbolic, there is no point in isolating ‘women’ as a
special category on biological grounds and inventing something called
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feminism to protect their interests." Langbauer, 101-8,120-26; Spacks, Desire
and Truth. 122-23.
95. Note th a t Roxana’s private voice starts with h er relationship with the
Jeweller in C hapter 3 because she is breaking the laws of matrimony. B ut in
term s of gender roles in the present chapter, Roxana is conceived in this first
stage as a "commodity" dependent on the male. In this sense, her feminine
role as a whore is p art of Defoe’s public voice defined by male ideologies.
96. Lacan, The Four Fundam ental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis. 204-5, cited
in Silverman, 152. Kaja Silverman, The Subject of Semiotics (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1983), 152-56. Lacan, "The Mirror Stage as
Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience,"
725, 734-7. See Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction (Minneapolis:
University of M innesota Press, 1983), 164, for the blurring sense of the self
and the other. Eagleton m aintains th a t although the child’s relation to the
"mirror" image is still of "an ‘imaginary’ kind - the image in the mirror both
is and is not itself, a blurring of subject and object still obtains, - it has begun
the process of constructing a center of self."
97. Julia Kristeva, "The Semiotic and the Symbolic," trans. M argaret Waller,
in The Kristeva Reader, ed. Toril Moi (New York: Columbia University Press,
1986), 93-5. For a useful introduction of Lacan’s Im aginaiy and Symbolic and
Kristeva’s Semiotic and Symbolic see Ruthven, 63, 98; Eagleton, Literary
Theory. 163-67; and Ram an Selden, A Reader’s Guide to Contemporary
Literary Theory (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1985, reprinted
1986), 79-83. See a useful passage in Ruthven, 63, for the Imaginary being
associated with the m aternal and the Symbolic with the paternal. Julia
Kristeva, "The Semiotic and the Symbolic," 93-101. Also see Kristeva, Desire
in Language: A semiotic Approach to L iterature and Art. ed. Leon S. Roudiez,
trans. Thomas Gora, Alice Jardine, and Leon S. Roudiez (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1980), 133. Olga Kenyon, W riting Women:
Contemporary Women Novelists (London: Pluto Press, 1991), 6-8.
98. Silverman, 36. For a more detailed discussion about Roland Barthes’
theory of the cultural codes in relation to a symbolic order, see Silverman
274-83.
99. Nussbaum, 210, 150. Spacks, Imagining a Self. 57-8; Desire and Truth.
117-18. For discussions about differences between male and female utterance
and about the role th a t gender plays in eighteenth-century literature, also see
the essays in Gender a t Work, ed. Ann Messenger (Detroit: Wayne State
University Press, 1990). Schofield, 9.
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100. The notion of m an as the self an d woman as the other is first developed
by Simone de Beauvoir in h er exposition of "alterity or otherness." The
Second Sex, tran s. an d ed. H. M. P arshley (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953),
71. Following Levi-Strauss’ anthropological observations, Beauvoir holds th a t
women have always been regarded as th e "absolute Other" and have never
been "a separate group set u p on its own account over against the m ale
grouping. They have never entered into a direct an d autonomous relation
w ith th e men." Shoshana Felm an also w rites th a t "theoretically subordinate
to th e concept of m asculinity, th e wom an is viewed by th e m an as his
opposite, th a t is to say, as his other, th e negative of th e positive" ("Woman
and M adness: The Critical Phallacy," Diacritics. 5, W inter 1975, 3). Also see
Ruthven, 41. "Beauvoir," R uthven argues, "starts from the in sig h t th a t
societies are organised on the assum ption th a t m an is Self and woman O ther,
and th a t th e consequences are always deleterious to women. The reason for
th is is th a t the Self tre a ts th e O ther as eith er a supplem ent or a threat."
101. Defoe, Roxana. 6.
102. Defoe, An E ssav Upon Projects (1697), a facsimile (M enston, England:
The Scolar P ress Limited, 1969), 284-85, 292-93, 290, 296, 302-3. For Defoe’s
satire on th e female take-over of th e governm ent, see M ason, 15-7. One can
connect Defoe’s ideal woman in th is pam phlet to th a t in other novelists’
fantasies to ren d er th e "public character" of women in order to hold them in
place as the O ther. See Spacks, D esire an d T ruth. 93-9.
103. M arx and Engels, Manifesto of the Com m unist P arty. 502. Lukacs,
H istory and C lass Consciousness: Studies in M arxist Dialectics, tran s. Rodney
Livingstone (Cambridge: The M.I.T Press, 1971), 14, 83, 86, 94. B erm an, 141.
In ligh t of th e notion of reification, W att has commented on the equation of
th e women on Robinson Crusoe’s island w ith commercial goods and
necessaries (The Rise of th e Novel. 68). In the eighteenth century, the
husband regarded his wife as his goods and could p u t h er up to "auction to
be sold to th e best bidder, as though she w as a brood-mare, or a milch-cow,"
although it w as practiced "among the common people" and was "grossly
ag ain st public decency an d good m anners." Anon, from The Laws Respecting
Women (1777), in E ighteenth-C entury Women: An Anthology, ed. B ridget Hill
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), 118. Also see L angbauer, 114-16, for
h er com m ents on M arx’s notion of th e prostitute as a symbol for property.
104. L angbauer, 118. F or comments on th e alignm ent of th e m ateriality of the
female body w ith m aterial conditions and historical fact in M arx, see
Langbauer, 114. Langbauer’s em phasis on th e female body is m eant to
transcend its m ateriality and to tu rn it into a m etaphor for w riting or into
th e fem ale body as discourse in W ollstonecraft in order to in itiate a power
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struggle w ithin the Symbolic, which, I think, is influenced by Helene Cixous’
notion of w riting th e female body and her equation of "text" w ith "my body."
See Cixous’ essay "The Laugh of th e Medusa," reprinted from Signs 1
(Sum m er 1976), trans. K eith Cohen and P aula Cohen, in Adams and Searle,
312-13.
105. Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which is Not One, tran s. C atherine Burke
(Ithaca: Cornell U niversity Press, 1985), 133. Robyn Wiegman, "Economies
of th e Body: Gendered Sites in Robinson Crusoe and Roxana." Criticism 31,1
(1989): 41.
106. Defoe, Robinson Crusoe. 153. David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning
H um an U nderstanding (1748), ed. Eric Steinberg (Indianapolis: H ackett
Publishing Company, 1977), 98.
107. Hom er O. Brown, "The Displaced Self in the Novels of Daniel Defoe,"
ELH 38 (1971): 570-73.
108. Silverman, 152. W att, The Rise of the Novel. 68.
109. Eagleton, L iterary Theory. 165.
110. Cixous, 311.
111. Backscheider, Daniel Defoe: Ambition & Innovation. 186, 208-9.
Backscheider argues th a t Roxana’s relationship w ith the M erchant indicates
one of th e th ree strains in women’s fiction; th a t is, "she is one of th e newly
fascinating evil women." One of the "‘dangerous’ characteristics m en assign
to women," Backscheider m aintains, is th a t "she w eakens and unm ans."
Spacks, Desire and T ruth. 112-3. Spacks contends th a t Roxana is one of the
eighteenth-century characters who resist m en’s notion of an ideal woman as
"changeless" and th a t h er character change in the novel "endangers herself
and implicitly endangers men." N ussbaum, 113. For N ussbaum , women in
Jam es Boswell’s journals "destroy male identity b u t they also, through sexual
license, confuse traditional class and gender hierarchies." Ray states th a t "it
is only through m asculine succor th a t she is saved from starvation and, in
tu rn , launched on h er infamous career.... Roxana, thus, rejects the traditional
economic role of women and prefers to be h er own person, financially and
socially" (30). A t th is second stage, Roxana surely has a m asculine role in the
novel. Then, Richetti is certainly partly rig h t when he argues th a t Roxana is
not quite a plausible figure and rem ains "untouched by the special quality of
female experience" because, Richetti thinks, she is a m ale creation. "The
P ortrayal of Women in Restoration and Eighteenth-C entury English
Literature," in W hat M anner of Women: Essays on English and American
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Life and L iterature, ed. M arlene Springer (New York: New York University
Press, 1977), 87-8.
112. For Defoe, to m ake a whore of the very woman a m an intends to m arry
is to defile his own bed, pollute his own seed, and spread bastardy in his own
race, Conjugal Lewdness. 65-6.
113. Ray, 30.
114. Chaber, 213, 221. C haber delights th e reader w ith an interesting
comment on the governess’ m aternity w ard in Moll Flanders as the
approxim ation of the m ass production, w here th e unw ed m other is considered
th e producer (of babies) and the governess the capitalistic entrepreneur. If it
holds tru e th a t Roxana considers h er whoring as an industry, h er later
concern about not mixing h er tinted money w ith "the honest well-gotten
E state" of th e M erchant is an ironic pretense for separating h er estate from
his. For a more detailed discussion, see Section HI of th e present chapter.
Carol H oulihan Flynn, The Body in Swift and Defoe (Cambridge: Cambridge
U niversity Press, 1990), 1, 5, 67. Flynn’s book studies the body economy in
relation to Swift’s and Defoe’s response to a struggle between idealization (the
soul) and m ateriality (the body). Both authors, Flynn argues, "reflected the
struggle against m ateriality th a t characterized th eir age."
115. For Defoe’s dissenting family background and th e influence of the
P u ritan community, especially the influence of Samuel Annesley, the Foe’s
family pastor, on th e young Daniel Foe, see Backscheider, Daniel Defoe: His
Life (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1989), 7-21. Braudy, 76. W att, The
Rise of the Novel. 71-4, 82-5. H unter, 133-39. Leopold Damrosch, J r. God’s
Plot and M an’s Stories (Chicago: U niversity of Chicago Press, 1985), 188. For
disbelief in God’s intervention in Defoe’s tim e and Defoe’s the conviction of
th e supernatural, see Baine, 3, 5.
116. Defoe, Conjugal Lewdness. 21. Also see Spiro Peterson, "The
M atrim onial Theme of Defoe’s Roxana." PM LA70.1 (1955): 184-88, for Defoe’s
C hristian views on m utual affections between a m an and his wife.
117. Mason, 30. Also see Kanowitz, 36. Ray, 25. About Roxana’s affliction
w ith m atrim onial law, see Peterson, 185-90. W att also notes th a t to achieve
economic independence outside m arriage, u n d er th e common law, was
increasingly difficult in the eighteenth century (142). Defoe actually advises
the wife not to leave the husband because "the Law gives him great
Advantages, and Custom Loads h er w ith Num berless Difficulties." Defoe,
Review. Saturday, F ebruary 3, 1705, Vol. I, 399.
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118. Soacks. PeBire and T ruth. 117-18. Burke. A Philosophical E nquiry into
the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, quoted in Spacks 117.
R ichard Stauffer, "Calvin.” in International Calvinism: 1541-1715. ed. Menna
Prestw ich (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 31.
119. David Blewett, "Changing A ttitudes toward M arriage in th e Time of
Defoe: The Case of Moll Flanders," The H untington Library Q uarterly 44
(1981): 78. Defoe, Conjugal Lewdness. 27.
120. About th e notion of women posing th e M edusa’s face as a th re a t to tu rn
m en into petrification, see Allan G ardner Lloyd-Smith, The Uncanny
ATnaripjin Fiction: The M edusa’s Face (New York: St. M artin’s Press, 1989),
46, 59, 71. About the substitution of "history" w ith "herstory," see Ruthven,
57-8.
121. W illiam Blackstone, Commentaries on th e Laws of England (1753), 4
vols. (Philadelphia: Robert Bell, 1771-72), 1:442, also in Nussbaum , 146, Hill,
112 .
122. Langbauer, 1-11, 101-4,15, 91-2.
123. For readings on the effects of Pam ela’s w riting on Mr. B., see Temma F.
Berg, "From Pam ela to Ja n e Gray; or How not to Become the Heroine of Your
Own Text," Studies in th e Novel 17 (1985): 117. Sheila C. Conboy, "Fabric
and Fabrication in Richardson’s Pam ela." ELH 54 (1987): 91. Richard H auer
Costa, "The Epistolary Monitor in Pam ela." M odem Language Q uarterly 31
(1970): 45. Jo h n Z. Zhang, "Free Play in Samuel Richardson’s Pam ela,"
P apers on Language and L iterature 27,3 (1991): 311-2.
124. Novak, "Crime and Punishm ent in Defoe’s Roxana." Jo u rn al of English
and Germanic Philology 65 (1966): 455. Novak believes it is punishm ent for
Roxana th a t she is "m arried to an upstanding middle-class m erchant to whom
she has surrendered control of h er wealth."
125. Peterson, 189-90.
126. Richetti, "The Family, Sex, and M arriage in Defoe’s Moll Flanders and
Roxana." Studies in the L iterary Im agination 15,2 (1982): 33-4. Roland
B arthes, Mythologies, trans. A nnette Lavers (New York: Hill and Wang,
1972), 141-42. For Richetti’s Hegelian dialectical interpretations, see his
Defoe’s N arratives. 96-105.
127. Schofield, 21. Schofield notes th a t eighteenth-century romance "exists on
two levels: m ale rationality and female emotionality." Novak, "Crime and
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Punishm ent," 455-46. Novak has discussed the combat between Roxana’s
"strong n atu ral affection for Susan" and h er judgm ent, and he rightly regards
it as p a rt of the punishm ent for Roxana, although he does not look a t it as a
symbol of Roxana’s both female and m ale qualities.
128. More's passage and Mandevill’s are reprinted in Bridget Hill, 50, 49.
Defoe, Review. Tuesday, Ju ly 4, 1704, Vol. 1 ,156.
129. W alter L. Williams, The Spirit and the Flesh: Sexual Diversity in
American Indian C ulture (Boston: Beacon Press, 1986), 18-25, 65-86.
130. Locke, Two Treatises of Government. 163, 192, 341. Stone, 239.
131. A lthusser, Essays on Ideology. 53-4. Spacks, Desire and T ru th . 118-23.
H enry Brooke, The Fool of Quality: or. The H istory of H enry E arl of Moreland
(1766), 5 vols. (New York: G arland, 1979), 1:155-56.
132. H unter, 51, 55. Defoe, Robinson Crusoe. 62. The H istory of the most
Rem arkable Life of the Truly Honourable Col. Jaau e. Commonly Call’d Col.
Jack (1722) (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 170. For a discussion
about Defoe’s conviction in God’s intervention in hum an affairs, also see
Earle, 38-9 and Baine, 3-5.
133. William R. Elton, King Lear and th e Gods (San Marino: H untington
Library, 1966), 9. For Epicurus’ concepts, see Andre M arie Jean Festugiere,
Epicurus and his Gods, trans. C. W. Chilton (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1955),
57, 58-61 and Elton, 10. John Calvin, The Institution of C hristian Religion
(1536), cited in Elton, 18.
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